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Part I
International patient mobility

1 General introduction
The internationalization process has widely advanced to almost all economic sectors. Since
the year 1995, when the General Agreement on Trade in Services was signed by the WTO,
the health care sector came into focus as a potential globalizing service sector (Chanda
2002, Adlung and Carzaniga 2001). A temporary movement of patients is required for
the usage of foreign capacities of medical care. For demanding medical services we use
the term ’migration’ of patients in a sense of a temporary cross-border movement.1
Worldwide, some clear dynamics have developed in the field of patient migration. For
example, countries like Thailand, Malaysia and India have developed into global destina-
tions for medical care (Mattoo and Rathindran 2005). However, patient migration within
different OECD countries is low and lacks a recognizable trend, measured by total service
trade and health care expenditures (Waeger 2007). Patients and insurers are skeptical
regarding the utility gain along with the potential for cost-savings. Normally, national
governments deny support for insurance coverage portability for tradable medical ser-
vices (Mattoo and Rathindran 2006). Between Austria and Hungary, Obermaier (2009)
identifies institutional and political barriers in medical trade. However, while trade in
health-services is a negligible phenomenon at this point in time, a significant increase
is estimated for the future. Corresponding to this, a new law, which allows for higher
flexibility in cross-border patient migration within the EU, was passed in 2011.2 Specifi-
cally, the treatment costs must be reimbursed as long as the foreign costs do not exceed
the corresponding domestic treatment costs. As a result, we would expect an increase in
patient migration if cross-border quality is homogenous and a price gradient exists.
The motivations for patient migration can be separated into push and pull factors (Gan
and Frederick 2011a). Push factors are primarily connected to costs. As described by Gan
and Frederick (2011b), pull-factors are related to the treatment itself, the characteristics
of travel and the target country. Push and pull factors can be summarized as price and
1The notion of cross-border mobility of patients has not been solved conclusively (Helble 2011). As it
is related to ordinary travel behavior, notions such as health tourism and medical tourism are a bit
confusing. For consistency purposes, ’migration’ is used to denote a movement based on a specific
kind of individual motivation, and in this discussion is restricted to the short term. Finally, the term
’migration’ itself can only be used as a provisional notation. At this point, I would like to thank
the participants of the cross-border medical care workshop at the University of York 2011 for their
extensive discussion of this issue.
2For more details, please see the directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and Council.
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quality gradients, resulting in an effective price gradient. In the following, the focus is the
price-related motivation when the offered supply is homogeneous (while a restriction of
maximum quality is possible). In this case, a price gradient must exist to realize demand
abroad (Kater 1995). There is empirical evidence of a price gradient. Busse et al. (2008)
compare costs for specific treatments among several countries in the EU, showing large
variance among them, caused by differences in wages and the technologies used.3 Mattoo
and Rathindran (2005) show price differences between the United States and countries
of South East Asia up to a factor of ten for relatively standardized and tradable medical
services of comparable quality.4 They estimate a savings potential of 1.4 Billion USD if
10% of patients were to demand relevant treatment abroad. Measured on the total expen-
ditures of almost 2 trillion USD (Smith et al. 2006), this figure appears small. However,
price gradients could be useful instruments in the debate concerning options for increasing
the efficiency of healthcare systems, considering the degree of out-of-pocket payments in
the USA and chronic cost pressures in a number of other countries. Furthermore, taking
a study from the consultancy Deloitte into account, an increase of U.S. patient migration
from 0.75m in 2007 to 15m in 2017 is forecasted, increasing the share of trade-related
health care provision (Deloitte 2008).
Smith (2008) considers the globalization of medical care to be one of the most important
topics health economists will face in the future. The following analysis contributes to
the economic discussion of trade in health services and patient migration. The analysis
has two components: a macro-economic perspective using trade theory and a micro-
economic perspective to explain the decision behavior of an individual. While the focus
lies on the latter, the former is briefly discussed in order to highlight the relevance of
cross-border exchange of health services according to possible efficiency gains. For that,
a simple framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is used, explaining trade in health
services through cross-border differences in input factor endowment. The analysis shows
a number of frictions that reduce potential trade gains. In Chapter 3, a simple decision
framework is applied, implementing essential elements as transaction costs, trust, health
status, price, quality restrictions and insurance, each being effective as determinants for
3Fujisawa and Lafortune (2008) analyzed the wages of general practitioners and specialists in 14 OECD
countries. Measured in purchasing power parities, there exists a wide range and variance, especially for
specialists. The highest wages are paid in the USA and The Netherlands, the lowest in Eastern Europe
(Hungary and the Czech Republic) with a difference of almost 200,000 USD. Based on input prices,
OECD (2008) identifies a wage spread of a factor of three to seven for nursing staff between Eastern
and Western Europe. Additionally, magnetic resonance tomography devices (relative to number of
citizens) in Western Europe exceeds the number of similar devices in Eastern Europe by a factor of
three to ten. The latter can be used as an indicator for a gradient in capital prices. The price should
be lower in countries with abundant equipment than in countries with limited equipment.
4For example, a skin lesion excision has an inpatient price in the USA of 6,240 USD. The average of the
three lowest foreign prices is 812 USD, in which travel costs are included.
4
cross-border demand. This analysis examines the effectiveness of individual demand and
the potential frictions according to the achievement of an efficient solution due to the
existence of a cross-border price gradient.
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2 Trade in health services - An
application of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model
Abbreviations Symbols
HO... Heckscher-Ohlin P ... care
OECD... Organisation for Economic H... highly advanced medicine
Co-operation and K... capital
Development L... labor
C... consumption
CFi ... free trade consumption point
country i
T ... fixed transaction costs
CTi ... consumption point country i
given T
QFi ... free trade production point
country i
pFH ... free trade price service H
pFP ... free trade price service P
pTH ... price service H given T
pTP ... price service P given T
TKi... transformation curve
country i
TTF ... terms of trade without T
TT Ti ... terms of trade including T
country i
Table I.2.1: Abbreviations and Symbols for analytical analysis - Part I, Ch. 2
2.1 Introduction
The issue of cross-border provision of health services in economic analysis takes, at best,
a marginal position. Although trade theories also analyze work-sharing processes in the
field of services, an application to the health sector has hardly been made. Lindl (2005)
and Schaub (2001) deliver some contributions; however, these are more general reviews
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rather than a focused analysis of specific theory frameworks. A more focused overview of
neoclassical and new trade economics is provided by Zimmermann (2008).
Basically, trade theories postulate a global increase in efficiency through the division of
labor and the exploitation of comparative advantages present due to price gradients and
market imperfections. A selection of literature on theories of foreign trade and the theory
used in this chapter are provided, for example, by Siebert and Lorz (2006), Krugman and
Obstfeld (2005) and Zweifel and Heller (1997).
A number of economic frameworks can be applied to explain trade in health services as
shown by Zimmermann (2008).1 The reason for this is the diversity of potential reasons
of trading medical services. However, in this discussion a simple neoclassical framework
is applied, which assumes the reason for trade lies in comparative price advantages. Price
gradients are a potential reason for patient migration and therefore trade in health ser-
vices. This is an appropriate way to highlight the essential efficiency impact of trade, but
also sources of frictions in trading health services, reducing gains of trade.
A price gradient could exist due to differences of input factor endowments between coun-
tries. As shown by OECD (2008), such differences are thoroughly significant. For that
reason the appropriate theoretical framework could be the Heckscher-Ohlin model (HO)
which postulates efficiency gains combined with a global production expansion through
differences in input factor endowments. The following illustration takes on a very simpli-
fied form to highlight the essential message. However, services, especially health services,
are characterized by properties that do not allow the application of the HO model without
restrictions. Therefore, the intention of this chapter is to discuss these features and to
analyze corresponding effects on the derived results. Specifically, the following conditions
are discussed: transport costs, patient mobility, price regulation and sector-specific in-
puts. These factors contribute to a reduced level of gains from trade. Reducing these
frictions increases the possibility of cross-border care and promotes increased efficiency in
healthcare related to an increase in global medical provision.
The following chapter introduces the framework of the HO model and its general ap-
plication to health services. Afterwards, the previously mentioned specific characteristics
of trade in health services are discussed. Finally, the results are summarized.
2.2 The Heckscher-Ohlin model and medical care
Trade in services differs from the trade in physical goods in its essential characteristics.
Central to this is the uno-actu principle, which requires a temporal and spatial synchro-
1Theories of new trade theory and economic geography also offer approaches for a more detailed analysis
of the above-named points.
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nization of demand (consumption) and supply (Graf 2005). Health services in particular
are assurance goods (Pauly 1988), since, on the one hand demand coincides directly with
consumption and, on the other hand, information concerning the quality of the provided
service is often less readily available. Thus, quality assessment is more difficult than for
conventional products (Breyer et al. 2009, Ch. 5).2 In addition to a variety of monetary
costs, which are mostly valid for conventional goods as well, demand for services results
in further non-monetary costs that can reach a prohibitive value.
In general, it is accepted that the existing frameworks of trade theory are also applica-
ble to services. Neoclassical theory tries to explain trade by the comparative advantage
of the countries involved in the trade. According to the HO model, trade is attributed to
differences in endowment of the production factors between countries. Thereby, a country
specializes in that sector, which employs the relatively abundant factor of production in a
relatively intensive way. Under conditions of free trade the relative prices converge. This
is accompanied by the assimilation of cross-border factor intensities in the different sectors
involved. The opening up of trade will eventually lead to a welfare gain by improving
input allocation and thus to an increased global production in the sectors involved. The
welfare level increases. The reason is a specialization of production based on comparative
advantages, caused by different factor endowments.
The basic model is replicated in a short form. There are two countries A and B.
Each country produces two health products: Highly advanced medicine (H) and care
services (P ). Both services require two homogeneous inputs: labor (L) and capital (K)
to manufacture, where both are inter-sectoral completely mobile. There is no explicit
differentiation between physical and human capital. The technologies allow a (limited)
substitution of inputs and have constant returns to scale. H is the capital-intensive and P
the labor-intensive service.3 This means, in the case of an inter-sectoral identical relative
price ratio of the factors K and L in sector H, relatively more capital than labor is
used compared to sector P . Moreover, within each of the sectors, both countries use the
same technologies.4 The two countries differ only in their factor endowments. Country A
(B) is equipped relatively abundantly with capital (labor): (K
L
)A > (
K
L
)B. The assumed
perfect factor mobility requires an inter-sectoral identity of the remuneration of factors.
Furthermore, the model implies perfect competition in the commodity market, leading to
2Chapter 3 discusses this point, specifically the role of trust, more extensively.
3In particular health services are widely regarded as labor intensive. However, a differentiation in the
relative labor input is possible. In sector H typically more specific technologies are applied relative
to P .
4Within Chapter 3 we also discuss the impact of differences in cross-border technologies. However, there
we apply a different methodological framework.
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zero profit for the providers. The rule here is an equalization of the price of the services
with the marginal production costs. Applied to health care, the services are made to cover
costs without profit. Consider, for example, a DRG system (Diagnosis Related Group),
where services are rewarded by lump sum benefits. Suppliers are forced to produce the
health services in a cost-effective way. The achievable price represents the costs of an
additionally produced unit.
The demand side is given as follows. The preferences of consumers are identical in
both countries. The preference structure is complementary. H and P are consumed in a
fixed ratio to each other. It is rather difficult to imagine that a service made by sector
H may be replaced by services from sector P et vice versa. In the health sector such
complementary relations are often encountered. The consumption of highly advanced
medicine often requires care services. If the demand for H is extended, benefits only
increase in the case of an increasing availability of P .
Finally, the budget constraint of the demand is defined. In the presented equilibrium
model, the value of production must be equal to the value of consumption, regardless of
whether it is produced under autarky or free trade. Therefore, a country cannot consume
more in value than it has produced and sold in value. The result is a macroeconomic
budget constraint. Since in the modeled economy only the health sector exists, all income
is generated by this sector. Hence, the income can be decomposed only in the services
produced in it. Therefore, no independent budget constraint is required, for example in
the form of a cap on expenditures in health care or social security. The budget constraint
is represented by the income of the economy as a whole.
Fig. I.2.1 describes the common solution of the HO model. Fig. I.2.1a indicates the
case under autarky and Fig. I.2.1b the solution under free trade. Under autarky, the
production points QA and QB have to coincide with the consumption points CA and
CB at the intersection of the transformation curves TKA and TKB with the line C,
leading to p
P
A
pHA
>
pPB
pHB
as price ratio. C is the constant ratio H
P
, which corresponds to the
complementary preferences of consumers. Under free trade, these points no longer match.
The comparative cost advantage, due to the different factor endowments, increases the
supply of H and lowers P in country A (QFA) (with a corresponding shift of input factors).
The supply of H in country B is reduced and P is increased (QFB). Within the equilibrium
the relative prices (terms of trade) - p
P
A
pHA
and p
P
B
pHB
- are equalized. The difference between
domestic production and consumption is compensated by the corresponding import and
export. Starting from the basic specifications set here in the HO model, the following
results in cross-border demand for health services can be derived:
1. Partial specialization of the capital-rich country on the capital-intensive service H
(and thus a reduction in the capacity for sector P ).
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Figure I.2.1: Equilibrium under autarky and trade
2. Partial specialization of the labor-rich country on the labor-intensive good P (and
thus a reduction in the capacity for sector H).
3. Increase in the price of H relative to P in country A and of P relative to H in
country B to realize an international balance of relative price.
4. By aligning the relative price of services the international alignment of the relative
factor prices occurs. Accordingly, this results in a cross-border adjustment of the
factor intensities in the corresponding sector H and P in both countries.
5. In sum, the social welfare is increased by improving the overall supply of services
from H and P .
The question of specialization is of specific interest in view of the degradation of certain
healthcare capacities. The fundamental ability of specialization must hold. Thus, it is
primarily about health services, which are not necessarily provided locally and therefore
not close to the individual’s life world. Combined with a selection mechanism that social
security systems can contract independently with service providers, the question occurs
as to whether contract partners must necessarily be native to the system’s country if the
HO model postulates advantages by specialization based on factor availability. This fact
could be determined according to the selection decisions of the financing side.
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2.3 Health service characteristics and limitations of
the model
The presented results correspond to the classical result of the HO model meaning a general
improvement in welfare by increasing the total supply of health services in country A and
B.5 However, it can be easily argued that these results are based on assumptions that do
not fully stand up to a comparison with a real-world health care or a cross-border supply.
For example, thus far a full patient mobility and the exclusion of any kind of transaction
costs have been assumed. In addition, a perfect mobility of input factors between sectors
has been assumed. However, there should be at least a restriction of mobility. Not least,
the assumption of price flexibility is of concern, as in reality prices are commonly heavily
regulated. These assumptions will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.6
2.3.1 Transaction costs
The relationship between supply and demand is specifically characterized by transaction
costs (T ). In particular for cross-border services, the relative proportion T of the total
costs can be significant and therefore prohibitive. The following costs are particularly
relevant for a cross-border patient migration:7
1. Fixed travel costs per journey - the consumption of foreign health services requires
a monetary expenditure to overcome distance.
2. Fixed non-monetary costs per journey - organizational efforts, such as by the man-
agement of interfaces between sectors along the patient pathway; mental and phys-
ical stress; language problems, etc.
3. Uncertainty and trust8 - the unknown level of the quality of foreign care causes
5It is irrelevant at first that the remuneration of production factors capital (labor) through trade is higher
(lower) in country A and worse (better) in country B. The expansion of consumption opportunities
for the entire system is beneficial from a welfare theoretical point of view. The income distribution
and therefore the distribution of consumption possibilities is changed which is another question. Fig.
I.2.1 shows that, starting from the consumption point under autarky, more of both services may be
consumed. An increased consumption of both services is then potentially possible for each individual
(Krugman and Obstfeld 2005).
6The HO model provides the factor endowments as an essential difference between the countries. It has
been abstracted from cross-border intra-sectoral differences in production functions and the result-
ing heterogeneity of care and high-tech medicine. Trade would then be explained by differences in
technologies (Siebert and Lorz 2006).
7See e. g. France (1997), Luft and Phibbs (1995), Luft et al. (1990), McGuirk and Porell (1984). Please
see also Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis.
8Uncertainty about foreign quality while assuming homogeneous goods can be motivated by the sub-
jective perception of patients and naturally given trust in relation to a domestic treatment (Crivelli
and Zweifel 1998, Chang and Wildt 1994). As can be seen in Chapter 3 a lack of trust results in a
distortion of demand by increasing the effective marginal cost.
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search and information costs in order to find a suitable provider. If the uncertainty
is not eliminated, the residual risk causes a reduction in demand.
2.3.1.1 Transport costs
First, a narrower sense of transaction costs is added, the monetary transaction costs,
referred to here as transport costs T . Accordingly, there are two prices: 1. Suppliers’
prices abroad (pFH , pFP ), whose ratio
pFP
pFH
expresses the terms of trade without T (TTF ),
2. Price for the patient in the importing country including T (pTH , pTP ). The difference
between the prices is T . Fig. I.2.2 describes the new situation under free trade (according
to Zweifel and Heller (1997)). Excluding transport costs, the equilibrium TTF consists
Figure I.2.2: Transport costs and free trade
as in Fig. I.2.1. After the introduction of T the situation is as follows: Country A
continues to provide H for the equilibrium price pFH and country B provides P for the
price pFP . Country A (B) can now import P (H) only for the price pTP > pFP (pTH > pFH).
Consequently, TTF increases to the new exchange ratio TT TA or TT TB . The revenues from
the export of H and P have to be allocated among the respective price and transportation
costs. Thus, the consumer points shift to CTA and CTB . The import quantities of H and
P decrease. Due to complementary preferences the demand for H (P ) in country A
(B) decreases. As a result, the demand for H and P in both countries decreases and
therefore also the benefit levels in comparison to total free trade. Furthermore, at given
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production points QFA and QFB, the export of H and P exceeds their import. To establish
an equilibrium situation of balanced trade quantities, an adjustment of the relative price
TT F (without T ) takes place, which especially causes a reaction in the production points
QFA and QFB (not drawn due to reasons of clarity). As consequence, the global trading
volume is reduced and an adjustment of the specialization by changing price relationships
takes place. However, trading can still be optimal for both countries.
T can be prohibitive meaning a complete stop of trade (see TT T ′A in Fig. I.2.2). The
consumption point at trading is below the autarky point. Country A prefers autarky
because of the unfavorable exchange ratio. Based on T a greater amount of H would have
to be provided than that which is abandoned under autarky. Country B would still be
willing to trade. A possible solution in order to begin trade would be an increase of pFH ,
another way to lower pFP . Both cases require, however, that trade in country B remains
attractive.
2.3.1.2 Mobility
Cross-border health services require patient mobility across national borders. The as-
sumption of perfect mobility of demand is not taken for granted in the special case of the
health services. Following up on the issues discussed concerning monetary transport costs,
those can be supplemented by non-monetary costs and uncertainty; these are collectively
referred to as the total transaction costs. The empirically observed cross-border activi-
ties have been negligible so far. One possible cause is the prohibitive impact of effective
non-monetary costs at the present time, which may outweigh monetary cost advantages.
For simplification, the transaction costs are infinitely high and the line TT T ′A in Fig. I.2.2
forms a vertical line. Trade would be disrupted, even after a reaction of monetary prices
pFH and pFP .
The degree of mobility typically depends on the total transaction cost. Uncertainty
is considered to be particularly critical. Health services are consumed in a familiar and
trustworthy environment of supply (Pauly 1988), resulting in a natural skepticism in the
case of a foreign alternative, which is associated with anxiety and psychological stress.
Certain diseases are characterized by physical properties that make it difficult to overcome
a larger distance and also by the associated management of organizational problems. Such
transaction costs affect the decision of consumption abroad.9
9A simplification is made insofar that heterogeneous patterns of mobility are ignored in the model. For
example, the demand for highly advanced medicine can be associated with particularly high physical
and mental stress. While such services are also associated with higher quality standards and a lack
of confidence with respect to foreign supply, the demand for care could show completely different
structures and amounts of transaction costs. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed analysis in which a
differentiation of illness severity takes place.
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A key finding in the context of transaction costs is the prevention and/or the restriction
of gains of trade. Relocation of services is only possible in a limited way. In extreme cases
there will be a complete cessation of trade. Therefore, the existence of transaction costs
makes a domestic supply necessary.10 11
2.3.2 Price regulation
To include trade in the context of the HO model, price flexibility of health services is
necessary. However, in practice, health systems often face regulations that may either
fix the price or determine prices by given budgets and consumption quantities. In the
model, for purposes of simplicity, it was assumed that the entire economy consists only
of the health sector, and thus the income of the economy is produced and consumed
within this sector only. This simplification allows one to pick up the basic concept of a
budget constraint in the health sector. Such a restriction limits the expenditure for health
services as part of the total expenditure of an economy, which, in our case, represents one
hundred percent.
In the HO model trade allows a more efficient use of global resources and an increase in
real income, combined with an expansion of production and consumption. Specialization
allows an increase in consumption opportunities within a budget. A shift of production
leads to a change in factor prices, depending on how much they are sought through
trade. The factor availability within real existing health systems is a determinant for
the remuneration of the factors. Long-term changes in factor quantities or adaptations
of the factor demand would have a corresponding effect on their prices. As a result, an
adjustment of costs and prices, for example in the form of lump-sum-DRG, is required.
This would cause highly advanced medicine in country A to be relatively more expensive
than care. In the case of standard charges, any supplier would be forced to keep its costs
to the respective price levels of the sectors, which is represented by perfect competition
in the model. Completely rigid prices would then be incompatible with specialization in
the HO model and would mitigate or entirely disallow efficiency gains.
10Under the ’poor-tradability-hypothesis’ high transaction costs place the need for a decentralized service
delivery in the foreground (see also Kater (1995) and Hirsch (1989)).
11In this context it should be noted that we have consciously not restricted the services on the basis of
their specialization ability. Therefore, the transaction costs are so general that in the case of services
such as acute care they may represent prohibitive additional costs. Studies, for example Busse et al.
(2008), examine as part of their cost comparison of specific treatments between EU countries, stroke
and acute myocardial infarction. Both services would be examples in which the cross-border costs
differ; however, treatment abroad is not feasible. The related transaction costs would be infinite due
to their highly acute nature.
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2.3.3 Sector-bound production factors
So far, the trade of health services was discussed under the condition of perfect factor
mobility between sectors. In general, however, factor mobility between sectors is limited
or impossible in the short and medium term. For example, the capital employed in sector
H can be seen as very specific. An immediate removal in H and a transfer to P is to
be regarded as unrealistic. This also applies to labor. The human capital used in sector
H is different from that in P . In sector H there is a prevalence of specialized doctors
and fewer nurses. The converse applies in sector P . An inter-sectoral migration is thus
possible only to a small degree.
As in Siebert and Lorz (2006), we now assume that capital is closely bound to its
particular sector, but we abstract from the former mentioned heterogeneity of labor.
Consequently, three factors exist: capital in sectorH, capital in sector P and homogeneous
labor in both sectors. Let us outline the impacts without a more intensive discussion of
the mobility mechanism of the three factors. For example, the HO model predicts for
country A: A price increase of the capital-intensive commodity by trade increases the real
return on capital in both sectors, while lowering the real wages in both sectors. However,
this requires the free mobility of K and L. Since K is specific, only L can be shifted in
the sector H, reducing its availability in P with a constant amount of K. As a result, the
productivity of K in sector H increases, whereas it decreases in P . This applies conversely
to L, whose productivity decreases in H and increases in P . This applies accordingly to
the factor prices. While K increases in its return in H, it decreases its return in sector P .
The homogeneous factor L, however, is now paid less in sector H than in P . A definite
development of the remuneration of labor is no longer possible. There no longer exists
international factor price equalization.12
In summary, trade in health services in the case of sector-specific capital and mobile
labor increases the return on the specific capital in the capital-intensive service or the
expanding sector within the capital-rich country. On the other hand, in the labor-intensive
or shrinking sector the return on specific capital decreases. The impact on the mobile
factor labor is not definite. On the other hand, trading of health services decreases the
remuneration of specific capital in the capital-intensive service or the shrinking sector
in the labor-rich country. In the labor-intensive or expanding sector the specific capital
wins. The impact on the mobile factor labor is again not definite. These developments
lead to an overall reduction of specialization capability by a more rapid cost increase of
production factors in each sector of specialization.
12Here the reader is briefly referred to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states that the real interest
rate increases in the case of specialization up to the capital-intensive good in both sectors while the
real wages decrease.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter´s intention was to associate neoclassical trade theory with the trade of health
services. Following the underlying Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade leads to a tendency of
specialization of health systems in which they have a comparative advantage. For the
capital-rich country this means that there is production specialization in the capital-
intensive service (highly advanced medicine), while the labor-rich country increases the
production of the labor-intensive service (care). In the case of a common market for
health services, consequently, the relative prices of both countries will adjust. The result-
ing exchange of H and P causes imports and exports, or better, bi-directional patient
migration. This leads to the increase in the total global provision of medical services
compared to autarky and an increase in the total supply opportunities in both countries.
The result within the HO model is a global efficiency gain. Apart from this effect there is
a cross-border adjustment of relative factor prices for capital and labor as well as factor
intensities in the sectors H and P .
If transport costs, limited patient mobility, price regulation and sector-specific input
factors are added to the model a restricted specialization is the result. Transaction costs
are responsible for a restriction of trade and deliver a reduction of medical provision.
Transport or non-monetary costs may finally achieve a prohibitive level resulting in a ces-
sation of trade. This property provides a strong basis for the declaration of the restricted
shifting ability and thus specialization (Hirsch 1989) of health services in comparison to
other goods and services.
The HO model requires flexibility in prices. Under the given mechanisms of the model
and the functioning of trade, restrictions on consumption can be reduced based on existing
budget constraints. Given the existing price regulations in health care, the question arises
as to what extent the model is still reasonably applicable. The necessary specialization
and shift of the factor demand calls for a mandatory change in factor prices and hence
the prices of the health services. A limitation of this flexibility within the model prevents
the possibility of an aggregate increase in welfare and a real budget increase.
Finally, the sector specificity of input factors was investigated. With adoption of sector-
specific capital and homogeneous labor, the model indicates an increased return on specific
capital in the sector of specialization and a reduction in the shrinking sector. This effect
causes a reduction in the ability to specialize.
Of course, the caveat that the HO model captures only a portion of the possible reasons
for trade in the health services must be added. Productivity and quality differences, the
design of the healthcare system and its institutional characteristics, such as the amount of
insurance-related payments and interactions with other economic sectors, were excluded
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entirely. However, these factors are also of particular relevance when looking at specializa-
tion and the decision-making of the patient between alternatives. As well, specialization
effects, in the sense of increasing returns in the healthcare system, are not negligible.
Those factors can be the cause of market imperfections.13
13This type of specialization is not to be mistaken with those from the HO model. However, it reveals
the basic possibility to limit or expand cross-border capacity.
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Abbreviations Symbols
PPR... patient-physician h... home
relationship f ... foreign
s... health status
H... health stock
H̄... maximum health stock
q... amount of quality
q̄... maximum amount of quality
πs... probability of s
Y ... gross income
y... net income
θ... share of maximum quality
γ... marginal treatment costs abroad
Ri... insurance premium country i = h, f
Ai... reimbursement country i
ci... out-of-pocket payment country i
c̄... vector out-of-pocket payment
α, β... relative co-payments
T ... fixed transaction costs
m... variable monetary transaction costs
n... variable non-monetary transaction costs
k... variable costs
C... total costs
t... sum of variable and
fixed transaction costs
τ ... level of pragmatic trust
τ̄ ... level of maximum trust
ŷ, Ŷ , q̃... perceived values
S (S)... max. (min.) illness
severity abroad (at home)
Table I.3.1: Abbreviations and Symbols for analytical analysis - Part I, Ch. 3
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3.1 Introduction
Although interest in cross-border medical care has recently increased in the political de-
bate and the praxis of the health care sector, only a small number of scientific contributions
have discussed the specific environment of cross-border healthcare demand along with the
individual decision-making behavior and its effectiveness. This chapter contributes to
this less developed field in the economic literature by addressing the issue of cross-border
patient migration, given the fact that cross-border medical care is poorly developed. The
following question shall be addressed:
1. How do individual characteristics influence patient migration and what is their im-
pact on the efficiency of cross-border medical demand?
2. How do institutional characteristics influence patient migration and what is their
impact on the efficiency of cross-border medical demand?
On the one hand, external barriers, such as restrictions in insurance coverage or quality
of medical care, are responsible for a limitation of cross-border patient migration; on the
other hand, some determinants are natural barriers of migration such as specific trans-
action costs or the subjective assessment of quality of medical care. Hence, despite the
fact of external barriers it will be a central question of this Chapter whether cross-border
patient migration is also restricted by characteristics of the individual. Following this
analysis, political measures supporting the potential of cross-border care based on a re-
duction of external barriers are discussed.
While in Chapter 2 a macro-economic perspective was adopted to demonstrate the
potential benefit of trade in health services, the following discussion is based on a micro-
economic framework. Thus far price gradients and transaction costs were developed as
essential determinants of cross-border demand. Not surprisingly, these elements are es-
sential to this discussion as well. Transaction costs are separated into monetary and
non-monetary, variable and fixed costs. As previously mentioned, connected to non-
monetary costs, the impact of trust or, better stated, mistrust concerning the provided
quality abroad is implemented in the model. As shown below in more detail, healthcare
provisions can be defined as a local assurance good derived from the basic characteristics
of medical goods, and from trust as a general determinant of economic transactions. A
change in the location of medical provision can generate mistrust concerning the foreign
provider without any objective evidence. In addition to these elements, the severity of
illness is identified as an additional determinant. Finally, a restriction in provided qual-
ity abroad is also implemented. Evidence concerning the quality gradient in the form of
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differences in the applied medical technologies is delivered by Busse et al. (2008).1
The role of insurance and its cross-border portability is of specific importance (Mattoo
and Rathindran 2006). For example, current regulations within the EU, as mentioned
above, should support cross-border migration. Otherwise, as shown for the USA, also the
degree of domestic insurance coverage can be crucial to generate foreign demand (Marlowe
and Sullivan 2007). Principally, the degree of cost coverage influences the potential for risk
reduction and therefore the level of individual welfare. It is therefore important, which
kind of cross-border insurance structure is given. Otherwise, after the realization of an
illness, the ex-post price level for the individual is crucial for cross-border demand. In the
following discussion, the individual asks for lump-sum coverage for medical provision at
home and/or abroad. A variety of contract forms are discussed: 1. strict separation of
treatment locations between home and foreign country, 2. a mix of locations within one
contract, 3. full exclusion of a foreign cost coverage, 4. a pre-existing insurance contract,
for example, national insurance, which allows a cross-border co-payment structure.
Summarized, given the framework of potential determinants of cross-border patient
migration as well as a variety of cross-border insurance contracts, this Chapter analyzes
how cross-border demand changes the results of a pure domestic treatment solution with
respect to the first-order conditions of the demand of healthcare and of the optimal degree
of insurance coverage. Given these results, the medical demand abroad is analyzed as a
utility-maximizing option, and therefore, as a potential alternative to a purely domestic
medical provision.
Only a few contributions to this topic can be found in the theoretical literature. Mattoo
and Rathindran (2005) discuss the impact of insurance for treatments abroad consider-
ing ex-post moral hazard. A price gradient can decrease ex-post moral hazard, yet two
important aspects are neglected. First, the specific characteristics of demand abroad are
not considered. Second, insurance contracts are considered to be pre-determined. While
we discuss moral hazard in a similar way to Mattoo and Rathindran, we also include
the characteristics of demand abroad and the option of choosing a cross-border contract.
Seninger (2000) analyzes theoretical and identifies empirical differences in spatial informa-
tion and transaction costs between certain U.S. federal states as determinants of hospital
choice. We also take these important determinants into account, but within an individual
1There is a broad literature concerning hospital choice and its general determinants. Adams and Porell
(1995) deliver a review article about a broad number of determinants. For a more detailed analysis
see also Luft and Phibbs (1995), Burns and Wholey (1992), Luft et al. (1990), Garnick et al. (1989),
McGuirk and Porell (1984). For the specific context of cross-border care within the EU see e.g. Crivelli
(1998), Crivelli and Zweifel (1998), Calnan et al. (1997), France (1997), Starmans et al. (1997). The
determinants identified in these papers are partially implemented or summarized in this Chapter.
However, in order to focus on demand behavior, the supply side is excluded.
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calculus of utility maximization. Crivelli (1998) discusses patient migration between can-
tons in Switzerland, and Crivelli and Zweifel (1998) do so in a principal-agent framework
for the EU. However, their focus is on physician behavior and the insurance approval
procedure for treatment abroad. Our focus emphasizes the effectiveness of the demand
and the choice of optimal insurance contracts. In contrast to the literature, we attempt
to fill a gap by focusing on individuals’ decisions between domestic and foreign medical
treatments. We highlight the role of individual characteristics as well as external deter-
minants of cross-border demand, which also includes the demand for specific insurance
contracts.
The analysis takes place within a micro-economic decision framework. The methodical
framework used to analyze medical demand and insurance coverage is taken from Breyer
et al. (2009) and Zweifel and Eisen (2000) who provide an excellent overview of the basic
ideas of medical demand and optimal insurance coverage.2 In line with these overviews,
Gaynor et al. (2001), Spencer and Zeckhauser (1971) and Zeckhauser (1970) deliver basic
contributions on the effectiveness of health insurance.3
The results can be summarized as follows: If marginal treatment costs abroad fall short
of a threshold level, the foreign solution is utility maximizing. Specifically transaction
costs and the mistrust-bias affecting perceived gross income determine this threshold
level. Mistrust adjusts the marginal costs upwards. Therefore, mistrust represents a
subjective downward adjustment of medical quality provided abroad. This creates a bias
between factual income ex-post and perceived income from an ex-ante perspective. The
absolute amount of the bias depends on the ex-ante health stock. The resulting costs
of mistrust cause a decrease in demand abroad. Furthermore, due to fixed transaction
costs, mistrust and limited quality, less severe as well as highly severe illnesses are not
appropriate for treatment abroad. Only moderate severity illnesses remain as viable for
cross-border treatment. As will be shown, under specific circumstances the level of care
demanded abroad can be efficient. Treatment abroad can be only maximally second best.
Finally, if the quality abroad exceeds the quality at home, migration can also be motivated
by a quality gradient. Of course, an over-assessment of quality supports demand abroad,
but also produces an inefficient solution.
We also discuss the effects of insurance. We find that lump-sum insurance cannot al-
ways eliminate the income risk, which is based on non-insurable transaction costs and
a perceived uncertainty in gross incomes, due to a subjective downward adjustment of
2See Breyer et al. (2009), Ch. 6; Zweifel and Eisen (2000), Ch. 3.
3I would like to thank Peter Zweifel for his valuable comments and motivation during ‘European Science
Days’, specifically concerning the analysis of the insurance framework.
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quality. Given any cost-advantage abroad, but excluding over-insurance, a first-best solu-
tion cannot be achieved as long as transaction costs, mistrust and restricted quality exist.
Individuals with a lower likelihood of highly severe illnesses are more capable of insuring
treatment abroad if fixed costs are low. The reason can be found in a higher degree of risk
reduction. Furthermore, full coverage of perceived net incomes does not necessarily imply
full risk elimination ex-post, which is a source of inefficiency. A separation of contracts in
a pure domestic and a pure foreign contract, and also contracts including mixed locations
can be second-best. Should the portability of insurance coverage be completely restricted,
a mix of treatment locations can be only third-best. A foreign solution is chosen less of-
ten. If the insurance contract is limited to treatments at home, a specific cross-border
co-payment structure can induce demand abroad, resulting in a decreasing level of ex-post
moral hazard. For that, a restriction of foreign demand, a minimum price gradient and a
(partial) lump-sum transfer of savings to the insurant is necessary. The level and correct
assessment of mistrust is also crucial in order to realize a welfare gain. The ex-post moral
hazard and the level of mistrust can offset one another. Finally, limited absolute cost
reimbursement can also support foreign demand if a perceived increase of net income is
induced by a corresponding price gradient.
A political implication is that the entire cost advantage of the foreign country cannot
be realized. The question arises as to what extent cross-border care is realistic, given inef-
ficiency sources that likely have limited potential to be reduced below a prohibitive level.
For example, Hirsch (1989) discusses the poor-tradability-hypothesis. Trade is restricted
due to transaction costs resulting in a necessity of decentralized provision of, for example,
the medical supply. So, to realize a beneficial foreign cost advantage for the home country,
the integration of the participating countries and certain essential structural elements (al-
lowance of over-insurance, free selection of treatment locations) and the portability of the
insurance must be mandatory. For example, support for simple reimbursement of costs
arising from foreign treatment is necessary. However, this alone is insufficient to increase
patient migration significantly.
The discussion in this Chapter is structured as follows: The next section introduces the
model’s basic structure and assumptions. Following this, the optimal cross-border choice
is discussed, differentiated into cases with and without insurance coverage. Finally, the
results are summarized and discussed.
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3.2 The model
The model represents the decision-making process of an individual faced with an uncertain
event of an illness that can be treated in two hospitals: either at home (h) or abroad (f).
3.2.1 Quality, Cost and Utility
The health stock Hs is uncertain with H1 > H2 > ... > HS and 0 ≤ Hs ≤ H̄ with H̄ as
maximal health. After a medical treatment, the ex-post health status is H̄s with H̄s ≤ H̄.
The health production is linear (as used by Dardanoni and Wagstaff 1990):
H̄s = Hs + qs (3.1)
Health is an input for gross income Y :4
Y = Y (Hs + qs) Y
′ > 0 ; Y ′′ < 0 (3.2)
Thus, medical quality ranges in [0, q̄s] with q̄s = H̄ −Hs. q̄s can be seen as the maximum
medical quality for a given illness. Quality in this context means the possible use of
different medical methods to treat a specific kind of illness s. The maximum quality level
for the most difficult condition HS = 0 is H̄ = q̄ = q̄S. The higher the health stock, the
lower the maximum range of medical quality. This can be explained with the example of
a surgery. There exist different techniques, such as the usual cut with a scalpel, keyhole
surgery or high frequency surgery. The higher q, the more advanced the medical methods
used and the higher the level of ex-post health. But for an ordinary influenza infection,
a smaller range of medical instruments exists, in comparison to a cardiac surgery. That
simply means that for a cardiac surgery a high range of treatment alternatives exists,
each related to a specific level of success or a specific level of health recovery. There is a
higher range of achievable health levels after recovery through the use of different medical
therapies.5 Every method results in a specific success, differing in its health recovery level
for the patient, like, for example, in the duration of aftercare, infections, or a large scar.
The countries can differ in the maximum achievable health level. The home country h is
able to care any illness perfectly. So, any Hs can be returned to H̄. However, the foreign
country f can only provide a maximum level qmaxf = θq̄ with 0 < θ ≤ 1. Because of this,
there are severe health levels with Hs < q̄ − qmaxf , which cannot be completely returned
4Health is modeled as an investment good (Grossman 1972). The utility does not depend directly on
health. The assumption can have an important impact for the results as will be shown.
5It is impossible to offer care higher than q̄s given Hs, because of its inefficacy. Hence, smaller levels of
q̄s are not a subset of higher q̄s’s.
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to H̄ in the foreign country.6 This difference indicates that the most modern technologies
are unavailable or that medical professionals in the foreign country lack experience using
them. Hence, the foreign medical provision is less developed than that of the home
country.7
The function for treatment costs ki is linear:
kh(q) = q (3.3)
kf (q) = γkh = γq (3.4)
The costs per unit at home are normalized to one. The marginal costs per unit abroad
are γ. In the following discussion, a price gradient with γ < 1 is assumed. The price
offered by a hospital in both countries equalizes the cost.
Finally, transaction costs ti(qsi) exist. th is set to zero to simplify the analysis. tf can
be written as:
tf (qsf ) = T + qsf (m+ n) (3.5)
T are lump-sum for individual demands abroad with q∗sf > 0, such as travel costs (see
Chapter 2). m describes constant marginal monetary costs and n constant marginal non-
monetary costs. The total amount of monetary costs is defined as q∗sfm = ms and non-
monetary costs as q∗sfn = ns. A greater medical effort qsf entails a greater monetary effort.
Examples of this would be the need for greater organizational efforts, the management of
interfaces between ex-ante and ex-post provision, and greater efforts to locate a specific
provider.8 Non-monetary costs as physical or mental pain are strictly connected to the
specific illness. These costs also increase with respect to the severity of illness and the
medical effort required.9 Please note, in fact m and n could be merged to one position
6Please note, that this restriction does not mean q̄sf = θq̄. In such a case a limitation of care would
exist for each kind of illness. However, qmaxf = θq̄ represents a restriction in the sense that the range
of medical quality for severe illnesses may not reach the technologically possible maximum. If this is
the case, the restriction does not come into effect for less severe illnesses.
7This assumption is relaxed later in this chapter.
8As an empirical example, monetary variable costs arise through an added organizational effort the
insurer has to make in the case when a patient demands home-based out-of-network treatment (Ober-
maier 2009). These costs are also of relevance in the case of patients without insurance.
9An interpretation of the tradability is the following: Constant marginal costs are assumed independent
of illness severity. However, illnesses exist with an acute character, such as an acute myocardial
infarct. Such a condition makes immediate treatment necessary for survival. Any attempt to demand
treatment abroad produces transaction costs reaching infinity. Hence, rising marginal costs m - and
especially n - are more sensible. For less severe conditions, such as a simple common cold, immediate
treatment is also necessary due to general indisposition. Severe conditions, such as cancer or a bypass
operation, could allow more time for planning. Severe illness could be connected with an indisposition
as a usual circumstance for the patient as well. Then, the decreasing marginal transaction costs
for severe conditions make more sense. To keep the entire analysis simple the functional form of
transaction costs is not differentiated between different levels of disease. Hence, there are no disease-
immanent attributes. Trading itself does not worsen the illness. Hence, illnesses as an acute myocardial
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of variable transactions costs. However, we distinguish into two different positions due to
reasons of insurability of these kind of costs. As we will describe later more detailed, while
monetary costs are insurable, non-monetary costs are not. This has significant impacts
on the demand of foreign health care if an insurance is implemented.
Finally, if we assume a monetary equivalent to ns, the individual’s utility is determined
by her net income ysi for a given health status.
ysi = Y (Hs + qsi)− ksi − tsi (3.6)
u(ysi) with u′ > 0 ; u′′ < 0 (3.7)
Summarized, the net income y depends on the health status Hs, the treatment costs
ks and transaction costs ts. The costs specifically depend on the treatment location. As
will be shown below, we can derive an optimal demand q following these variables.
3.2.2 Information, trust and trade in medical services
The individual knows the factual offered quality. However, there is an important differ-
ence between the countries. There exists a trust gradient, meaning a gradient of perceived
quality of care.10 The result is a bias between the objective and perceived quality. For
simplification, mistrust is internalized within individual decision-making, but excluded
from the supply side. Providers at home and abroad behave as perfect agents. There
is no response on the supply side. Strategic behavior on the supply side is excluded. I
want to highlight the role of trust, because of its extraordinary and particular importance.
Trust is important to all economic transactions (Arrow 1975). Coleman (1990) defines
trust as a principal’s voluntary transfer of resources to an agent expecting a specific pay-
back. A formal contract does not exist. Moreover, trust is connected to a risk surrounding
the agent’s behavior. Principally, trust is connected to an interpersonal relationship and
influences transactions independently from a natural lottery risk (Bohnet and Zeckhauser
2004, Eckel and Wilson 2004). Moreover, trust is crucial in the intensively discussed
field of social capital. This capital is seen as a major determinant for the performance of
institutions, and therefore, economic prosperity, as it facilitates overcoming any imper-
fect information within an informal environment of communities (La Porta et al. 1997,
Fukuyama 1995).
Experiments based on theories concerning a prisoner’s dilemma, reciprocity and re-
peated games give us an insight into the drivers of trust. Experience gained in the history
infarct are excluded from the discussion.
10In fact, trust must be seen as a kind of meta level of perception which is dominant to objective
knowledge.
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of a specific relationship and the possibility to develop reputation is essential to develop
the trusting behavior of the principal as well as the trustworthiness of the agent (Bohnet
and Huck 2004, Glaeser et al. 2000).11 Other determinants are religious (La Porta et al.
1997) and cultural similarities (Glaeser et al. 2000, Rauch 1999, Fukuyama 1995, Greif
1993), historical ties (Rauch 1999, Greif 1993) and associated persons (Buchan and Croson
2004). Furthermore, network structures within organizations or specific coalitions with
respect to a specific shared cultural background can be important (Rauch and Trindade
2002, Rauch 1999, La Porta et al. 1997, Greif 1993). These institutional arrangements
can reduce mistrust and extend investment activities (see also Knack and Keefer (1997)).
3.2.2.1 Trust and medical care
Medical services are characterized as reputation or assurance goods (Pauly 1988). This
is based on the information asymmetry between the expert physician and the layman
patient, the exceptional circumstances in which the medical demand of a sick individual
happens and the small-sized sample of demand (Arrow 1963). Experiences within an
interpersonal patient-physician relationship (PPR) are necessary to generate trust. A
more specific definition of trust within a PPR is a relationship in which the individual
relies on his/her potential vulnerability not being exploited by the physician (Abelson et
al. 2008, Hall et al. 2001). This also has an ethical dimension (Maynard and Bloor 2003).
Goudge and Gilson (2005) give an overview of the important characteristics of this specific
trust form. The patient’s trust is based on his/her beliefs concerning the motivations and
intentions of the physician. Trust depends on the aggregate characteristics of the provider,
particularly perceived integrity. Technical competence, ability to communicate, fidelity,
confidentiality and concern for the patient’s well-being are concrete dimensions. Thus,
trust in medical care has a higher degree of emotionality compared to other services
(Goudge and Gilson 2005, Hall et al. 2001, Mechanic 1998).
The previous discussion results in a definition of a trusty PPR based on experience
with a specific medical provider and the reputation the provider has achieved. The re-
lation is not primarily based on risk, produced by potentially opportunistic behavior by
the physician as an agent, but rather on more fundamental and emotional trust as an
interpersonal tie, which also holds true outside of the case of specific illness and generated
medical demand (Hall et al. 2001).
11Bohnet and Huck (2004) identify the strong impact of experiences when the relationship between agent
and principal has the form of a partnership, rather than an anonymous reputation system.
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3.2.2.2 Trust, trade and medical demand
Guiso et al. (2009) discuss trust’s impact on trade. Trust depends on the specific bilat-
eral relationship between two countries. The highest trust is directed towards one’s fellow
countrymen based on stereotypes generated by cultural characteristics, available informa-
tion through the media, one’s common history and religious similarities. The more similar
countries are, the more trust is pronounced in terms of trade relations. Researchers also
find an increasing role of trust for highly differentiated goods.12
Derived from the previous discussion I adopt the definition of medical provision as a local
assurance good, based on the characteristics of trust connected to medical demand outside
the local place of residence. Experiences with and the reputation of a specific provider
are usually achieved locally. Generally, individuals are accustomed to ask for care locally
within a small group of general practitioners, specialists and hospitals. Thiede (2005)
uses the term overlapping life worlds. An increasing degree of congruency of different
individuals’ life worlds increases the relationships’ trustworthiness. Hence, the habit of
using a specific healthcare system makes it part of the individual’s life world, which widens
the definition of a trusty relationship. Regarding this definition, not only an interpersonal
PPR, but also the healthcare system itself plays a role in trust development. Thus, trust
is also influenced by the general characteristics of the healthcare system in which the
patient asks for care.13 Summarized, for trade in medical services, trust plays a critical
role. Due to the character of a local assurance good, trust decreases if potential medical
demand is directed towards a provider abroad or outside the familiar life world of the
patient.14
In the following discussion, trust is implemented as follows:
H̄si = Hs + τiqsi (3.8)
τi describes a subjective perceived productivity of the medical quality in country i while
the objective productivity remains 1. We assume τh = 1, which means full trust at home
and τf < 1, which indicates mistrust with respect to foreign treatment (the index ’f’ is
suppressed in the following to simplify illustration).15 τ does not represent the probability
12For example, Rauch (1999) postulates specific searching costs for highly differentiated goods, which
make an informal and trusty network structure necessary. Based on informal relations, and therefore,
trust, Greif (1993) discusses historical trade networks in the Mediterranean area. Economic losses are
also identified, based on reduced trade outside these networks.
13There exists some literature concerning trust in medical institutions, describing the bi-directional im-
pact of trust between interpersonal and institutional relations (Abelson et al. 2008, Schee et al. 2007,
Rowe 2006, Hall et al. 2002, Mechanic 1998).
14Within the following discussion the case of a trust gradient in the opposite direction (that is, a situation
where trust is higher outside of the home country) will also be discussed.
15m and n are explicitly separated from trust’s impact. m and n are connected to a specific provider
(m) and to an illness (n). One could argue that mistrust could also be a part of n as an alternative
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of poor medical quality due to opportunistic behavior on the part of the foreign provider.
Instead, it stands for a general and subjective downgrade of the capacity the foreign
provider can deliver, despite the fact that the patient might have objective knowledge
of the offered quality.16 This is related to the fact that the PPR is more emotional and
related not only to a specific demand, but also to a more familiar relationship, which
is difficult for a foreign physician to provide in the initial contact. If the physician is
assumed to be a perfect agent, trust is only related to an emotional dimension, based less
on calculations of risk. Hence, τ simply bundles the above made considerations. Factual
uncertainty about the success of a treatment is excluded.17 More generally, the tourism
literature contains a common thread concerning perceptions and demand behavior, in
which a negatively formulated perception of quality decreases the touristic demand (Chang
and Wildt 1994). The former also supports the assumption of an objective homogeneous
cross-border marginal productivity and a subjective heterogeneous cross-border marginal
productivity of health care. In detail, while a difference in cross-border quality can also be
justified, we want to separate such an additional determinant for health care demand from
the pure effectiveness of trust. For that reason we only implement a cross-border gradient
of trust while we exclude a cross-border gradient of marginal productivity. While the
technical effectiveness is similar, the interpretation is different, especially when we discuss
the perceived versus factual ex-post effectiveness of foreign health care. This point is
going to be discussed later in more detail.
Furthermore, mistrust is separated into: a) intrinsic mistrust 1 − τ̄ and b) pragmatic
trust τ̄ − τ with τ < τ̄ . These differ in rationale. The intrinsic mistrust cannot be easily
changed externally, nor can it be totally eliminated. It represents a more natural mistrust
as a preference.18 As described above, medical services are often considered to be very
sensitive services related to the emotional assessment of medical care by the individual.
description. However, the transformation of the production function is more plausible, as will be
demonstrated later.
16Montefiori (2005) discusses a similar problem within the framework of competition between hospitals.
The individual is not able to observe the factual quality. Hence, only a perception of quality can be
used for decision-making. The quality can be described by the mean and variance of provided quality.
Transferred into this model, the mechanism of τ would be substituted by βσ2 in which β describes the
costs of uncertainty and σ2 the potential positive or negative difference of quality from the mean of
quality. However, this interpretation of mistrust introduces factual uncertainty. In our interpretation,
factual uncertainty is not necessary. A subjective decrease in perceived productivity of care takes
place for every demand independent from knowledge about quality. To operationalize this concept of
mistrust, we believe a simple adjustment of foreign productivity is adequate.
17Guiso et al. (2009) use a similar approach to implement mistrust in a decision about a foreign direct
investment. However, they assume an objective probability of misinvestment, besides a subjective
mistrust about the trustworthiness of the foreign partner. A decreasing trust level reduces the oppor-
tunity for investment and generates first-order losses.
18Fehr (2008) gives the example of the statement that ’one can’t be too careful’, which represents a general
preference, rather than a specific behavior. Preferences are mostly exogenously fixed long-term. Thus
preferences shape trust in a similar way to the defined intrinsic trust.
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This is particularly the case when the habitual environment of medical provision changes,
which is the case for foreign treatments.19
Pragmatic mistrust τ̄−τ is an extension of mistrust above the level of intrinsic mistrust.
It can be changed by external measures more effectively. Pragmatic trust is connected
to characteristics of the foreign healthcare system, which generate a specific attitude
regarding the system.20 Schee et al. (2007) delineate this kind of trust partially as a public
attitude produced by different kinds of experience and public exposure in the media.21
Therefore, the quality perception concerning foreign supply can depend on the country
itself.22 Not least, an individual’s personal experience, gained from foreign medical care
can influence mistrust. Pragmatic mistrust can be interpreted as non-rational, because
it is less preference-inherent, and can therefore result in an inefficient demand (similar to
the problem described by Guiso et al. (2009)).
At this point, we explicitely distinguish between θ and τ . While θ represents a re-
striction of the maximum upper quality offered by the foreign health care providers, τ
represents a correction of the perceived marginal productivity of the foreign health care
providers. Hence, the impact is different. As it will be shown, while τ has a direct impact
on the first-order condition for demand, θ is just an external restriction of maximum de-
mand abroad. In fact, the first-order condition could deliver a level of optimal demand,
given τ , which can actually not be achieved, because a given level θ may not allow for
such a demand, because of unavailability of a corresponding medical supply abroad.
The focus here is on demand behavior. Hence, measures to increase trust are not
discussed. The reputation process is not explicitly modeled. This could be seen as a strong
simplification, particularly as the argumentation above lists reputation as an important
19Hall et al. (2001) distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental forms. The former is applied to the
PPR and its inherent characteristics, the substantial sense of a trustworthy and sensitive interpersonal
relation. The latter is more pragmatic and related to a specific medical demand. It is also related to
the patient’s willingness to trust the physician’s judgment over his own and to possibly recommend
him to other individuals within the healthcare system. Although this separation of trust is not the
same as that used here, it shows the necessity of separating trust into its different aspects.
20A specific attitude also exists in terms of more highly developed systems (in the USA, mistrust rises
due to managed care, cost pressure and restricted freedom of choice (Mechanic 1998)). Then, the
individual perception of the domestic health care system must not be better compared to a foreign
system. However, we assume, that the home-country healthcare system is generally more trusted.
21Guiso et al. (2009) say that trust can take the form of a preference, such as, for example, the long
term relations between French and British citizens and a kind of congenital mistrust. But it is also
endogenous in the sense that belief influences trust. This is more compatible with an influenceable
pragmatic trust.
22For example, trust can depend on θ or γ with τ ′(θ) > 0 or τ ′(γ) > 0. However, this shall not be
incorporated into the discussion. The affinity of countries is relevant as well. For example, regions
like the western border of Germany to the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have similarities
in their language, traditions, historical development, cultural and religious practices, etc., which also
influence the subjective assessment of medical provision. As illustrated by Carrera and Bridges (2006)
and Lee and Davis (2004), culture plays a crucial role in international patient migration.
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element of trust generation. However, one argument can weaken the importance of this
simplification. The focus is on a general trust gradient between domestic and foreign
medical provision. Related to the former, the individual history of reputation of domestic
medical care is usually higher than gained experiences abroad. Usually, contact with the
healthcare system is sporadic. Hence, trust formation abroad based on reputation is much
more difficult, given the stock of trust available at home. Even if τ is able to be increased
as the number of contacts abroad increases, the general persistence of the trust gradient
is of much more importance.
3.3 Cross-border choice without insurance
The following section discusses the decision-making between a domestic and a foreign
medical provision. At this point, insurance coverage is excluded. The focus is on the
impact of price and trust gradients, transaction costs, and quality limitations, as well as
the individual’s health status.
3.3.1 First-order conditions for individual demand
Firstly, given (3.7), we can determine individual domestic demand q∗sh [where τ = 1, t = 0
and θ = 1] by setting ∂u
∂qsh
= 0. The marginal revenue equalizes the marginal costs:
Y ′h(Hs + q
∗
sh) = 1 (3.9)
To fulfill (3.9) as an inner solution, Hs + q∗sh ≤ H̄ is assumed to be valid. Please note,
Y ′(Hs) > 1 is not valid for all Hs. Hence, there also exist some higher health levels which
may not be appropriate for a beneficial demand at home given marginal costs of one.
Secondly, we can determine a benchmark level as the efficient solution for the foreign
demand (conditioned on the absence of insurance). For that, let us set τ = τ̄ < 1 and
t > 0. So we exclude pragmatic mistrust. At this point we also set θ = 1.23 The
productivity abroad is adjusted through τ < 1. Therefore, Ysf and ysf are also adjusted.
To mark this characteristic, the gross and net income are written as Ŷ and ŷ in the
following analysis, meaning subjectively ’perceived’ values. Given (3.7) and (3.8), q∗sf is
derived by:
Ŷ ′(Hs + τ̄ q
∗
sf ) =
γ +m+ n
τ̄
(3.10)
At this point, we also assume an inner solution. Let us compare the solution q∗sh with q∗sf .
23While this implies an ignorance of possible differences in medical technologies; we need this assumption
to keep the illustration less complex at this point of analysis. However, below we will also discuss the
impact of θ < 1.
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For example, if we set γ = 1 and t = 0, due to τ̄ < 1, the perceived marginal costs exceed
the factual marginal costs, resulting in: q∗sh > q∗sf ∀Hs and u(ŷ(q∗sf )) < u(y(q∗sh)) ∀Hs.24
There is indifference if Y ′h = Ŷ ′f or γ = γ∗ = τ̄ −m − n where q∗sh < q∗sf and q∗sh = τ̄ q∗sf
due to τ < 1. Hence, the price gradient γ < 1 must be sufficient to realize cross-border
demand, increasing in τ̄ and decreasing in n+m.
Finally, let us calculate a third case for which τ < τ̄ is valid. Hence, we also allow for
pragmatic mistrust. The optimal demand abroad changes to:
Ŷ ′f (Hs + τq
∗
sf ) =
γ +m+ n
τ
(3.11)
Again, we assume an inner solution. Comparing (3.10) with (3.11), where τ̄ > τ . There-
fore, qsf is higher in the case τ̄ than in a case τ ∀Hs, resulting in a corresponding ranking
of utility.
In fact, this utility difference represents a specific kind of transaction-costs based on the
bias between the net income under „efficient mistrust“ and „inefficient mistrust“ abroad
(τ̄ − τ). Related to the literature presented in the preceding section, mistrust is simply
translated into an increase in marginal costs and results in a decrease in transactions.
In other words, if a solution with τ̄ = τ is the benchmark abroad, a further increase
of mistrust is sufficient to result in a second-best solution abroad. As long as τ̄ = τ ,
mistrust only represents a specific preference and (3.10) represents the efficient solution.
If τ̄ − τ > 0, mistrust is defined not as preference-inherent but endogenous. An increase
in efficiency abroad is possible if τ̄ − τ can be reduced.
Finally, we have to distinguish between the perceived health status realized from an
ex-ante perspective and the factual ex-post health status. From an ex-ante perspective
a solution q∗sf for τ or q∗sf for τ̄ result in different perceived health status. The factual
health status ex-post depends on q∗sf and therefore on the level of trust where τ = 1 as
objective productivity. If τ < 1, a difference arises between both values. The individual,
however, looks about the perceived quality. Hence, while from an ex-post perspective a
foreign solution may be attractive it is less attractive from an ex-ante perspective. This
aspect will also be discussed in the further section.
24Please note, q∗sh > q
∗
sf is valid as long as the upper quality bound is not effective. This case is discussed
below.
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3.3.2 Selection of treatment location
Given a specific health status, the individual decides pairwise whether the alternative
abroad is beneficial with:
γq∗sf + t(q
∗
sf )− q∗sh < Ŷ ∗sf − Y ∗sh (3.12)
as condition for a realization of foreign demand. (3.12) can be interpreted as an economic
border, whose shift specifically depends on Hs, τ , θ, γ, m, n, and T . The corresponding
cross-border demand abroad is given by (3.11).
3.3.2.1 Perceived and factual health status after treatment
Fig. I.3.1 shows the health status after treatment at home and the perceived health status
after treatment abroad. H∗ represents the optimal health level at home. We assume the
optimal level is H∗ < H̄. The lower Hs, the higher q∗sh(H). Corresponding to the first-
order conditions and the production function for the individual health stock, the sum of
Hs and q∗sh delivers H∗. We assume γ = γ∗. Then, based on the adjustment through
τ , q∗f (H, τ, γ) represents the medical demand abroad which corresponds to q∗h(H) where
q∗sf > q
∗
sh if τ < 1. In the case of indifference H∗ is delivered as long as q∗sf ≤ q̂f , where
H∗f (q
∗
f ) represents the perceived health abroad after treatment. As discussed previously,
the foreign demand is adjusted upward for each level Hs. As long as Hs ≥ Ĥs within Fig.
I.3.1, the demand abroad is sufficient for indifference where Hs = Ĥs delivers demand
at the upper bound of available quality. If Hs < Ĥs, H̄ also delivers demand at the
upper bound. However, for each health level, the maximum quality q̄∗sf is demanded given
Hs and the upward adjustment is restricted, resulting in a decrease of H∗f (q∗f ).25 The
maximum demand abroad (if θ = 1) is given by q̄∗f for Hs = 0.
A further aspect is of importance. As already mentioned above, given an equalization
of effective marginal costs (meaning γ = γ∗), the curve H + q∗f represents the actual ex-
post health level as a product of medical demand abroad (because the actual productivity
abroad is one). This corresponds to a factual inequality of gross incomes ex-post for
each health level greater than Ĥs. A conflict can arise if the factual ex-post health
status is higher than the health status from an ex-ante perspective. The demand abroad
could be inhibited because the individual demand is derived from the perceived quality.
25Consider a demand for a four-star-hotel abroad, in which the consumer demands a five-star-hotel to
be on the safe side. In case of very low trust, a six- or seven-star-hotel is necessary, but not available.
Then, the perceived quality is reduced. In this context, Rauch (1999) postulates a decreasing success
of matching when the degree of differentiation of a traded good increases. A trusty environment would
be necessary to compensate for this. This can also be translated into an adjustment of marginal costs,
based on a lack of trust, especially when the health state decreases and the portfolio of treatments
expands.
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Furthermore, for Hs < Ĥs and given that θ = 1, the maximum demand takes place and is
factually provided abroad, which is in fact efficient. However, from an ex-ante perspective
this situation does not necessarily correspond to a higher perceived health status after
treatment abroad than health status after treatment at home (principally valid for τ and
τ̄) .
Figure I.3.1: Factual and perceived health production at home and abroad - partial indif-
ference
Related to the previous discussion, θ < 1 intensifies the perceived inequality of health
states and therefore of gross- and net incomes for higher illness severities, which is valid
for both cases τ and τ̄ .
Fig. I.3.2 shows a situation where γ < γ∗. The following aspects change. Firstly, given
(3.11), the optimal health status after treatment abroad from an ex-ante perspective
increases to H∗f > H∗h. Secondly, related to the former the demand q∗sf increases (given
τ). E. g. q∗1f increases. This also means, that health states H∗f − H∗h are beneficially
treated abroad while these is not possible at home. Thirdly, the critical health status
Ĥs increases. Due the increase of demand, the upper quality bound is achieved earlier
than before (where γ = γ∗ was assumed) resulting in a decrease of perceived health
status after treatment if Hs < Ĥs. The latter does not mean a disadvantage compared
to the case of indifference. Instead, there exists a critical health status H∗∗ for which
the perceived health status H∗f (q∗f ) equalizes H∗h. For Hs > H∗∗, the foreign solution is
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inferior to the domestic solution in terms of the achieved health states from an ex-ante
perspective. Hence, there exist health levels with a low degree of severity Hs ≥ Ĥs which
should be treated abroad and for which an equalization of the perceived ex-post health
status is also valid. Additionally, there exist health levels with a middle degree of severity
H∗∗ < Hs < Ĥs for which a foreign solution is also preferable, however, connected to
an inequality of perceived health states after treatment. Finally, there exist health levels
with a higher degree of severity Hs < H∗∗ for which a treatment at home should be
preferred in terms of the health status. For Hs = H∗∗, indifference between a domestic
and a foreign solution exists. However, for Hs ≤ H∗∗ and γ < γ∗ a price advantage abroad
may compensate for the constraint on maximum quality.
Figure I.3.2: Factual and perceived health production at home and abroad - without in-
difference
3.3.2.2 Ex-post costs
The cost situation is shown in Fig. I.3.3. Ch and Ċf represent the cost-functions for the
home country with 1 as slope and the foreign country with γ+n+m as slope. Ċf represents
the factual costs as the sum of treatment and transaction costs. The two functions are
specifically related to each other by τ due the upward adjustment of marginal costs abroad
by τ to one resulting in Ch =
˙̂
C
τ
f . In other words: The figure shows an indifference with
γ = γ∗ and Y ′h = Ŷ ′f = 1. E. g. the demand q1h corresponds to q1f resulting in equal costs
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Figure I.3.3: Costs at home and abroad without insurance
C1h = C1f . Again, this indifference is not valid for all health states. As illustrated in
Fig. I.3.1 there is a corner solution meaning a maximum possible demand for all Hs < Ĥs
corresponding to qf > q̂∗f . The corresponding domestic demand to q̂∗f is q∗h with Ch = Cf .
For each domestic demand higher than q∗h in a situation of indifference, a corner solution
abroad takes place with a cut of the foreign cost function C(q̄sf ) < C(qsh) and q̄sf as the
maximum demand abroad for a given health status Hs (not drawn). However, the cost
cut corresponds to uh > uf .
If Ch and Ċf represent indifference, C̈f and
¨̂
C
τ
f stand for a situation in which the
marginal (adjusted) costs abroad are lower than one. As shown in Fig. I.3.2, q∗h decreases.
However, as long as Hs ≥ H∗∗ the solution abroad is beneficial with a corresponding
increase in gross and finally net income. As mentioned previously, a benefit abroad is
also possible for illnesses with Hs < H∗∗ (not drawn). The latter only takes place if the
loss in gross income is compensated by a cost benefit. Hence, a value γ∗∗ with a sufficient
difference γ∗ − γ∗∗ > 0 induces foreign demand as beneficial. This results in a maximum
health level H(γ∗∗) < H∗∗ which can be still beneficially treated due to the existent cost
benefit.26
Finally, in Fig. I.3.3, ¨̂C
τ
f (T ) represents the cost function after the adjustment of the
26If a quality difference was a source of utility reduction, a utility improvement in such a scenario would
not necessarily take place.
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marginal costs when T > 0. Due to unchanged marginal costs the demand is unchanged
for each illness. However, the average costs increase. Then, q̃Tf = τqTf with qTf as the
minimum demand abroad related to a minimum illness severity is necessary to achieve
an indifference of costs between both countries. Hence, treatment abroad should be less
beneficial for greater health stocks than for lower stocks, based on a fixed cost regression.
In other words: for a common cold, the flight ticket reduces the total savings due to a
comparably low potential for savings. In the case of cardiac surgery, however, the ticket
has the same price, but loses its importance in the overall cost calculation.27
3.3.2.3 Expected individual welfare gain
As derived from the previous discussion it is of specific importance to differentiate into
the degree of illness severity. Three levels of illness severity are indicated: low H lows (for
Hs ≥ Ĥs), middle Hmids (for H(γ∗∗) ≤ Hs < Ĥs) and high Hhighs (for H(γ∗∗) > Hs). The
previous discussion has shown γ/(τ −m− n) < 1 being necessary for a beneficial foreign
alternative.
As previously discussed, for T > 0 the benefit of a treatment of H lows abroad decreases.
Otherwise, θ < 1 reduces the benefit of the foreign option especially for Hhighs . Finally, a
decreasing parameter τ shifts the borders among the three separated health levels, which
means that the set of income relations for low (high) health states increases (decreases),
and thereby reduces the total benefit of the foreign option.
Finally, the expected utility can be written as (with πs as probability for each health
status and sel as ’selection of treatment location’):
EUsel =
S∑
s=1
πs(usi|max{y∗sh; ŷ∗sf}) (3.13)
In this respect, (3.13) delivers a second-best solution. Within this solution foreign supply
is beneficial as long as γ is sufficiently low to compensate the effects through τ < τ̄ , t > 0
and θ < 1.
Summarized, the marginal treatment costs must fall short of a threshold level to com-
pensate for transaction costs and/or losses in perceived gross income, due to a limited
perceived medical quality. However, because of a subjective downward adjustment of
productivity, the demand abroad always decreases below the efficient level (for τ). The
only exception is a situation in which no quality restriction abroad exists and the max-
imum quality is demanded. Altogether, either a perceived inequality of gross incomes
27For a concave structure of variable transaction costs, a relative advantage (per unit) for low health
states would be produced, while a convex structure would generate the opposite.
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from an ex-ante point of view or a factual inequality of gross incomes ex-post is realized,
both connected to gross income risk as a source of inefficiency, compared to a domestic
solution.28 Translated into ex-post health levels, an adjustment of foreign demand de-
livers a range of a perceived cross-border indifference for lower levels of illness severity
and a range of inferior perceived ex-post health level for higher illness severities (with a
perceived inequality). The case for actual ex-post health levels is the opposite.
The illness severity is a determining factor in whether treatment abroad is beneficial.
While this is only the case for less severe illnesses if fixed transaction costs are low, highly
severe illnesses are not capable due to restricted quality or restricted upward adjustment
of demand. Even in the extreme case of γ = 0, the perceived gross income deficit might be
too high to be compensated by a cost advantage. This concurs with Gan and Frederick
(2011b). They find empirical evidence that the individual benefit of cross-border care
depends on the health status. The more severe the status, the lower the willingness to
go abroad for medical treatments. The reason for this finding could be explained by our
argumentation. Hence, only health states with a moderate degree of severity are eligible
for treatment abroad. However, this is related to a possible decrease of the ex-post health
status compared to a domestic solution.29 The perceived adjustment of gross income can
inhibit the demand abroad despite a factual benefit. Finally, costs of care organization,
monetary transaction costs, and particularly costs connected to psychological discomfort,
non-monetary transaction costs, as a specific characteristic of medical treatment, are
important factors contributing to inefficiency due to its possibly prohibitive impacts.
In conclusion, when τ < τ̄ , the case τ̄ delivers a foreign option as utility maximizing
and first-best. But how should the solution for τ be ranked? As shown, a solution with
τ can be second-best compared to τ̄ where a demand at home is third-best if the average
costs at home exceeds the corresponding costs abroad. Then, the foreign option is utility
maximizing and the solution at home is third best. However, if γ/(τ − m − n) > 1,
indicating high marginal transaction or treatment costs, a low value of trust (γ/τ̄ > 1),
or a too low value of θ, indicating a deficit in provided quality abroad, may deliver a third
best solution abroad either with a domestic demand as second-best or as first-best where
in both cases demand abroad given τ is third-best.
28The problem of inefficiency is of specific relevance if in the case of insurance full cost coverage is
possible at home, but a compensation of inequalities in perceived gross incomes is impossible for a
foreign solution.
29Hall et al. (2001) postulate trust as an essential element for the treatment of severe illnesses, which is
derived from a larger degree of vulnerability. In addition, patients are much more willing to enter a
paternalistic relation due to a high degree of powerlessness. This is compatible with my results. The
patient makes an ex-ante decision in which the existing mistrust in terms of a treatment abroad has
a greater impact for severe illnesses. This induces a decision in aid of the provider at home, who is
more trusted by the patient.
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3.3.2.4 Adverse quality, price and trust gradients
Let us relax the assumption of γ ≤ 1 and θ ≤ 1. If γ ≥ 1 and θ ≤ 1, the quality abroad
may be restricted and the marginal treatment costs may exceed the costs at home. This
case is easy to solve because γ < 1 remains necessary for a utility improvement abroad.
If γ ≤ 1 and θ ≥ 1, cost and quality advantages exist abroad. In this case, q̄h is not
the maximum possible (objectively offered) medical care for Hs = 0. If γ̃ < 1 reaches a
sufficiently low value of marginal treatment costs, a perceived quality and gross income
above the domestic level can be the result for each kind of illness. However, the problem of
mistrust remains. For that reason, θ < θ̃ must also be sufficiently high for such a situation
to occur. Then, a situation of (γ̃, θ̃) improves the overall position of the foreign country.30
If, γ > 1 and θ > 1, the quality advantage has no effect as long as H̄h is not achieved as a
corner solution at home with marginal costs of one. If the latter is the case, a beneficial
treatment abroad with γ > 1 is possible (if θ > 1), due to a possible extension of de-
mand abroad to realize an equalization of marginal product and costs despite an existing
level of mistrust. Therefore, excluding this last case, γ ≤ 1 and θ > 0 is a more general-
ized parameter constellation, which can be effective as a welfare raising alternative abroad.
Furthermore, differing from the definition of medical goods as local assurance goods,
τ > 1 indicates an overassessment of the productivity of the foreign quality. Let us set
θ = 1. Contrary to τ < 1, the demand is too high. Then, based on γ/(τ −m−n) = 1, to
achieve a perceived indifference the marginal costs abroad can exceed the marginal costs at
home delivering qsh > qsf . From the ex-ante perception, severe illnesses have an advantage
relative to lower severe health states. Due to Hs+τqsf , the lower Hs the more the demand
is adjusted downwards relative to higherHs. Furthermore, compared to τ < 1, a perceived
uncertainty in gross income cannot arise. If the demand is adjusted downwards, an upper
quality bound does not come into effect. However, such a situation delivers a factual
inequality in gross income. The latter is valid for all H∗s ≤ H̄f . Altogether, given a
specific value of marginal costs, τ < 1 (τ > 1) reduces (increases) the demand, compared
to the efficient case, because of a subjective downgrade (upgrade) of productivity abroad.
While the former can produce both a perceived and a factual inequality of income, the
latter, however, can produce only a factual. From an ex-ante point of view, the decision
is based on the perceived quality. The individual does not have the factual inequality in
mind. As shown, if the effective marginal costs at home and abroad are equalized, τ < 1
(τ > 1) delivers an increase (decrease) in the factual ex-post utility based on q∗sh < q∗sf
30It could be debated whether pragmatic mistrust related to a foreign country with a higher quality
than at home is a feasible assumption. However, some intrinsic mistrust should exist, but reduced in
comparison to a case in which θ < 1.
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(q∗sh > q∗sf ).
Rather than an overassessment of foreign quality, a trust gradient in favor of the for-
eign country could also exist. In this case, foreign physicians are more trustworthy than
domestic physicians. The argumentation is contrary to that stated in the previous discus-
sion. While the quality is underrated at home, the foreign quality is correctly assessed. As
long as the transaction costs are not too high for the demand abroad, the foreign country
is preferred, because of an increase of the effective marginal treatment costs at home.
Then, biases in the factual as well as perceived gross incomes result at home. This second
argumentation should be kept in mind for the following discussion concerning insurance
contracts.
3.4 Optimal cross-border choice with insurance
The main benefit from insurance coverage is a decrease in risk, resulting in an increase
in individual welfare. The discussion is structured as follows. First, given the previously
discussed framework, the first-order condition of an optimal insurance coverage is derived.
Second, we discuss two alternative scenarios of insurance coverage. First, the contracts are
defined as allowing free choice of treatment location. Either the contracts are separated
into two contracts, one for each country, or a mix of treatment locations is possible
within one contract. Second, the cross-border insurance portability is restricted. Either
foreign treatment is explicitly excluded from coverage or the contract itself is already
given, covering treatments at home, while a foreign treatment is possibly beneficial for
the insurer. The focus is on the optimal choice and the question of whether an individual
would voluntarily choose to exclude foreign treatment from his insurance coverage. If
the insurance coverage at home is predetermined, for example, in the case of national
insurance, the focus is on an efficiency increase in medical provision, when a cross-border
co-payment structure is able to induce foreign demand.
The insurer itself is not able to influence the demand generated by individual. Fur-
thermore, the health status and the factual demand are observable. This means that the
insurer could be better informed about the foreign providers, and thus potentially have
less mistrust concerning them; however, the insurer would not be able to influence the
mistrust level of the individual.
3.4.1 First-order conditions for optimal coverage
The individual can insure the treatment costs with a lump sum refund. The insurance’s
objective is the maximization of the patient’s expected utility. Given a fair premium, the
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insurance rate Ri can be written as:
R =
S∑
s=1
πsAs (3.14)
with Asi as the reimbursement. The net-income at home and the perceived net-income
abroad can be written as:
ysh = Ysh −R− qsh + As (3.15)
ŷsf = Ŷsf −R− γqsf + As − ts (3.16)
So far, the contract has not been specified. This will be discussed below more extensively.
The optimal insurance contract is given by (MCi stands for marginal costs in i):
Li =
S∑
s=1
πsu(ysi) + λ(Ri −
S∑
s=1
πsAsi) (3.17)
∂Li
∂qsi
= πsu
′(y∗si)(Y
′
si −MCi) = 0 (3.18)
∂Li
∂Asi
= πsu
′(y∗si)− λ∗πs = 0 (3.19)
∂Li
∂Ri
= −
S∑
s=1
πsu
′(y∗si) + λ
∗ = 0 (3.20)
∂Li
∂λ
= R∗ −
S∑
s=1
πsA
∗
si = 0 (3.21)
There is an equalization of the marginal utilities in the optimum ((3.19) and (3.20)). For
a domestic solution, the standard result of a full cost-coverage can be calculated with Rh
as corresponding contract and A∗sh = q∗sh.
For a foreign solution the optimal insurance coverage specifically depends on non-
insurable costs and mistrust. Full-coverage of foreign costs is chosen if firstly over-
insurance is possible, which compensates non-monetary costs for all s as a kind of ’pain
and suffering money’.31 Secondly, the upper quality bound must not be reached.
If non-monetary costs are excluded, the reimbursement for demand abroad is limited
with A∗sf = γq∗sf + T +m∗s. Hence, it must be determined whether or not full insurance is
31For a detailed analysis of these elements in general, see Breyer et al. (2009). They also discuss
administration shifted to the insurant. However, in this paper’s model transaction costs would also
arise without insurance and are an inherent part of a foreign provision.
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optimal. Equation (3.22) shows the Kuhn-Tucker condition:
∂Lf
∂Asf
=

≤ 0
= 0
≥ 0
if
if
if
A∗sf = 0
0 < A∗sf < ms + T + γqsf
A∗sf = ms + T + γqsf
(3.22)
Combining (3.19), (3.20) and (3.22) results in:
u′(Ŷsf −Rf − ns) ≥
S∑
s=1
πsu
′(Ŷsf −Rf − ns) (3.23)
Full coverage is possibly not optimal due to non-insurable costs ns. If n is constant, the
total amount ns of non-monetary costs increase in an increasing demand q∗sf . Then, the
marginal utilities can no longer be equalized ((3.23) is not fulfilled). Full insurance cannot
be optimal for all s. The lower the severity of illness is, the higher the out-of-pocket
payment. Nevertheless, the out-of-pocket payment is limited with γqsf as maximum,
delivering a remaining inequality of marginal utilities, particularly for less severe illness.
Another source of partial insurance coverage can be the impact of mistrust. Mistrust
(τ < 1) functions as follows: As discussed above, for all s for which q∗sf = q̄sf as maximum
demand holds, the perceived value Ŷ decreases more strongly the lower Hs is. Hence, Ŷ
is not equalized for all s as claimed in (3.11). This trait is discussed below in more detail.
Again, severe illnesses are particularly affected. Partial coverage for less severe illnesses
can be used to equalize the net incomes. Again, if over-insurance is excluded risk can
remain.
All in all, if n and τ < 1 are relevant, a limited income transfer from less to more severe
illnesses can induce a remaining risk.
For the efficient case abroad with τ = τ̄ < 1 and t = 0, the foreign country is chosen
for each kind of illness if γ < τ̄ as long as the upper quality bound is not achieved. Then,
full-coverage with R̄f as insurance premium with full risk elimination and EU(R̄f ) as
maximum welfare is the result. If the upper quality bound is effective a remaining risk
is possible as previously described for the case where τ is valid. EU(R̄f ) represents the
foreign benchmark. If γ > 1, EU(Rh) follows as a purely domestic solution.
3.4.2 Portability of insurance and cross-border choice
3.4.2.1 Cross-border separation of insurance contracts
Now, both contracts, Rh or Rf , are exclusively for either domestic or foreign treatments.
There is no mix of them within one contract. Given τ < τ̄ and t > 0, Rf is chosen (and
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therefore only treatments abroad) if:
S∑
s=1
πsu (Ysh −Rh) <
S∑
s=1
πsu
(
Ŷsf −Rf − csf − ts
)
(3.24)
As discussed above, csf as out-of-pocket payment is possible for a foreign solution.
We already know γ/(τ −m − n) < 1 is necessary to realize a demand abroad. Again,
we separate into different levels of illness severity. Let us set firstly θ = 1 and T = 0. The
optimal demand at home delivers H̄∗s < H̄ resulting in Y ∗h . Then, given full coverage at
home:
(i) H lows
S∑
s=1
πsu(Ŷ
∗(Hs + τq
∗
sf )−Rf − csf − ns) > u(Y ∗h −Rh)∀H lows
(ii) Hmids
S∑
s=1
πsu(Ŷ
∗(Hs + τ q̄
∗
sf )−Rf − csf − ns) > u(Y ∗h −Rh)∀Hmids
(iii) Hhighs
S∑
s=1
πsu(Ŷ
∗(Hs + τ q̄
∗
sf )−Rf − csf − ns) < u(Y ∗h −Rh)∀Hhighs (3.25)
(3.25) is differentiated into three contracts, separated by illness severity. For H lows , the
foreign option is preferable if γ/(τ −m− n) < 1. However, despite ns > 0 ∀s, clows likely
leads to an equalization of net incomes abroad with a corresponding vector c̄lowf = (clow1f >
clow2f > ... > c
low
Sf ) with clow1f as co-payment for the lowest illness severity and clowSf = 0 as co-
payment for the highest severity within the set of H lows . Then, u(ŷlowf (Rf )) > u(ylowh (Rh)),
due to the full risk elimination at home and abroad. In this context, an equalization of
perceived net incomes also means a remaining risk ex-post for the health states H lows . The
reason is a factual difference in gross income, leading to an ex-post inefficiency according
to income risk. If a total equalization of perceived net incomes cannot be realized32, a
strict preference for the home option exists, if γ/(τ − m − n) = 1, due to a remaining
uncertainty abroad. In that case, γ/(τ −m − n) < 1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for
a foreign choice of treatment. γ must be sufficiently low to compensate for the inequality
effect.
For the set Hmids , given a restriction of quality adjustment due to a bounded maximum
32This is the case if a partial coverage is limited with clowsf = γq
∗
sf +ms as a corner solution.
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quality level abroad, Ŷ mid∗sf < Y ∗h is assumed to be valid. In principle, with respect
to the net income within the set Hmids , we allow for health states to be included that
both, are and are not able to be beneficially treated abroad from an ex-ante point of
view (so, Hs < Hs(γ∗∗) is also possible). However, in (3.25), the expected utility for
insurance abroad is assumed to exceed that at home. At home, the risk is again fully
eliminated. Now, in addition to ns, cmidsf must also compensate for differences in perceived
gross income with a corresponding co-payment vector c̄midf . Again, γ/(τ − m − n) < 1
is necessary for indifference between the expected utility at home and abroad. In this
context, the following is of importance. Let us assume a situation without insurance
coverage where we have a sufficient level of γ resulting in an indifference between the
domestic and foreign alternatives. Then, within the set of health states Hmids , the range
of net incomes between the highest and lowest health status must exceed that at home.
On the one side, for the lowest health states a limited upward adjustment of quality
results in a lower perceived net income abroad than at home. On the other side, for the
highest health states within Hmids the net income increase above the level at home. The
higher the range of perceived net incomes within Hmids is, the higher the benefit through
an application of insurance resulting in a relative benefit of full insurance for a foreign
solution. Hence, a case of cross-border indifference without insurance could result in a
superior solution abroad with insurance. However, if q̄sf as maximum demand is valid
for all health levels within Hmids and cmidsf is restricted by an upper bound, resulting in
remaining risk, γ must decrease to a sufficient level to compensate the remaining risk
according to the perceived gross income.
For the set Hhighs , the perceived net income abroad is too low (either for all health
states or in expectation of utility) or γ is too high to satisfy (3.24).
Summarized, partial coverage within a foreign contract is optimal, yet possibly con-
nected to a remaining risk after the adoption of insurance. The reasons are the perceived
differences in gross incomes, due to mistrust and restricted coverage for transaction costs.
Hence, a compensation for immaterial damage leading to an equalization of net incomes
from an ex-ante perspective could induce an incentive to generate demand abroad.33 Simi-
lar to the case without insurance, individuals with a lower likelihood of high severe illnesses
are more able to insure treatments abroad (if fixed costs are low). The reason is a higher
degree of risk reduction. Furthermore, if there is full-coverage of perceived net incomes,
a full risk elimination ex-post is not necessarily fulfilled, which also delivers a source of
inefficiency. Altogether, an improvement in the expected utility including all health states
33If the objective quality is certain and observable, compensation according to a suboptimal health status
after treatment reassures the individual without any additionally expected costs for the insurance.
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is possible, if γ/(τ −m−n) < 1 complies with the necessary compensation of transaction
costs, the impact of mistrust and income risk. The strict distinction between contracts
at home or abroad implies treatments that are not beneficially insured within the given
contract and therefore not beneficially treated within the given country. However, the
illness levels which are beneficially treated within the given contract may compensate
these deficits in terms of the total expected utility over all health states. However, if the
insurance contract envelops each severity level, a benefit of a foreign insurance contract
is more difficult to realize delivering a benefit of a domestic solution according to income
risk.
Finally, the relation between EU(Rh), EU(Rf ) and EUsel(R0) with R0 = 0 (condi-
tion (3.13)) is ambiguous. If the pairwise benefits of particular treatment locations are
sufficiently high, a cross-border mix of treatment locations without insurance could be
superior. Either EU(Rh) < EU(Rf ) < EUsel(R0) or EU(Rf ) < EU(Rh) < EUsel(R0)
is possible. Otherwise, a solution with a strict separation of insurance contracts either
EU(Rh) or EU(Rf ) can be also superior, as the result of risk reduction. The lower the
price gradient and the less possible a full risk reduction, the more beneficial the domestic
alternative with EU(Rh) > EU(Rf ).34 35
3.4.2.2 Selection of treatment locations within one contract
So far, a strict division into a contract at home or abroad was assumed. Based on the
previous results, a mixed insurance contract is conceivable based on a pairwise selection:
max{y∗sh, ŷ∗sf}. Firstly, let us set T = n = 0. Then, corresponding to the previous
discussion, γ < τ−m guarantees that for the lowest illness severities a treatment abroad is
beneficial. S represents the lowest health status that can be treated abroad and S = S+1
the highest health status treated at home. As given in (3.13) the expected utility is:
EUsel(R0) =
S∑
s=1
πsûsf +
S∑
s=S
πsush (3.26)
in which s = 1 is the health state with the lowest severity degree and R0 = 0. Firstly, let
us assume S as the threshold health state for which Ŷ ∗sf > Y ∗sh is valid. Additionally, we
assume that there are no differences in perceived gross incomes abroad (see H low in the
34The situation changes if the insurance contract is predetermined, for example, full-insurance at home.
Demand abroad loses attractiveness because of the full-coverage of marginal costs at home (see section
3.4.3).
35Another possible case is the following: If only a strict separation between a foreign and domestic
contract is possible, the individual chooses Rh, if EU(Rh) > EUsel(R0), but decides for the foreign
supply for specific illnesses, if Ŷsf >> Ysh as a single case ex-post. However, this case is neglected in
this discussion. Under the given assumptions, such a case should not be of a significant relevance.
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analysis above). Hence, the foreign demand delivers an equalization of Ŷ for the whole
interval {s = 1;S}. Principally, given the possibility of insurance, similar to (3.19) and
(3.20), an equalization of net incomes would be optimal. The result is an income transfer
from expected health states treated abroad to states treated at home. Given γ < τ −m,
Ŷ ∗sf > Y
∗
sh and therefore csh = 0 is optimal at home. However, a cross-border equalization
of net incomes requires a partial coverage abroad resulting in the following premium:
Rsel =
S∑
s=1
πsA
∗
sf (csf ) +
S∑
s=S
πsA
∗
sh(csh = 0) (3.27)
with csf = Ŷ ∗sf − Y ∗sh resulting in A∗sf < γq∗sf + ms which delivers Rsel < Rh with Rh as
contract for a pure domestic solution.36 Then, all cross-border net incomes are equalized,
resulting in EU(Rsel) > EU(Rh). If there is a further decrease in γ connected to an
increase in the foreign gross-income (and T = n = 0), csf can be bounded with γq∗sf +ms.
However, despite a remaining risk, EU(Rsel) > EU(Rh) is still valid. Please note, each
contract Rf with S = 0 and S = S is inferior to a solution of a mixed contract Rsel as long
as some health states are beneficially treated at home. This is also valid for the following
discussion.
Now, n > 0 is assumed. If γ/(τ − m − n) = 1, indifference between both treatment
locations for a range {s = 1;S} of low illness severities follows for a situation without
insurance. If an insurance is implemented and due to non-coverage of ns, a co-payment
at home becomes necessary due to Y ∗h > Ŷ ∗Sf − n(q∗Sf ) for the whole range of illnesses
treated at home {S, S}. The co-payment can be calculated as csh = Y ∗h − (Ŷ ∗Sf − n(q∗Sf )).
(3.27) changes with A∗sh < q∗sh. Additionally, co-payments abroad are also necessary, as
discussed in the previous section with c̄f = (c1f > c2f > ... > cSf = 0). Then, if csf is
not bounded by γqsf +ms for the highest health states abroad and if γ/(τ −m− n) = 1,
EU(Rsel) = EU(Rh) must follow due to full risk elimination for both a pure domestic
solution or a solution of mixed treatment locations. On the contrary, if csf is bounded,
EU(Rsel) < EU(Rh) follows. While the risk within Rh is fully eliminated, this is not the
case within Rsel. Then, a sufficient decrease of γ is necessary to induce indifference and
therefore EU(Rsel) = EU(Rh).
If Hmids can also be beneficially treated abroad (additional to H lows ), in which (3.26)
is still valid, S and S are shifted downwards. However, due to the reason of a bounded
upward adjustment of quality some health states within the set Hmids can be connected
to a lower perceived gross income than at home with Y ∗h > Ŷ mid∗f . If (3.26) is valid, the
36In general, if Yh−Ch < Yf −Cf , then Cf −Ch < Yf −Yh. cf = Yf −Yh is the sufficient co-payment to
equalize both net incomes, given full-insurance at home. Then, Cf − Ch < cf , resulting in Ah > Af ,
and therefore, Rsel < Rh.
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difference to the case without insurance is, that even the worst case of Hmid is at least
indifferent to a corresponding treatment at home in terms of net income. This also means
that the interval {s = 1;S} implies a sufficient value γ with γ/(τ −m) < 1 as necessary
condition (if n = 0). Hence, corresponding to (3.13), a mix of locations strictly dominates
a pure domestic solution, if no insurance coverage is applied (R0). If insurance is applied,
csh > 0 ∀s{S;S} is optimal, due to Y ∗h > Ŷ mid∗f . In that case, csh = Y ∗h − Ŷ mid∗Sf ∀s{S;S}
is necessary. Additionally, c̄f = (clow1f = clow2f > ... > cmidsf > ... > cmidSf = 0) as a foreign
co-payment vector is necessary abroad due to Ŷ low∗f > Ŷ mid∗f , also based on HS.37 Because
of γ/(τ − m) < 1, EU(Rsel) > EU(Rh) is strictly valid, if an upper constraint for the
co-payment does not come into effect and the risk is fully eliminated. Additionally, let us
set n > 0. Again, csh > 0 ∀s{S,S} is necessary, with csh = Y ∗h − (Ŷ ∗Sf − n(q∗Sf )) ∀s{S;S}.38
There is also a corresponding co-payment vector for treatments abroad. An increase
of csh and c̄f is necessary to compensate differences in non-monetary transaction costs
additionally to differences in perceived gross income. The maximum value of co-payment
csf = γq
∗
sf + ms comes faster into effect. Then, given c̄sh and c̄f , EU(Rsel) > EU(Rh) is
valid, if a sufficiently low γ with γ/(τ−m−n) < 1 compensating for a possible constraint
on risk elimination.
If T > 0 and γ is sufficiently low, only moderate severe health states are beneficially
treated abroad. (3.26) is modified to:
EUsel =
S∑
s=1
πsush +
s=S−1∑
s=S+1
πsusf +
S∑
s=S
πsush (3.28)
In this case, cross-border partial coverage is again optimal. A full risk elimination is
more probable, because T is a further component of insurance coverage (then the partial
coverage is less limited) and due to a shift in treatments for less severe health states to
the home country.
Summarized, EU(Rsel) > EUsel(R0). If the net incomes are equalized, Rsel maxi-
mizes the expected utility: EU(Rh) < EU(Rf ) < EU(Rsel) < EUf (R̄f ) or EU(Rf ) <
EU(Rh) < EU(Rsel) < EUf (R̄f ), delivering a second-best solution as long as τ < τ̄ and
t > 0.39 EU(Rsel) > EU(Rf ) is strictly valid, because the net incomes at home are su-
perior for the lowest health states. Then, Rf is maximally third-best. If an equalization
cannot be realized within Rsel, EU(Rsel) < EU(Rh) < EUf (R̄f ) is possible due to a
minimization of risk at home, but not abroad. In that case, Rsel is third-best.
37If n = 0 the co-payment for low illness severities is constant due to a constant gross income.
38If Hmids is beneficially treated abroad and Y ∗h > Ŷ
mid∗
f , q
high∗
sh > γq
mid∗
sf is necessarily valid. Hence,
chighsh < q
high∗
sh ∀s
high
h .
39Please recall that a situation with τ̄ is always better than a situation with τ .
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Selective contracts are of specific relevance when insurers select and contract including
foreign providers. The insurer must contract with specific countries that have sufficient
cost advantages and positively influence an individual’s trust. Additionally, the treatment
of non-monetary transaction costs as well as differences in perceived gross incomes within
the insurance contract is of importance to realize a foreign cost-advantage.
3.4.3 Restricted portability of insurance coverage
Cost coverage for treatments abroad is now excluded from the insurance contract. Presently
medical provision is limited to treatments at home based on national law for most health-
care systems. A contract is available for a domestic provision, but not for treatments
abroad.
3.4.3.1 General exclusion of foreign insurance coverage
Principally, (3.26) or (3.28) can be used as objective functions. Then, (3.19) can only be
calculated for domestic treatments. However, an income-transfer (3.20) is still valid. Com-
bining these conditions, with u′sh =
∑S
s=1 πsu
′
s and allowing for cross-border treatments,
an equalization of marginal utilities is impossible per se due to non-coverage abroad. The
individual is confronted with a choice between Rh as full-insurance at home and a contract
R̄h with a limited coverage for more severe illnesses treated at home:
R̄h =
S∑
s=S
πsAsh (3.29)
R̄h is chosen if EUh(Rh) < EUf (R̄h). Medical services abroad are substituted for treat-
ments at home for which a sufficient cost-advantage is necessary to compensate transaction
costs, remaining income risk and losses in gross income. As above, if only low and mod-
erate illness severities are treated abroad with a corresponding γ/(τ − m − n) < 1 and
a low level of T , EUsel(R0) > EUh(R0) is the result. Then, A∗sh = q∗sh is optimal within
R̄h if Y ∗h ≤ ŷmid∗Sf to close the gap between the net incomes with an income transfer from
savings abroad to the home country. However, A∗sh < q∗sh is optimal, if Y ∗h > ŷmid∗Sf to
equalize marginal utilities for the worst health status treated abroad. However, a full risk
elimination remains impossible.
Compared to a mixed contract, the foreign alternative is less advantageous, because of
a limitation of risk reduction, possibly resulting in a pure domestic solution, if EU(Rh) >
EU(R̄h). Hence, to compensate the former effect, the price advantage must increase.
If EU(Rh) > EU(Rsel), given a possible selection of treatment locations, EU(Rh) >
EU(R̄h) must follow, resulting in Rh as generally optimal and a second-best solution.
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Otherwise, EU(Rh) < EU(R̄h) < EU(Rsel) < EUf (Rfb) as third-best or EU(R̄h) <
EU(Rh) < EU(Rsel) < EUf (R̄f ) as fourth-best solution follows if insurance is restricted
and R̄h is chosen. For that reason, EU(Rsel) must dominate EU(R̄h). A solution EU(Rf )
as a coverage of foreign treatments is dominated by EU(Rsel). But EU(Rf ) may be
superior to EU(Rh) and EU(R̄h), and therefore, third-best, depending on the distribution
of foreign utility benefits and the degree of risk reduction abroad. Of course, a full
waiving of coverage with EUsel(R0) is an option. As discussed above, the latter can
exceed a solution EU(Rh) or EU(Rf ) in their benefits. However, EUsel(R0) must be
strictly dominated by EU(R̄h) due to decreased risk.
In conclusion, the scope of insurance coverage is essential to determine whether insur-
ance inhibits or stimulates foreign demand.
3.4.3.2 Fixed insurance contract at home and treatment alternatives abroad
Let us now consider an insurance system that covers only treatment at home. The insur-
ance rate Rh is predetermined. At all times, a treatment alternative is available abroad.
Such a description can be seen as similar to the current situation in a number of countries,
in which medical provision and cost coverage is focused on the domestic healthcare sys-
tem. Nevertheless, in these countries foreign treatment alternatives can be encountered.
Despite the fixed contract the insurer may offer the possibility of insurance portability.
This analysis focuses on the conditions that are sufficient from the perspective of the
insurant and the insurance to realize foreign demand, when a specific health status is
realized.
Firstly, if we consider the former structure of a lump-sum insurance, a treatment is
demanded abroad if:
Y (Hs + q
∗
sh)−Rh − csh < Ŷ (Hs + τq∗sf )−Rh − csh − ts
or
Ŷ ∗sf − Y ∗sh > ts (3.30)
The lump-sum co-payment at home and abroad are equal. Then, the difference in gross
incomes from an ex-ante perspective must exceed the transaction costs.
Secondly, in contrast the more or less trivial case of a fixed lump-sum co-payment, a
relative co-payment αh is implemented to reduce ex-post moral hazard as a source of
inefficiency.40 If
Y (Hs + q
∗
sh)−Rh − αhq∗sh < Ŷ (Hs + τq∗sf )−Rh − αhγq∗sf − ts(β)
40For a basic discussion of moral hazard and treatment abroad see Mattoo and Rathindran (2005).
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or
Ŷ ∗sf − Y ∗sh > αh(γq∗sf − q∗sh) + ts(β) (3.31)
treatment is demanded abroad given a specific health status Hs. β is a co-payment for
monetary transaction costs (as well as for T ). At first, the co-payment rates at home and
abroad are equal. The foreign provision is chosen if the difference in gross incomes as in
(3.31) exceeds the difference of out-of-pocket payments plus transaction costs. Similar to
(3.11) the optimal demand abroad is given by:
∂u(ŷsf )
∂qsf
= 0 → τ Ŷ ′ = αhγ + βm+ n (3.32)
In the case of indifference, which occurs when Y ′f = Y ′h = αh (with T = 0), a threshold
level γ∗ = τ − (βm+ n)/αh can be calculated. The higher αh, the lower the cross-border
price gradient can be in the case of indifference.
Restriction of foreign demand
(3.31) represents the patient’s point of view. If the premium is fixed, what is the condition
for the insurer to send the patient abroad? The insurer could set a restriction:
τqsf = qsh (3.33)
The effective quality abroad shall be equal to the quality demanded at home as a bench-
mark for the insurance. Let us separate the co-payments between both countries into αh
and αf and set t = 0 which is relaxed later. Then, γτ =
αh
αf
is sufficient for indifference
given an equalization of actual quality at home and perceived quality abroad as well as
an equalization of cross-border costs. Two additional restrictions should be implemented.
First, a country should be chosen for which γ < 1 is valid. Otherwise, a too low level
of αf could stimulate foreign demand that is inefficient. Second, recalling the situation
without insurance, γ = τ was necessary for indifference. γ > τ could also be the case as
long as αh−αf > 0 is sufficient to fulfill (3.33). While (3.31) also holds, the total variable
costs exceeds the domestic cost level without any welfare gain for the individual from an
ex-ante point of view. Such a solution is also inefficient. Thus, γ < τ should be a set.
Given the former restrictions of 1 > τ > γ, αf > αh can be set to satisfy (3.33). (3.33)
and (3.31) are satisfied as indifference conditions if γ
τ
= αh
αf
. Given these parameter rela-
tions, q∗sh > γq∗sf occurs. The degree of ex-post moral hazard abroad is reduced relative
to the home country, resulting in cost savings. However, savings must be shared with the
patient to fulfill (3.31) as an inequation, carried out as a lump-sum reimbursement. If the
premium is fixed in the short term, an incentive must be induced on the demand side to
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gain trade benefits.41
At this point, the observability τ is of relevance. If mistrust is underestimated by the
insurance (τ is set too high), αf will be set too high meaning a choice of a country with
an inappropriately high γ. Demand abroad deceases. Otherwise, if τ is set too low, on the
one hand, no country could be offered to the individual, if the necessary cost differential
exceeds the lowest value γ available abroad. On the other hand, if αf is set too low,
demand exceeds the indifference level. The decrease in moral hazard is reduced.
Compared to a first-best solution with τ = τ̄ , a loss of benefit from cost savings arises.
Principally, an increase in mistrust increases the moral hazard necessary to compensate
for the bias in productivity assessment. But an increase of moral hazard abroad indicates
compensation for the opposite inefficiency of mistrust.
If transaction costs are included with n = 0 and 1 > τ > γ +m, γ = (αhτ − βm)/αf is
necessary to achieve indifference in gross incomes. The co-payment β for ms + T can be
set at a level at which (3.31) is fulfilled. Hence, αf and β must induce a specific structure
of marginal costs for an appropriate demand abroad. Otherwise, the marginal treatment
costs must be sufficiently smaller than one to produce further cost savings, not only to
compensate for T , but also to produce savings transferable to the patient. Principally, the
reduction of moral hazard is also possible in this case. Let us set n > 0 and T = 0 with
1 > τ > γ+m+n. In the case of indifference, the cross-border costs for the individual are
equalized (with corresponding co-payments to realize (3.33) with γ = (αhτ−βm−n)/αf ),
delivering savings for the insurance (due to the focus on monetary costs, and exclusion of
non-monetary costs) with αhq∗sh − αfq∗sf − βms. This savings can be used to compensate
non-monetary costs as a further incentive to induce demand abroad. The latter is not
a direct insurance of non-monetary transaction costs, but a transfer of real cost savings
generated by a limitation in foreign demand.
Full insurance coverage at home
Let us assume αh = 0 as a borderline case. Here (3.31) cannot be fulfilled. The right-hand
side can be minimally zero, or positive for t > 0. However, the left-hand side is negative
due to maximum demand at home. Then, γ = (αhτ − m − n)/αf is also impossible to
fulfill independent of the level of αf . According to an equalization of demand, a corner
solution is only possible, in which the maximum demand takes place at home and abroad.
However, the patient has no incentive to choose the foreign country as long as t > 0 and
τ < 1. Full coverage reduces the sensitivity to a cost advantage abroad. In this case, only
a higher quality abroad would induce foreign demand.
41Note that if γ is too low, αf = 1 is a corner solution. Then (3.33) is no longer fulfilled.
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However, if γ < 1 and (3.33) are fulfilled, the insurance is interested in stimulating
demand abroad. Similar to the previous case, a lump-sum reimbursement could induce
demand and a cost advantage (with full-coverage and maximum demand). However,
despite the possibility of fulfilling (3.31), the patient loses in terms of the perceived health
status after treatment from an ex-ante point of view (but not ex-post, if (3.33) is fulfilled).
If θ < 1, a loss in factual health is realized ex-post, compared to a solution at home.
No insurance coverage
We can separate cases into αf = β = 1 and αf = αh = β = 1. For the former,
γ < αhτ − m − n is necessary to fulfill (3.31). For the latter, γ < τ − m − n must be
fulfilled (as demonstrated in the previous chapter). Of course, for both cases the fixed
costs T must be considered in the calculation.
Restriction of cost reimbursement
An upper bound of costs can be another objective. The insurance contains the costs to
the level of expenditures at home to treat the same condition. A similar situation can
be observed within the European Union. The national social insurances are committed
to pay for costs (1 − αh)qh arising at home for an equivalent treatment related to an
equivalent illness. Additional costs are covered by the patient. Hence, there is no cross-
border adjustment of co-payments, but simply an upper limit on absolute reimbursement.
Thus, a separation of co-payments is no longer applied. So, if the insurer can observe
the health status, the insurant is able to generate any demand abroad with, however, an
absolute limitation of reimbursement. Then, demand abroad is induced for which
γq∗sf − q∗sh + ts < Ŷ ∗sf − Y ∗sh (3.34)
is fulfilled. Hence not only the covered costs for the treatment abroad, but also the total
cross-border costs are important. In this case, (3.34) equals (3.12). In contrast to the
previous case where a limitation of foreign demand is the objective, demand can exceed
this limited level, when higher quality can be realized abroad (based on lower marginal
costs).42 The incentive for foreign demand is induced by sufficiently low marginal costs
delivering an increase in net income compared to the domestic solution. Due to the non-
existence of possible marginal reimbursement abroad, there is no moral hazard problem
abroad.
Up to this point, the transaction costs have also been paid by the insurance. If these are
42In this context, foreign quality can also be interpreted more broadly. For example, increased waiting
time at home can be seen as a quality loss. Despite an out-of pocket payment due to limited re-
imbursement, the foreign demand can reduce the waiting time, which translates to lower marginal
transaction costs. Thus, net income increases and the individual is willing to pay a larger amount out
of-pocket.
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excluded, (3.34) remains valid as long as γq∗sf > (1−αh)q∗sh. Otherwise, γqsf is fully paid
and (3.34) changes to ts − αq∗sh < Ŷ ∗sf − Y ∗sh as the sufficient condition for an individual
to choose a foreign location. If this condition is not fulfilled (specifically through T ), the
insurance could transfer a portion of the savings (1−αh)q∗sh−γq∗sf to the patient in order
to induce foreign demand.
In sum: If the contract is fixed for treatments at home, a price gradient can be used to
induce demand abroad connected to a decrease in moral hazard. To do so, a restriction of
foreign demand, a minimum price gradient and a (partial) lump-sum transfer of savings
to the insurant are necessary. Otherwise, an inefficient demand abroad may be the result.
The level and correct assessment of mistrust is crucial to the realization of a welfare gain.
The lower the co-payment at home, the more difficult it is to induce demand abroad.
Nevertheless, foreign demand could be induced and be beneficial, but possibly resulting in
a decreased ex-post health status if the quality abroad is restricted or significant mistrust
is present. Finally, a simple limitation of absolute cost reimbursement associated with
foreign demand is only feasible when a perceived increase in net income is induced. A
cost savings related to a lump-sum transfer is also possible, despite an (perceived) inferior
ex-post health status.
3.5 Conclusion
The former analysis contributes to the emerging debate surrounding cross-border medical
care. A necessary condition to generate demand abroad is that the marginal treatment
costs abroad must fall short of a threshold level in order to compensate for transaction
costs in addition to a mistrust-bias with respect to gross income. A treatment abroad can
represent a second best solution. The marginal costs are adjusted upwards by mistrust,
resulting in mistrust cost as a biased utility. However, if there is no quality limitation
abroad and at home and if maximum quality is demanded abroad, the factual level of
demand abroad is efficient. This is related to a biased gross income over all health
states from an ex-ante point of view, influencing the individual demand decision. The
opposite case is when the optimal demand abroad is below the maximum quality level.
Then the perceived income is equalized. However, the factual ex-post gross income is not
equalized for all health states. Additionally, due to the impact of mistrust, the factual
ex-post realization of health production exceeds the perceived production from an ex-
ante perspective. Therefore, foreign demand can be inhibited despite its factual benefit.
There is a relative advantage for higher health states, however, this is reduced by fixed
transaction costs. The reason is an increasing impact of mistrust for lower health states
combined with a restricted quality abroad. However, highly severe illnesses are less able to
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generate foreign demand, despite the higher cost savings potential. Hence, only illnesses
of moderate severity are viable for treatment abroad. Nevertheless, for these states a
reduction in ex-post health status could be induced compensated for by a cost advantage.
The latter is possible only if health is seen as an investment good, as assumed in this
discussion.
Furthermore, higher quality and lower costs abroad lead to patient migration motivated
by a quality and price gradient. So, if foreign quality is overrated, the demand abroad is
supported, but also inefficient. An adverse trust gradient in favor of the foreign country
inverts the results. The effective marginal costs at home are adjusted upwards.
Whether insurance inhibits or stimulates foreign demand depends on its portability.
The income-risk can possibly not be eliminated. This is due to non-insurable transaction
costs and perceived uncertainty that results from a subjective downward adjustment of
quality resulting in a specific cross-border co-payment structure. Similar to the case
without insurance, individuals with a lower expectation to realize highly severe illnesses
are more able to insure treatments abroad when fixed costs are low. The reason is a
higher degree of risk reduction. Furthermore, full-coverage of costs arising on the basis of
perceived medical quality does not imply a factual full risk elimination ex-post necessarily
which is a source of inefficiency. Finally, a separation of contracts into a pure domestic
or pure foreign solution as well as a contract with mixed locations can be a second-
best solution. This means a foreign solution may also be only a third-best solution.
Additionally, if insurance portability is entirely restricted, a mix of treatment locations is
maximally a third-best solution. Thus, foreign treatment is less probable.
If insurance costs are fixed for treatment at home, a price gradient can induce demand
abroad. A specific cross-border co-payment structure can decrease moral hazard. A re-
striction of foreign demand, a minimum price gradient, and a (partial) lump-sum transfer
of savings to the insurant are necessary to induce such a welfare gain. The level and
correct assessment of mistrust is crucial to realize a welfare gain. Ex-post moral hazard
and mistrust can cancel one another’s effects. The lower the co-payment is at home,
the more difficult an inducement of demand abroad is, due to a reduced sensitivity to
foreign cost savings. Finally, a limitation of absolute cost reimbursement is connected
with the generation of foreign demand, if a perceived increase in net income is induced
by a corresponding price gradient. Under specific conditions, a cost savings by means of
a lump-sum transfer is possible.
Principally, individuals with a high risk of illnesses with a very low or high severity are
possibly worse off with a foreign contract and will then prefer a domestic solution. This
is of specific relevance if the contract is strictly separated between treatment locations.
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This analysis includes a number of simplifications. The supply side is completely ig-
nored. In the context of trust, asymmetric information is much more realistic. If there
is no external guarantee of quality, a problem of adverse quality selection abroad could
arise. Otherwise, if there is a trust gradient delivering an upward adjustment of foreign
marginal costs, a decrease in domestic quality could be the result.
The role of insurance is also simplified in the discussion. The assumption of full in-
formation is not realistic. Within the discussion, monitoring costs as well as transaction
costs were included, but only as a non-specified part of transaction costs. The symmetric
information assumption is also problematic in the home country. However, with respect
to foreign demand and supply, the information problem could be more serious. The reg-
ulation of the supply side in a foreign country can be different than in the home country.
For example, prices are set differently. Are prices fixed by a schedule of fees or is there no
price regulation? In the latter case, there would also be no exogenous relation between a
specific service and price. Accordingly, the insurance must not only observe the quality
of service, but also change the optimal form of reimbursement to reduce incentives for an
over-supply of services. Otherwise, the integration of cheaper supply within the offered
insurance contracts may lead to a competitive advantage, compared to insurances which
focus on domestic supply. While the analysis took into account mixed insurance con-
tracts, the effects on the insurance market and the selection of risks were not discussed
in detail. The latter can be of specific interest. As shown, only specific risks, measured
on the degree of illness severity, are suitable for foreign medical provision. This could be
used for processes of risk selection given the possibility to offer specific kinds of contracts.
Another important point is the role of trust and the process of reputation-building.
The existence of a trust gradient per se is of importance. The formation of trust is as
well an interesting aspect. In order to investigate these aspects, the static character of
the discussion should be transformed into a dynamic setting.
If health is simply an investment good, a cost advantage can compensate for quality
deficits. However, the assumption of a lexicographical configuration of preferences is
plausible. In this case, health can also be a consumption good and the foreign quality
must be at least identical with the quality at home. The result could be a full elimination
of the foreign alternative because moderate levels of illness severity are also no longer
appropriate for foreign treatment.
Legal resources abroad are an important element as well (Cortez 2010, Mirrer-Singer
2007). US patients are often not able to appraise legal risks abroad, as well as at home.
When malpractice occurs abroad and at home, it is often difficult for the patient to receive
compensation. As a considerable risk this could significantly influence treatment location
decisions.
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A further aspect of empirical relevance is the problem of waiting lists.43 Waiting lists
can be a vital driver of cross-border demand. If there are restrictions of medical provision
at home, the individual may have the incentive to go abroad. Of course, there are direct
effects for participating countries with respect to their degree of capacity utilization.
Otherwise, restrictions in capacity can be a volitional characteristic of the system to
limit unnecessary demand. In this case, a restricted capacity could be accompanied by
restricted foreign demand or cost reimbursement.
These aspects complicate the analysis considerably, but could also deliver very inter-
esting insights. However, even when adding these factors to the analysis, the basic role
of the determinants discussed here should not change significantly.
43See for example the current situation in the United Kingdom (NHS 2011).
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As shown within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, specific characteristics of health services
can be identified as sources of a limited specialization in the healthcare sector and therefore
limited possibilities of trade in healthcare. In contrast, a reduction in monetary and non-
monetary transaction costs and, consequently, improvement in cross-border integration
and an increase in the ability of patient mobility imply an increase in efficiency gains
from trade in healthcare. Furthermore, inflexible prices but also a limited mobility of
production inputs as institutional characteristics are reasons for a limitation of trade.
An analysis of patient migration on the microeconomic level provides further insight. If
healthcare is defined as a local assurance good, mistrust concerning quality abroad must
be considered. It is important to focus on its empirical relevance and influenceable deter-
minants. If mistrust represents a preference, an immediate efficiency problem would not
exist, but the potential of cross-border medical care would be restricted nonetheless. If
mistrust is based on a specific image or stereotype of a foreign country, the question arises
as to how these biases can be reduced. Guiso et al. (2009), Rauch (2002, 1999) and Greif
(1993) discuss cross-border networks and the affinity of trading partners as instruments
for improving the efficiency of trust in trade relations. Hospital networks and transferred
standards to hospitals abroad could increase the familiarity between different healthcare
systems. For example, U.S. hospitals, such as Harvard or John-Hopkins, arrange network
contracts with hospitals abroad. Schroth and Khawaja (2007) discuss the necessity of
validating quality in the form of accreditation, as done, for example, by the Joint Com-
mission International, which sets quality standards in the U.S., but has also accredited
a number of foreign medical providers. As derived by Rauch (1999), a higher degree of
standardization through the certification of specific treatments could reduce mistrust.
Lunt et al. (2010) discuss the Internet as an information source for cross-border health-
care. The Internet could be able to be used as an instrument to decrease pragmatic mis-
trust; however, an appropriate design is needed to achieve this goal. Deri (2005) discusses
the utilization of health services by immigrants. She finds strong evidence for a posi-
tive relationship between social networks and the utilization of health services. Moscone
et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between social interaction as a substitute for
other information sources and the choice of hospitals. Both findings can be understood
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to demonstrate the necessity of personal relations to generate demand in regions outside
the local medical provision area, functioning as a kind of interpersonal transfer of trust.
Furthermore, the literature identifies reputation and experience as central determinants
of trust. So, if foreign treatment options are viable, a process of familiarization between
patients and providers is necessary; the success of which will depend on numerous ad-
ditional characteristics of the target country and the individuals involved. Last but not
least, the effort required to increase trust in a foreign system must be investigated, so
that the efficiency potential of such measures can be determined.
A simple reimbursement of costs arising from foreign treatment is necessary, but is,
however, not large enough to increase patient migration significantly. Reduced quality
abroad, transaction costs and mistrust are also important elements for an optimal in-
surance contract. A sufficient adjustment of insurance coverage becomes necessary as for
example a mixed contract with a selection of domestic and foreign treatments or a calibra-
tion of co-payments. The latter could allow for more efficient demand due to a decrease
in moral hazard. However, some type of fixed transfer is necessary. An accurate assess-
ment of mistrust is crucial to realize an efficient contract. Mistrust and ex-post moral
hazard are common sources of inefficiency, but moral hazard could in fact compensate for
mistrust. A limited absolute cost reimbursement (as in the EU) can also support foreign
demand, but treatment locations must be carefully chosen on the basis of the existing
price gradient to avoid an inefficient foreign demand and to reduce loss through moral
hazard at home. As previously shown, the difficulty of compensating costs that arise from
mistrust and physical or mental stress is a structural problem of the insurance contract
that restricts foreign demand. However, in this context, the insurer’s ability to observe
the foreign supply is a strong assumption.
Foreign treatments are not preferable for all types of illness which supports processes
of risk selection. A differentiation of contracts must be assessed carefully with respect of
such an effect.
Transaction costs are typical for trade particularly in medical services. Can these costs
be reduced below a prohibitive level through better integration of international healthcare
markets? Organization, travel, and interfaces between treatment locations at home and
abroad are the fundamental sources of monetary costs. As a result, insurances can be
motivated to restrict foreign demand, if costs that arise from administration or monitoring
are too high. Hence, country network could be preferable, for example, within systems
such as the EU and NAFTA due to their integrated character and the instruments used
in bilateral agreements (Calnan et al. 1997, France 1997, Starmans et al. 1997). Such
agreements support the integration of markets along with the reduction of inefficiencies
discussed above, especially in regions with neighborly relations. One must also pay atten-
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tion to non-monetary transaction costs specific to demand for medical services abroad.
These costs are closely connected to the specific character of a treatment. They are also a
parameter for mobility, especially connected to different kinds of illnesses in which not all
are feasible for international trade. These costs are responsible for much of the restriction
of healthcare trade, due to their prohibitive level. Compensation for immaterial damages
could be an instrument to induce demand. However, the latter should be connected to
asymmetric information for which reason this option is a more hypothetical one.
Limited maximum quality arises from differences in the development of healthcare sys-
tems around the world. Hence, a network of developed countries could be preferable, for
example, within systems such as the EU.
The potential for utilization of comparative advantage abroad is bounded as long as the
discussed factors play a significant role. Future work should examine which cost reduction
potentials, particularly for prohibitive non-monetary transaction costs, exist in practice.
As a result, cross-border care is most possible, if at all, between countries in close proximity
to one another. Today, the process of internationalization of healthcare is in its infancy,
and hence the general trade limitations in health services are now of particular relevance.
First, a theoretical discussion is important not only due to the unavailability of data,
but also to create a general analytical framework connected to health and international
economics.
The ability of specialization of specific health services and the ability of the supply
and funding sides to contract increase the potential benefit of integrating foreign service
providers in the ’production process’. While legal issues must be taken into account,
institutional representatives should consider expanding healthcare location options.
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Part II
Patient autonomy and education

1 General introduction
Despite the widespread recognition of a positive relationship between education and the
productivity of medical care, the question of how this channel might work in detail is
often neglected in the theoretical discussion (Deaton 2002). Taking the positive relation-
ship for granted and acknowledging the more intricate discussion of patient behaviour and
empowerment within the health related sciences, the following both chapters focus on spe-
cific education rather than general education as an individual decision problem. For this
reason, patient education as a source of increasing health care productivity is explored in
greater depth. The effect of increased patient autonomy is treated particularly intensively.
There is an extensive discussion in the medical and ethical literature covering the field
of informed and educated individuals/patients. This debate is driven by a change of the
framework for the patient-physician relationship (PPR) from the classically paternalistic
conception towards a more patient centered one (Taylor 2009). The focus in this area is on
shared decision-making, either with general information to support self-care for patients
encountering a certain clinical situation or with very specific information in the form of
decision aids which alleviates the choice between treatments (Llewellyn-Thomas 1995).
Generally, this kind of patient empowerment implies a higher degree of patient autonomy
and personal responsibility. From an ethical point of view, such an empowerment is seen
as strengthening self-awareness, knowledge and skills to improve the individual decision
competence. Patient empowerment is related to an ideal of self-dependent behaviour that
also integrates self-care as an alternative method of health production (Anderson and
Funnell 2005). Haug and Lavin (1981) already described self-care and efforts in education
as crucial elements for an increase in patient autonomy. Parker (2006) identifies health
literacy as essential for an individual to participate in a health care system and to have
access, to navigate, and also to manage self-care.
A large amount of economic research has been conducted concerning the impact of
uncertainty regarding actual health status and the effectiveness of medical care. Gross-
man’s health production function is often used therein as a basis (Grossman 1972).1 The
1See, amongst others, Picone et al. (1998), Liljas (1998), Chang (1996), Selden (1993), Dardanoni and
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production of health follows an optimization problem. The individual health capital de-
preciates over time. However, the individual can invest in different health investments as
prevention or medical care. In this context, education is mostly discussed as a general,
rather than a specific, input that decreases the rate of depreciation of health, increases
productivity of care, and reduces uncertainty, leading to an increase in allocative effi-
ciency of demand. There is a vast body of empirical evidence supporting the existence of
a positive relationship between health and education that corresponds with an increase
in productivity of health care demand and resource allocation in the area.2 Moreover,
Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) show that almost one third of the education gradient
(the difference in outcome relative to education) is caused by the cognitive ability and
knowledge of an individual. Hence, one important element of every explanation for the
impact of education is cognitive competence, not only in terms of general education, but
particularly in the area of specific health knowledge.
Related to Grossman (1972), Becker (1962) and the related literature, an increase in
human capital, specifically knowledge capital, increases the efficiency of production in gen-
eral. More specifically, Grossman (2005) delivers an extended analysis of the production of
health as a non-market good. An increase of health care productivity may only be a more
specific application of knowledge capital connected to an increase of the marginal product
of producing non-market goods such as health, resulting in a more efficient allocation of
resources. As in Grossman (2005), let us assume
H = eγEF (K) (1.1)
as a static production function of the non-market good ’individual health’ determining a
health stock H, where γ > 0, E is the individual level of medical knowledge, and K an
input implemented in a specified technology F linear homogeneous in K. Then, ∂lnH
∂E
= γ.
An increase in the individual skill level produces a percentaged increase of K’s marginal
product by γ. The sources used as input for the individual health stock become more
efficient in their application as the skill level rises.
However, a general increase in education is not sufficient to increase patient autonomy.
As previously mentioned, general education represents an input with, at most, a diffuse
effectiveness. As stated by Grossman (2005), a more accurate and detailed description is
delivered by weighing the competent handling of information as a crucial source of greater
allocation efficiency. To empower an individual to act more autonomously, or be more
informed or reflexive, it is necessary to enable him to correctly use different sources of
information (Henwood et al. 2003).
Wagstaff (1990), van Doorslaer (1987), Wagstaff (1986), Muurinen (1982).
2Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) present evidence with the help of an empirical survey.
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Kenkel (1990) analyzes symptoms in terms of imperfect information as a basis for de-
manding a physician or not. He finds that the more severe a health status is, the higher
the value of acquiring further information. An increase in the availability of information
is also able to increase the efficiency of medical demand due to a better assessment of the
necessity of professional medical provision by patients. Related to this, Culyer (1971) dis-
cussed patient rationality. The patient experiences uncertainty concerning proper illness
assessment as well as with respect to adequate treatment options and how to make a ratio-
nal choice among them. Hence, the ambiguity between the use of information and efficient
medical demand is possibly found in the bounded competence of properly utilizing this
information. For this reason, patient empowerment is strongly related to an increase in
this specific competence, leading to more autonomous behaviour and, therefore, decision-
making between alternative forms of medical provision. In the end, competent handling
of information is the basis for autonomous behaviour. From their empirical study on de-
cision competence, Fagerlin et al. (2010) also conclude that knowledge of certain medical
facts relevant for decision making can be very poor among patients. This fact makes
improvement of this specific knowledge indispensable for a proper optimization of the
quality of patient decision-making.
A more specific contribution regarding patient education is delivered by Price and Simon
(2009). These authors show that specific proposals, based on the choice of appropriate
treatments produced by medical research, have a positive effect on individual medical
behaviour. However, this seems to be more related to the level of individuals’ general
education. This result can be regarded as an indicator for the existence of a positive
relationship between converting specific information into concrete behaviour and the ne-
cessity of a capacity to afford such a conversion, possibly in the form of specific medical
knowledge.3
Finally, Altindag et al. (2011) show that the allocative efficiency hypothesis can only
be weakly supported by empirical evidence. The hypothesis states that there is a pos-
itive relationship between education and the efficiency of health production based on a
change of the input mix. The authors focus on the relationship between general education
and specific health knowledge. The authors results, however, could also be explained by
the type of education as explanatory variable. Education is measured by the degree of
schooling. Specific health knowledge, however, could need much more specific education
to increase more specific competences, such as assessment of medical information or the
state of one’s own health. Additionally, Altindag et al. focus on knowledge corresponding
3However, Price and Simon also offer an alternative explanation. More highly educated people might
just be able to choose more sophisticated physicians. Furthermore, education is a proxy for income
and access to such physicians. Hence, education and the ability to convert information is a possible
but not a necessary channel.
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to preventive behaviour, not on behaviour in a situation of illness. It could be the case
that the mix of treatments as ex-post inputs for health is more relevant for a positive rela-
tionship between health and education in the sense of the allocative efficiency hypothesis
than a mix of preventive measures.
Related to this discussion, sources such as the Internet can also be used by patients
to acquire further information. There is some empirical evidence suggesting that these
information sources influence the demand for traditional sources of medical care. Wag-
ner et al. (2001) point out the related potential for a decrease in medical demand. By
contrast, Suziedelyte (2010) and Lee (2008) find the Internet to be a complement to,
rather than a substitute for, medical care. Baker et al. (2003) report an ambiguous
impact of internet sources. Perhaps the reason for such an ambiguity is to be found in
the changes of quality and quantity of information supplied by the Internet over the last
ten years. Nevertheless, whether this ambiguity reflects an inefficient medical demand is
all but clear, as will be shown in the following analysis. On the one hand, there may be
an inefficiency caused by inadequate abilities to correctly assess the information that is
offered. On the other hand, different kinds of illnesses may result in demand for differ-
ent alternatives of treatment, such as consultation or self-care. Both these explanations
rely on the individual degree of medical knowledge. Knowledge in this respect means to
be able to correctly assess information, be it symptoms or external sources of information.
Given an increase of the individual productivity of medical care through general educa-
tion, investments in specific medical education represent an individual decision problem.
Investments imply a loss of money and time in order to purchase professional teaching
in medical subjects for laymen. Otherwise, such investments are able to increase the
efficiency of demand. Following the basic idea presented by Ehrlich and Becker (1972),
specific education is here configurated as a private investment in self-insurance and self-
protection. Usually, any measure to decrease the damage after realization of a risky event
is classified as self-insurance and any measure to decrease the risk of a specific illness is
classified as self-protection. The difference between our definition of self-insurance and
self-protection and the one by Ehrlich and Becker is the focus of education. As will be
shown below, education itself is a pure instrument of self-insurance. Hence, education
only focus on the ex-post damage due to some illnesses. However, education will be split
into two dimensions. The first dimension focus on a probability of a correct self-diagnosis
while the second dimension directly decreases the costs of health care. For that reason,
the first dimension is a kind of ex-post self-protection and the second dimension a kind
of ex-post self-insurance. However, both dimensions can be summarized as self-insurance
as described by Ehrlich and Becker. The following description discusses this specific
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structure of education in more detail.
In the following, chapter 2 focus only on education as self-insurance. A combination
of self-insurance and self-protection is the topic of chapter 3. Self-insurance is assumed
to take place within a decision framework as presented in Fig. II.1.1 with a focus on the
production of health after the realization of an illness. The timeline of decision-making
Figure II.1.1: General decision structure
is the following, valid for the discussion in chapters 2 and 3. First, one of two kinds of
illness can be realized ex-post, distinguished by the degree of severity (banal and severe).
Secondly, the individual is forced to generate a self-diagnosis as a subjective assessment
of the individual symptoms. Thirdly, a treatment choice takes place. There are two
treatment alternatives. Related to the literature discussed above, I want to discuss a
(partial) replacement of a consultation by self-care. Both types of treatment can be
realized as imperfect substitutes due to the division of labor between the physician and
the patient. In summary, two separate decisions have to be considered - diagnosis and
treatment. Typically, a risk in self-diagnosis surrounds this kind of decision-making (see
eg. Dardanoni and Wagstaff 1990). The choice of treatment depends on the (expected)
outcome of a consultation or self-care. The expected outcome depends on the quality
of self-diagnosis and the productivity of self-care. Hence, the treatment choice depends
on the following specific skills of the individual: 1. competence for self-diagnosis, 2.
productivity of self-care. Education should improve both competences. For this reason,
Fig. II.1.2 depicts self-insurance (right-hand side) as transformed into ex-post education,
which is in turn distinguished into ex-post self-protection and ex-post self-insurance. The
former focus on improving the self-diagnosis competence, whereas the latter accentuates
the productivity of self-care. The notation ’ex-post’ refers to the effectiveness of this kind
of education. As self-insurance in general, the impact of ex-post education as a concretion
of self-insurance comes into effect after a realization of an illness. The investment in ex-
post education itself takes place before any kind of illness is realized.
As discussed in more detail in chapter 2, both self-diagnosis and the number of viable
treatment alternatives can be seen as dimensions of patient autonomy. Altogether, ex-
post education fulfills the general objective of self-insurance in the sense of increasing
patient autonomy and, therefore, the efficiency of health production and, consequently, a
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decrease in costs after realizing a specific form of illness. The objective of chapter 2 is the
Figure II.1.2: General investment structure
formulation of a specific decision problem and a discussion of individual incentives to invest
in the defined specific forms of ex-post education in order to increase patient autonomy,
and thus the efficiency of resource allocation. A further focus lays on the rationality
of treatment decisions in acute situations of illness. This depends on a difference in
the information structure within the treatment decision. This structure will distinguish
between uncertainty and ambiguity.
Chapter 3 addresses self-protection as a preventive measure. As shown in Fig. II.1.2,
self-protection is transformed into ex-ante self-protection, divided into prevention itself
and ex-ante education. The reason is as follows. The individual is not able to perfectly
assess the effectiveness of the measure. The preventive measure is uncertain in its success.
Education could increase the competence of prevention (therefore the notation ’ex-ante’).
The effectiveness of prevention is crucial and ex-ante education can stimulate prevention.
In addition, the framework in which prevention takes place is also of importance. For
that reason, the framework of treatment alternatives and decision-making used in chapter
3 is adopted in chapter 3. Therefore, the specific ex-post treatment structure and de-
cision competences of the individual are also of relevance for investments in prevention.
Furthermore, to specify prevention, it is only focused on banal, rather than severe, ill-
ness. The objective of chapter 3 is the discussion of the incentive structure to invest in
ex-ante self-protection. As a further objective, the interrelationship between prevention
and investments in ex-post education, as discussed in chapter 2, is of specific interest. It
is clear, that resources can be allocated between decreasing risk (ex-ante) or decreasing
damage (ex-post). Finally, if both kinds of private investments are analyzed, it is also
necessary to include market insurance as an alternative (Kenkel 2000, Ehrlich and Becker
1972). A market-insurance can be effective as substitute or complement to self-protection
and self-insurance. Hence, the relation between the previously defined investments and
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market insurance is also investigated by making a distinction between symmetric and
asymmetric information.
Summarized, the outline is the following. First, patient autonomy and ex-post educa-
tion is analyzed in a framework of self-care and ex-post decision making under ambiguity
and uncertainty. Secondly, in addition to ex-post education, the roles of prevention, ex-
ante education and market insurance are included. The interrelation between ex-ante
self-protection and ex-post education is of specific relevance. The results are discussed
and conclusions are drawn in the final section.
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2 Patient autonomy, specific
knowledge and the role of self-care
Abbreviations Symbols
c... consultation Hi... health stock i = 1, 2
sc... self-care q... amount of medical demand
fb... first-best π... a priori probability
IV ... information value πi... error probability of self-diagnosis given i
SI... self-insurance Is... signal of self-diagnosis given i
SP ... self-protection psi... conditional probability given s and i
PPR... patient-physician z, z... lower, upper boundary of a positive IV
relationship Y ... gross income
y... net income
θ... subjective parameter of pessimism
α... marginal treatment costs self-care
E... education
M ... fixed costs c
N ... fixed costs sc
S... fixed costs for sc-inconvenience
Z... unspecified amount of expenditures
e... utility difference banal illness
d... utility difference severe illness
a... degree of risk-aversion
Table II.2.1: Abbreviations and Symbols for analytical analysis - Part II, ch. 2
2.1 Introduction
An extension of treatment alternatives through self-care and by reducing patient vulner-
ability through self diagnosis competence can be seen as dimensions of patient autonomy.
The questions are as follows:
1. How does decision-making under full rationality, uncertainty and ambiguity influ-
ence the efficiency of ex-post demand for consultation and self-care as imperfect
treatment alternatives?
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2. How does full rationality, uncertainty and ambiguity influence the amount of invest-
ments in specific medical education?
The PPR is, as a matter of principle, asymmetric due to the information gradient between
an expert and a layman. Arrow (1963) defines the information competence of a medical
specialist as costly due to the necessary investments for a professional education. A full
medical education for everybody would be inefficient. Hence, a division of labor makes
sense. However, Arrow also indicates a difference in quality, where differently trained
suppliers could also offer diverse forms of medical care (see also Smith (2005)). Vuori
(1980) discusses the optimal, but not maximal, supply of medical care, where the choice
between alternative forms of medical care is directed towards its optimization.
As previously discussed, specific knowledge corresponding to decision-making in the
field of health production is crucial to increasing allocative efficiency in medical care.
This can be the result of an increase in efficiency of production through a more efficient
choice of treatment alternatives. Lee (1995) discusses a threshold for choosing a consulta-
tion determined by the severity of illness and several socioeconomic variables. In this case,
the patient realizes demand due to a lack of information or competence to produce an
adequate treatment. Were it otherwise, the patient could care for himself. However, this
study does not discuss self-care explicitly. The patient may be able to identify the diagno-
sis and still not produce adequate treatment. Subsequently, Lee focus on the uncertainty
with which the patient is faced concerning the medical services offered by physicians. In
contrast, at the heart of my approach are the individual and his self-care alternative while
the physician as alternative behaves as a perfect agent. The choice between alternative
treatments is then a question of individual competence. Chang and Trivedi (2003) de-
scribe self-medication as a risky alternative to the risk-free option of professional care.
Their basic idea is similar to mine in its differentiation of care, but with a different focus.
They associate the function of income in developing countries with a generally superior
professional care alternative and disregard elements such as education.
As presented above, we will discuss consultation and self-care as a polarized differen-
tiation of medical supply. Contact with a physician is (partially) replaced by self-care.
Total replacement of the physician seems unrealistic; for that reason self-care should be
interpreted as an imperfect substitute because self-care is not appropriate to all kinds of
illness. The individual produces a higher outcome for a banal illness and a lower outcome
for a severe illness, when compared to a usual consultation. Differentiation between ill-
nesses demonstrates the real effectiveness of education. As stated by Grossman (2005), a
general increase in education is not sufficient for an increase in patient autonomy. More
specific knowledge, with corresponding investments, is necessary to handle specific infor-
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mation. If the main dimensions of a physician’s competence are diagnosis and therapy,
education should increase self-diagnosis competence and productivity of self-care. Both
categories are defined as dimensions of patient autonomy. Self-diagnosis competence can
be interpreted as ex-post self-protection (SP ), meaning a reduction in the risk of a false
diagnosis associated with a loss of utility due to a wrong treatment choice. Productivity
of self-care can be interpreted as ex-post self-insurance (SI), which means a reduction in
utility loss after realizing a specific kind of illness based on a more efficient production of
health. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) define SP and SI more generally. The main difference
is that while the former is focused on the a priori risk and the latter on the ex-post utility,
I discuss both with respect to the ex-post treatment choice. While the a priori risk of
realizing a specific illness is not influenced, the risk of a false treatment choice can be
altered. With respect to Fig. II.1.2, the right-hand branch is the focus of this discussion.
For simplification, the following discussion represses the prefix ex-post for SI and SP .
The decision between treatment alternatives is based on a decision tree framework.
There are two decisions: a) investment in education ex-ante (before realization of an ill-
ness); and b) choice between self-care and consultation ex-post (after realization of an
illness). Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) discuss the relationship between uncertainty of
diagnosis and healthcare demand. An increase in uncertainty increases demand. Taking
this relationship into account, my approach focus on the formulation of a more explicit
decision problem, with consultation and self-care as explicit treatment alternatives, distin-
guishing the effectiveness of risk in self-diagnosis. To reflect this aspect I use a framework
of a) ambiguity and b) uncertainty as information structures determining the ex-post
treatment choice. The difference between both mechanisms is the handling of stochastic
dependence between the actual illness and the ex-post treatment choice. While from an
ex-ante point of view the education decision takes place under conditions of uncertainty,
the ex-post treatment choice itself takes place under conditions of either ambiguity or un-
certainty. Under ambiguity a decoupling between ex-ante and ex-post knowledge about
risk occurs in connection with an ex-post decision based on the fixing of a self-diagnosed
illness and the application of a decision rule. The background of this assumption is a
kind of loss of rationality in an acute situation of indisposition (Arrow 1963, Pauly 1988).
While from an ex-ante point of view perfect knowledge about any risk is available, in an
ex-post state of acute indisposition, the individual is only aware of symptoms that should
be assessed. However, as further discussed, the treatment choice itself is based on a sub-
jective parameter of pessimism rather than the calculation of risk. The latter is different
in an uncertain situation where the ex-post treatment choice implements knowledge of
the quality of self-diagnosis and therefore the risk of false self-diagnosis associated with
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a conditional decision. This research differs from Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990). The
framework of uncertainty discussed here has a similar impact to that derived by Dard-
anoni and Wagstaff. However, the dependence on specific treatment characteristics, as
well as the explicit formulation of conditional decision-making, focus on an explicit quality
of diagnosis, thus delivering more detailed results with respect to demand behavior.
To model the decision-making problem, the following sources are used as technical
inputs: Pauker and Kassirer (1980) provide a framework for a decision threshold in health
care. Specifically the ex-post decision between treatment alternatives depends on the
outcomes by alternative, which are uncertain. There is a critical a priori probability for
which one alternative is superior to another, which is also important to the analysis.
Furthermore, as stated previously, the analysis distinguishes the rationality of ex-post
decision-making. Eeckhoudt (2002) and Eeckhoudt et al. (1984) analyze decision behavior
under conditions of uncertainty, focusing on diagnostic tests and conditional decisions in
a framework of imperfect information. More general studies about conditional decisions
and imperfect information are reported by Hirshleifer and Riley (1979), as well as La
Valle (1968). These studies utilize the factual risk situation within the decision between
(treatment) alternatives resulting in an information value, given a framework of imperfect
information about the factual state of nature. This technical framework is also applied
to this study in terms of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Additionally,
in terms of ambiguity, there is a replacement of conditional probabilities by a specific
parameter that represents a specific attitude related to pessimism. The main difference
is its fixed character and independence from any change of a priori illness risks and risks
in self-diagnosis. Using the former instruments, conclusions can be derived on how the
difference in individual rationality influences decision-making in terms of the choice of
treatment alternatives and corresponding investments in education.
The results are as follows. Education can increase patient autonomy by extending the
range of treatment alternatives and abolishing pure paternalism in the sense that con-
sultation is the dominant treatment alternative. Connected with the former, an increase
in self-diagnosis competence can be essential to an extension of the benefit of treatment
alternatives. Under certain circumstances of ambiguity, even measures that focus on the
avoidance of extending treatment alternatives can be beneficial, and medical paternalism
should instead be supported in order to increase individual welfare. The effectiveness of
SI and SP is of vital importance to evaluating the impact of education. The relative
fixed and marginal costs, the differentiation of illnesses according to their severity, the
characteristic appreciation of treatment alternatives under ambiguity and the degree of
risk-aversion are important parameters influencing the advantageousness of education and
self-care itself. Related to the former, the potential loss due to a false self-diagnosis and
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the net income for each state of illness and treatment are crucial to education. The for-
merly named impacts particularly depends on the focus of education on self-care and the
banal illness, as well as on the substitutional and complementary relations between SI
and SP . The degree of rationality and the distinction between decisions under conditions
of ambiguity or uncertainty are crucial. Compared to a first-best situation, meaning a
perfect competence of self-diagnosis, a second-best case under conditions of uncertainty
can deliver a too low or too high demand for consultation or self-care respectively. Under
conditions of ambiguity, however, the demand level for each treatment alternative can
be too high or too low when compared to the case under conditions of uncertainty. The
latter is based on an exaggerated level of optimism or pessimism with respect to the po-
tential realization of utility maximizing self-care or consultation outcomes. Therefore, a
solution under conditions of uncertainty is always second-best. However a situation under
conditions of ambiguity can never be superior to uncertainty. Following the former, the
optimal level of education expenditure under conditions of uncertainty is second-best, but
can be third-best under conditions of ambiguity.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section two analyzes the decision-making under condi-
tions of full rationality, uncertainty and ambiguity and section three optimal investments
of education under these conditions. Section four summarizes the results.
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2.2 Individual decision-making between treatment
alternatives
The patient is modeled as an active decision-maker. The physician on the other hand is
a perfect agent. The decision is made with a preference for avoiding consultation if this
should be beneficial. The chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, the basic elements of
the model are presented. Secondly, we discuss decision-making under conditions of full ra-
tionality. Thirdly, a lower degree of rationality is implemented where the decision-making
takes place under conditions of uncertainty. Fourthly, the decision-making structure is
extended in terms of a further decrease of the individual rationality where the decision-
making takes place under conditions of ambiguity.
2.2.1 Basic elements of the model
2.2.1.1 Illness structure and self-diagnosis
Given Fig. II.1.1, a severe illness H1 and a banal counterpart H2 can be realized with
H̄ > H2 > H1. Here, H̄ stands for perfect health. Let H1 occur with the a priori
objective probability π and H2 with 1 − π. Then the occurrence of an illness is certain,
but its severity is not. The individual is at least crudely informed about his own health
history and is therefore able to derive π ex-ante. After realizing Hi, a self-diagnosis
becomes necessary. The physician’s competence for diagnosis is perfect. In a case of full
rationality, the individual is also able to derive a perfect self-diagnosis. We also discuss
the case of an imperfect self-diagnosis. Then, the competence is bounded to be imperfect
for the layman.1 Then, in addition to π, πi (1−πi) represents the probability of a correct
(false) self-diagnosis of state i. The decision can then either be correct, false positive, or
correct, false negative (Tab. II.2.2).
πi depends on x with πi(x1, ..., xm), where x represents exogenous individual character-
istics, eg. age, general education, social surrounding, etc., which influence the capability
of arriving at a correct self-diagnosis in the absence of any specific medical education. πi
depends on the factual health status in the shape of a stochastic dependence. In principle,
π1 = π2 is possible. However, different probabilities may represent different perceptions
of illness. A factual situation H1 might be underrated because symptoms may seem quite
harmless and can be taken as suggesting H2. By contrast, H2 often exhibits symptoms of
a higher degree of acute indisposition, such as nausea, headache, or fever. Furthermore,
the medical education of laymen can differ in its potential of increasing self-diagnosis
1A self-diagnosis H1 does not primarily mean a specific diagnosis, but rather an exclusion of H2 due to
the great difficulty for laymen to come up with a correct diagnosis in the case of a critical illness.
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Illness Self diagnosis (sd) πi type of diagnosis
H1 H1 π1 correct positive (negative) sd H1 (H2)
H1 H2 1− π1 false positive (negative) sd H2 (H1)
H2 H2 π2 correct positive (negative) sd H2 (H1)
H2 H1 1− π2 false positive (negative) sd H1 (H2)
Table II.2.2: Possible types of self-diagnosis
competence. A layman diagnosis of H1 can be expected to be more difficult than one of
H2 and might depend on the learning capacity. For further discussion let π1 < π2. The
chance of a correct self-diagnosis in the case of H2 is higher than that for H1.2
2.2.1.2 Treatment alternatives and ex-post medical demand
Before the actual treatment choice is analyzed, the available treatment alternatives are
presented; these are consultation c and self-care sc as a polarized differentiation of medical
supply. The corresponding utility states are defined in Tab. II.2.3. These states depend
on the types of illness and care. It is important to highlight that the actual realization
of utility ex-post strongly depends on the treatment choice, either c or sc. Tab. II.2.2
suggests four possible states of nature as a combination of the actual illness and self-
diagnosis. However, while the self-diagnosis is important for the actual treatment choice,
the final outcome for each treatment alternative only depends on the final application
of c or sc, as will be shown below in more detail. The utility function uik fulfills the
characteristics of u′(y) > 0, u′′(y) < 0 where yik presents the corresponding net income
for each utility state with k = c, sc and i = 1, 2. We now derive the medical demand
2A dependence π′1(π) > 0 in which π′2(π) < 0 is conceivable. An increase in π might raise the individual’s
sensitivity in the case of H1 being the factual illness, eg. through a specific exposition and disposition
to be sick. However, this also leads to an increase of sensitivity for the false positive diagnosis of H1
in the case of H2. Otherwise, the opposite may be the case if π is low. Then, a false self-diagnosis
regarding H1 can be expected. This is not equivalent to a stochastic dependence of the probabilities.
Additionally, as is shown by Khwaja et al. (2007), smokers and non-smokers can be divided along
the lines of their risk-assessment. While the former are relatively optimistic, the latter are more
pessimistic. This could also be seen as an indicator for a difference in ex-post assessment of illnesses.
While the former could be more often disposed to diagnose H2, the latter may tend towards H1.
Hence, there might be a natural difference between people when it comes to their self-assessment.
Finally, while these points are not explicitly discussed in the context of the model at hand, they
should still be kept in mind if educational measures are to be implemented.
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consultation (c) self-care (sc)
H1 u
1
c = u(y
1
c ) u
1
sc = u(y
1
sc)
H2 u
2
c = u(y
2
c ) u
2
sc = u(y
2
sc)
Table II.2.3: Specification of utility for consultation and self-care - I
given a choice of c or sc. For that we need to specify the utility arguments: For c, the
marginal costs are set to one. sc usually differs in marginal costs which are set to α where
sc can be more or less costly than c per demanded unit. The latter means an implicit
differentiation of productivity between the physician and a layman.3 There are also fixed
costs N (M) for sc (c). M could be the waiting time when a physician is demanded,
whereas N could represent the costs of searching for adequate self-care.4 Furthermore, N
can cover costs connected with a certificate of incapacity to work, which cannot be issued
in the case of sc. In addition, costs can be connected to a kind of inconvenience if c is not
applied in the case of illness. The latter point can be very different between individuals.
Some elderly persons may search for contact with a physician, sometimes only for social
contact. Other individuals may be very sensitive when they fall ill, accompanied with an
urgent personal requirement to be attended to by a physician.
The production of health is linear with H + q, where qi is medical demand ex-post
through either c or sc. Health is an input for Y with Y ′ > 0, Y ′′ < 0. y is the net income
as the difference between Y and the variable as well as fixed treatment costs as presented
before. We have four different combinations between health state and treatment, each
with a corresponding medical demand and net income. For c the gross and net incomes
are defined as:
Y ic = Y (Hi + q
i) (2.1)
yic = Y
i
c − qi −M (2.2)
Given a choice of c the diagnosis is delivered by the physician which is assumed to be
perfect, resulting in definite demand qi∗c . The optimal demand after realization of Hi and
3It might also be pointed out that especially in the case of banal illnesses, the patient actually knows
more about their physiological and psychological conditions and, accordingly, about the appropriate
provisions, eg. through immediate experience and a better assessment of individual requirements.
For that reason, a layman could be more efficient in the implementation of a therapy. This is quite
a fundamental aspect, especially in the ethical discussion concerning patient autonomy in which, at
first, the patient would have to assess their own situation before contacting any external person for
care.
4Cauley (1987) identifies a time price as the equivalent to the loss of income during demand of medical
care. See also Wagner et al. (2001), reporting some evidence for M .
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a choice of c is:
Y i′c = 1 → q1∗ > q2∗ (2.3)
We assume that Y 1′c (H1) > 1 and Y 2′c (H1) > 1. The marginal product with respect to
an increase in the health status and the marginal costs must be equalized. The demand
essentially depends on the particular health status or the physician’s (certain) diagnosis
respectively. To simplify matters, given an marginal cost of one, the physician is always
able to recover perfect health with
H̄ = H ic + q
i∗
c (2.4)
For sc the gross and net incomes are defined as:
Y 1sc = Y (H
−
1 + q
1−) (2.5)
Y 2sc = Y (H1 + q
sc) (2.6)
y1sc = Y
1
sc − αqsc − q1− −N −M − S (2.7)
y2sc = Y
2
sc − αqsc −N (2.8)
with H−1 as health status reduced by a depreciation and q1− as the corresponding demand
The demand for sc is more specific. We assume that any demand of sc is not productive
in the case of a severe illness (see below). The patient is able to assess the productivity,
which is meant to reflect a crude idea about their own competences pertaining to sc.
Given a choice of sc and given a productivity of zero in the case of H1, the medical
demand in the case of sc can only be derived for H2 as the actual illness. Due to the risk
of a false self-diagnosis the outcome of sc is potentially uncertain. Different to the choice
of c where the diagnosis is certain both u1sc and u2sc are potential outcomes. Then, usually
qsc∗ as medical demand for sc would be derived by a maximization of the expected utility
of sc. However, we assume that given a choice of sc the individual always chooses qsc∗
only in dependence of u2sc. This assumption implies, that a realized choice of sc is always
connected with ignorance of a potentially false treatment choice in dependence of the
factual illness. If sc is chosen by the individual then only H2 is in mind of the individual
while H1 is ignored. However, when the individual calculates the expected utility values
for c and sc to derive a choice of a treatment alternative from an ex-ante perspective, qsc∗
is necessary to be anticipated and implemented into this calculation.
The former situation of assumed ignorance also implies an over-assessment of the indi-
vidual productivity of self-care due to the ignorance of the potential outcome u1sc. How
can this be motivated? As described by Culyer (1971), individuals tend to ignore their
79
2 Patient autonomy, specific knowledge and the role of self-care
sickness. However, this ignorance may be an extreme situation. A more weak case is
a situation in which the individual does not ignore the sickness (eg. H2) itself, but the
effectiveness of an alternative treatment c where sc can also be chosen, but H2 is not
certain. Both cases, the complete ignorance of a sickness (eg. of H2) or the ignorance of
the effectiveness of alternative treatments (eg. of c) result in a wrong assessment of the
chosen alternative sc. In detail, an over-assessment of the individual productivity takes
place or in other words an inappropriate or too high demand qsc (either zero in the case
of total ignorance or qsc∗ in the case of ignorance of H1 as potential sickness beside H2).
Additionally, this over-assessement differs from Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990). They
determine that an increase in uncertainty also increases demand. However, there is also a
relationship between risk of false self-diagnosis and medical demand in our context. While
an increase in the risk does not deliver an increase in qsc, there will be shown below, in a
situation of uncertainty, a decrease of demand for consultation (self-care) and an increase
of demand for self-care (consultation) can be related with a decrease in the risk of a false
self-diagnosis of a banal (severe) illness. Finally, the demand for sc is given by:
Y 2′sc = α → qsc∗ (2.9)
Firstly, if 1 < α, y2sc < y2c follows. Secondly, for 1 > α, (2.9) cannot be fulfilled. In fact,
Y 2′sc is bounded due to the maximum level of health H̄ with Y 2′sc = 1. q2∗ = qsc∗ is in fact
realized as a corner solution resulting in y2sc > y2c due a cost advantage on the side of the
layman. The latter implies the assumption, that q2∗ as the medical supply delivered by
the physician also represents the maximum level of medical instruments available for that
specific kind of illness. Every additional demand has a productivity of zero.
Finally, y1sc is composed as follows: sc only generates demand as in (2.9). Hence, if H1
is the factual illness and sc is chosen, qsc is conditional on H2 (as a false self-diagnosis,
presented above). As can be seen in (2.5), another demand q1− than qsc is effective. That
represents a zero-productivity in the case of a banal illness. The application of sc only
produces costs αqsc∗ and N . Hence, the assumed demand behavior for sc implies a too
high demand qsc∗ with respect to the risk of false self-diagnosis.5 As a result of the false
choice, a depreciation of H1 with dH < H1 is the result delivering H−1 as new health
status. Finally, an urgency of choosing c is assumed to follow if sc is chosen at first in the
case of a severe illness. Then, the optimal demand q1−∗ is given by:
Y 1′sc = 1 → q1−∗ > q1∗ (2.10)
5In fact, we could also reduce the net income through any fixed value. However, as will be shown below
any measure which is able to reduce the marginal costs α also influences y1sc and not only y2sc.
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Additionally, S ≥ 0 are the fixed costs generated by further inconvenience. In summary,
due to (2.10), the optimal gross income is Y (H1 + q1) = Y (H−1 + q1−), however, y1c must
exceed y1sc. In fact, this relation delivers a sufficient condition for sharing the division of
labor.
To sum it up, u1c > u1sc as relationship of the outcomes for the severe illness. However,
for a banal illness u2c < u2sc or u2c > u2sc are possible relationships. Hence, sc is not
appropriate for all types of illness. sc thus can be defined as an imperfect substitute for
c based on the remaining division of labor. Finally, u2c > u1c and u2sc > u1sc. Hence, u1sc is
the worst and u2c or u2sc is the best case. As is assumed throughout this paper, certainty
concerning the utility at each health state and therefore the effectiveness of medical care is
given. Uncertainty can only arise through the risk of false self-diagnosis and, subsequently,
an inadequate treatment choice or one that fails to maximize utility, realizing one of the
four different utility values.6
2.2.1.3 Dimensions of patient autonomy
What understanding of paternalism and autonomy underlies the following discussion?
Paternalism can be seen as one end of a spectrum of control (Stewart 2001, Taylor 2009).
While on one side the perfectly informed patient is located, paternalism represents the
opposite. On the one hand, ’informed’ means that the patient is able to assess the
actual situation as well as to react appropriately in the way of being productive in a
self-made therapy which may also deliver a choice against a physician. On the other
hand, paternalism in the medical literature is described as physician-centered where the
patient strictly follows the directives of the physician independently of the actual situation
of illness (Byrne and Long 1976). If we connect this idea with an economical decision
problem, a situation of paternalism or in other words a situation of a dominant treatment
alternative of consultation could also be a result of optimization. In detail, the patient
could assess consultation as strictly superior to any other treatment alternative because
of its superior expected value of utility. Hence, paternalism in a medical sense does
not necessarily mean a difference to an optimal choice between treatment alternatives.
For example, elderly people feel more comfortable in a situation of a strict demand of
consultation (Coulter 1999, Jones 2003, Taylor 2009). This is especially the case for people
with more severe illnesses. In fact, if the outcomes for a severe illness are higher weighted
6Note that, usually, a perfect substitute entails an indifference between alternatives due to the equaliza-
tion of utilities. In the context discussed here, however, such equalization is only possible according to
the expected utility between both treatment alternatives. Hence, imperfect substitute actually means
this kind of relation between said alternatives. However, imperfect also means that the expected
utility is also only equalized with respect to a specific probability relation.
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than the outcomes for a less severe illness, consultation could be generally beneficial as a
result of a common decision-making problem.
The construction of utility presents a simple set of treatment alternatives - c or sc
(Tab. II.2.4). In the case of pure paternalism, c can be seen as objectively dominant with
c dominance non-dominance sc
H1 u
1
c > > u
1
sc
H2 u
2
c > < u
2
sc
Table II.2.4: Dominance and non-dominance of consultation
u2c > u
2
sc or
Y (H2 + q
2∗)− Y (H2 + qsc∗) > q2∗ − αqsc∗ +M −N (2.11)
The patient knows c is superior to sc. The physician is always the best alternative from a
rational point of view.7 Hence, paternalism here does not mean a general shift of decision
competences to the physician, but means that this competence is rationally transferred
by the individual to the physician. As explained, this does not necessarily differ from a
situation of paternalism in the understanding within the medical discussion.
In addition to the objective dominance in (2.11), a further way of realizing dominance
can be defined as follows which we call subjective dominance. If the existing probabilities
are implemented within the decision, ex-post dominance can arise through EUc > EUsc
(see the cases of uncertainty and ambiguity below).
Following the former discussion, paternalism does not amount to a complete absence
of decision competence, but rather entails a lack of alternative treatments for the banal
illness. As a result, autonomy (or to be informed or to be productive) implies an abol-
ishment of the dominance of c. Thus, autonomy can be interpreted as a gradual value
increasing with the number of alternatives. However, to simplify matters, only two treat-
ments are discussed here. Autonomy is taken to be a categorical variable in the sense that
either an alternative exists (c is non-dominant) or this is not the case (c is dominant).
A second dimension of autonomy, self-diagnosis competence, is of importance as well.
The case of a perfect competence πi = 1 can reasonably be discarded. This fact can be
regarded as a reason for medical paternalism and the shift of decision competence from
7Note that if N < M and 1 < α non-dominance is possible. One could justifiably argue that in such a
case, similar to sc(H1), a depreciation of health capital takes place because sc is not able to achieve
H̄. In consequence, sc decreases in utility and c turns to dominance and eliminates N < M as a
possible case of non-dominance. However, this case does not significantly influence the results.
82
2.2 Individual decision-making between treatment alternatives
the patient to the physician, but at the same time as a source of a voluntary shift of
demand to consultation from an economical perspective. Hence, as will be shown below,
the mere extension of alternatives does not guarantee utility-maximizing decisions.8
2.2.2 Treatment choice under conditions of full rationality
A situation of full rationality reflects a perfect competence of self-diagnosis with π1 =
π2 = 1. After realizing H1 or H2, the individual is always able to identify the illness
perfectly. Hence, from an ex-ante perspective, the expected utility can be written as:
EUfb = πu
1
c(q
1∗) + (1− π)max{u2c(q2∗);u2sc(qsc∗)} (2.12)
In the optimum the individual should choose the utility maximizing treatment alternative
for each health state. (2.12) is the first-best case conditional on a scenario where no
educational measures are offered and insurance contracts are not available.9
2.2.3 Treatment choice under conditions of uncertainty
The ex-post decision takes place under uncertainty. Given Tab. II.2.2, the self-diagnosis
competence is not perfect. Two cases have to be distinguished: 1. ex-post knowledge
about a priori probabilities π, 2. ex-post knowledge about π and πi.
2.2.3.1 Ex-post knowledge about a priori probabilities
In a case of acute indisposition, some knowledge may be available concerning the likelihood
to realize Hi. Hence, only π is taken into account when deciding between c and sc. At this
point the ex-post decision itself does not depend on an assessment of the symptoms. From
an ex-ante point of view the decision structure is given by Fig. II.2.1. It should be noted
at this point, the four states of nature presented in Tab. II.2.2 are crucial to the final
treatment choice. However, the realized utility values in Fig. II.2.1 are symmetric. In
fact, the actual illness determines the effective utility given the treatment choice resulting
in two possible utility values for each treatment alternative. From an ex-ante point of
view, the expected utility can be written as:
EU = πmax{EUc;EUsc}+ (1− π)max{EUc;EUsc} = max{EUc;EUsc} (2.13)
8Due to the static consideration of investments in education, a temporal choice with respect to a dis-
counting of the future value of health is not implemented here as a determinant of autonomy. For
this subject, see inter alia Reach (2009).
9The possibility of demand for insurance coverage is extensively discussed in chapter 3.
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Figure II.2.1: Decision structure under knowledge about a priori probabilities
with
EUk = πu
1
k + (1− π)u2k, k = c, sc (2.14)
In such a situation, either c or sc is exclusively chosen. Hence, different to the case of full
rationality sc can also be dominant (if π < π∗), however, only in terms of expected utility.
If EUc > EUsc the patient chooses c. Afterwards, the physician informs the patient of
the factual diagnosis and a corresponding treatment, which is not necessarily optimal if
H2 is the factual illness and u2c < u2sc. If EUc < EUsc, then sc is chosen. Please note, as
discussed above, a choice of sc only generates a demand qsc as a result of optimization
of u2sc, although H1 is in fact possible and although the individual is informend about π.
We focus on the rationality of decision behaviour in terms of the choice of a treatment
alternative and less on a change of rationality in terms of medical demand after the
treatment choice. The threshold π∗ for which both alternatives yield equal utility is given
by (similar to (2.22))
π∗ =
e
e+ d
(2.15)
with u1c − u1sc = d and u2sc − u2c = e (see also Eeckhoudt (1984)). Fig. II.2.2 shows the
decision threshold where the expected utility values are printed in dependence from the
a priori probability π. π∗ decreases (increases) with a potential loss of H1 (H2). (2.15)
cannot be fulfilled with π∗ ∈ [0, 1] if c is dominant with u2c > u2sc. In Fig. II.2.2 EUfb
represents (2.12) as the first-best case under full rationality and non-dominance of c.
Except for π = 1 and π = 0, (2.12) always exceeds (2.13).
A choice of sc is more difficult to realize if the individual is risk averse with u1sc < u1c <
u2c < u
2
sc or u1′sc > u1′c > u2′c > u2′sc. It may be reasonable that y1c − y1sc >> y2sc − y2c and,
accordingly, π∗ << 0.5.10 A risk neutral individual may choose sc while a risk averse
10This relation can be explicitly calculated as S −M > q1 + q2 − q1− should be valid due to S >> M
and q1 < q1−.
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Figure II.2.2: Decision threshold and knowledge of a priori probabilities
individual does not. The loss through a severe illness given a choice of sc is less fatal for
a risk neutral than for a risk averse individual.
2.2.3.2 Conditional ex-post decision
The competence for self-diagnosis is implemented as a dimension of patient autonomy.
Now, after realizing an illness a self-diagnosis takes place delivering the basis for a treat-
ment choice. Besides π the individual is also informed ex-post about πi. Hence, the
quality of a signal Is in case Hi is known. Is here represents the self-diagnosis Hs. Qual-
ity means the level of πi as the competence for correctly interpreting a symptom in order
to derive Is. This knowledge means that the diagnosis and the choice between c and sc
are conditional on Hi and stochastically depend on it. This can typically be described by
a posteriori probabilities using the theorem of Bayes calculated as follows:11
p(H1, I1) =
ππ1
p(I1)
= p11 ; p(H1, I2) =
π(1− π1)
p(I2)
= p12 (2.16)
p(H2, I2) =
(1− π)π2
p(I2)
= p22 ; p(H2, I1) =
(1− π)(1− π2)
p(I1)
= p21 (2.17)
11La Valle (1968) as well as Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) discuss imperfect information as conditional
decisions. Eeckhoudt (1984) analyzes diagnostic tests also using conditional decisions as a technical
background also applied to the problem we discuss in this section.
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with
p(I1) = ππ1 + (1− π)(1− π2) ; p(I2) = π(1− π1) + (1− π)π2 (2.18)
(2.18) represents the probabilities of signal Is (self-diagnosis Hs) occurring. (2.16) [2.17]
represents the probabilities that H1 [H2] occurs conditional on the symptom being in-
terpreted as I1 or I2. The lower the quality of interpretation, the lower p(H1, I1) and
p(H2, I2). The maximum value is achieved for πi = 1 with p(H1, I1) = p(H2, I2) = 1. The
competence for self-diagnosis thus becomes perfect and the expected value from an ex-
ante point of view is equal to (2.12), which necessarily exceeds (2.13) if c is non-dominant
(with u2c < u2sc). If πi < 1, the conditional probabilities are relevant. The individual then
calculates the expected utility for each signal in order to choose between c and sc. There
are only two of these, one for I1 and the other for I2. Then, similarly to (2.13), the ex-ante
expected utility can be calculated using the decision structure in Fig. II.2.3 (with s = 1, 2
and i = 1, 2):
Figure II.2.3: Decision structure under conditional decision-making
EU =
2∑
i=1
p(Ii)max
{
2∑
i=1
psiu
s
c;
2∑
i=1
psiu
s
sc
}
(2.19)
The expected utilities of c and sc are based on p11 and p21 in case I1 and on p22 and p12
for signal I2. From an ex-ante point of view, the occurrence of Ii is uncertain with p(Ii).
Hence, the quality of a patient’s self-diagnosis is of specific importance. Given the signal,
a threshold level can be calculated for the choice between c and sc. The threshold for
choosing sc for each indicator I1 and I2 is (similar to (2.15)):
p1i <
e
e+ d
(2.20)
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2.2.3.3 Information value
Let us assume the individual consciously uses Is as further information. Then, an in-
formation value IV can be calculated from the difference between (2.13) and (2.19) in
which EU(π)−EU(p(Is), psi) ≤ 0 strictly holds (see app. 5.1). IV represents the (condi-
tional) increase of the expected utility through knowledge of the quality of self-diagnosis.
To show IV more clearly, the representation from Eeckhoudt (1984) is used here (Tab.
II.2.5) and printed in Fig. II.2.4a/b. While Fig. II.2.4a depicts the differences between
the expected utilities with and without further diagnosis information, eg. IV1 and IV2,
Fig. II.2.4b represents Tab. II.2.5 in which IV depends on π.12 To keep the analysis as
π IV
0 ≤ π ≤ z 0
z ≤ π ≤ ed+e dπ1π − e(1− π2)(1− π)
e
d+e ≤ π ≤ z d(π1 − 1)π + eπ2(1− π)
z ≤ π ≤ 1 0
Table II.2.5: Function of the information value
simple as possible we set p12 < p11 which implies that π1 + π2 > 1 as a sufficient level of
quality of self-diagnosis.13 Then, z = e(1−π2)
π1d+e(1−π2) and z =
eπ2
(1−π1)d+eπ2 .
14 Following Pauker
and Kassirer (1980), π < z (z < π) represents a threshold for which sc (c) is chosen
independently from a self-diagnosis. For π < z, the decision is for sc with or without the
use of the signal (sc is also delivered as optimal using (2.15)). Hence, IV = 0 and sc
is dominant.15 In Fig. II.2.4a this is valid for p11 < π∗0 and the corresponding expected
utility value on curve EUsc. If π exceeds z, IV increases as long as the threshold level of
π is within the interval shown on line two in Tab. II.2.5. If I1 occurs, then c is chosen,
but by contrast, sc remains optimal for the individual if I2 occurs. Without a signal the
decision is also in favor of sc. In that case, a line EU(Is) (or (2.19)) can be drawn in
Fig. II.2.4a between EUc and EUsc in the range between p′11 and p′12, representing the
12At this point I would like to thank Louis Eeckhoudt for the intensive scientific exchange according to
imperfect information and the general problem of medical diagnoses.
13p12 > p11 is also a possibility, which does not influence the results significantly.
14z (z) can be easily calculated with p11 (p12) smaller (higher) than the threshold (2.20).
15Dominance of sc was excluded under ambiguity due to θ1 > θ∗.
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Figure II.2.4: Information value
expected utility under imperfect information. At π′, the second line in Tab. II.2.5 can
be represented as IV1. Then, an increase of π to π′′ shifts EU(Is) due to an increase of
p′′11 and p′′12. IV also increases until π = π∗0. The printed example shows π′′ > π∗0. The
choice without a signal will be c and remains thus if the signal is I1, but changes to sc
with signal I2. IV takes the value of the third line in Tab. II.2.5 and IV2 in Fig. II.2.4a.
If line four becomes relevant, p11 and p12 lie above the threshold and, consequently, c is
chosen independently from the signal with IV = 0, resulting in dominance of c. Note
that dominance with u2c > u2sc might again be the case. Then, IV = 0 for each value of π.
Tab. II.2.5 is translated into Fig. II.2.4b representing the differences between the curves
EUc, EUsc and EU(Is, π). The maximum is IVmax = ed(π1+π2−1)e+d , which increases in π1
and π2 with IVmax = ded+e under perfect information and p11 = 1 and p12 = 0. IV
perf is the
curve for perfect information always dominating IV nonperf . IV perf represents the case of
full rationality, given by EUfb. Given any value π, the ratio IV (π)
nonperf
IV (π)perf
can be interpreted
as a measure of the competence for self-diagnosis. In other words, if IV > 0 the individual
utility is improved in comparison to a situation without the use of information about the
quality of self-diagnosis. Only in case of dominance, IV = 0 is the result. Hence, a
conditional decision-making between c and sc produces a second-best solution as long as
the quality of self-diagnosis is not perfect. This second-best solution is conditional on
a situation without education. The second element of the second-best solution can be
found in the ignorance in terms of the illness risk and the quality of self-diagnosis as well
as the assumed calculation of medical demand in the case of sc where a risk of a false
self-diagnosis is also ignored.
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As can be read from Fig. II.2.4a/b and Tab. II.2.5, if IV > 0, then d and e are relevant
with respect to the attitude of EU(Is) and the amount of IV . Due to the implementation
of conditional probabilities including πi, the loss within one health state based on a false
self-diagnosis is thus of importance for IV .
If the individual is risk neutral, d and e increase (see below in more detail). The
thresholds z and z increase, leading to a shift in a positive IV to the right due to a more
attractive sc. sc becomes relevant for a higher range of π, independent of the diagnosis.
2.2.4 Treatment choice under conditions of ambiguity
The case of uncertainty implies a high degree of rationality, meaning the consideration
of conditional probabilities. However, as it is usually postulated in health economics,
there is a lack of rationality in terms of applying adequate information about the factual
situation with respect to risks or the awareness of the own competences on self-diagnosis.
For that reason we discuss a further ex-post decision-making scenario under conditions of
ambiguity. How is that structured? The structure depends on the knowledge about risks
and treatment alternatives. From an ex-ante point of view (before any illness is realized),
the individual can assess both π and πi and is also aware of the medical demand ex-post.
However, the medical demand ex-post is derived under conditions of a different level of
knowledge (after realization of an illness). The reason is, that in contrast to an ex-ante
situation of perfect health the individual is in a situation of acute indisposition ex-post.
Then, a decoupling of ex-ante information and ex-post behavior could take place. In detail,
after the occurrence of illness, the patient is not aware of any probabilities, yet is aware of
the given symptoms and forced to generate a self-diagnosis from them. After generating
a self-diagnosis, the individual is also aware of the treatment alternatives that could be
chosen and the corresponding utility values provided by each alternative. However, at
this point, the decision is made under a reduced form of rationality. This is because the
individual is neither aware of the probability of having Hi nor of the probability of a false
self-diagnosis. Hence, under said ambiguity the choice is only based on an awareness of
all possible outcomes and the application of a specific kind of decision rule. It follows
then that the stochastic dependence between πi and Hi remains, however, this does not
bring about any technical consequences affecting the ex-post treatment decision.
Summarized, the timing of decision-making under ambiguity is as follows: If Hi is
realized, the individual is forced to generate a self-diagnosis. Given the self-diagnosis,
a decision rule is applied to decide between the treatments ex-post. In other words,
knowledge about the general possibility of a false self-diagnosis coerces the individual
to cover each of the possible health states in the calculus. The used rule is the Hurwicz
decision rule (Hurwicz 1951) which includes maximin and maximax rules as extreme cases.
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The individual is characterized by a parameter of pessimism θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, which is
used to weight the respective utility values for each treatment alternative:
EUk(θ) = θu
1
k + (1− θ)u2k (2.21)
θ is interpreted generally as a degree of pessimism, because it weights the worst of both
levels of potential illnesses. For θ = 1, (2.21) is EUk(1) = u1k with u1c vs u1sc as expected
outcomes. For θ = 0, (2.21) is EUk(0) = u2k. Given a self-diagnosis, the treatment choice
is derived by a comparison of expected utilities EUc and EUsc based on θ. Given a choice
of c or sc and given a factual degree of illness severity, uik is realized. The crucial difference
to uncertainty is given by the way the choice is derived. Under ambiguity the expected
value is calculated by application of a decision rule and a parameter of pessimism θ. Under
uncertainty, θ is replaced by the conditional probabilities.
θ is assumed to be state dependent. Given H1 (H2) as self-diagnosis, θ1 (θ2) is realized.
Basically, given a self-diagnosisHi, the individual shifts the weight to uik. This assumption
can be seen as the individual belief in the own competence for self-diagnosis. Then, θ1 is
comparably high and θ2 comparably low.16
Finally, given the previous description about self-diagnosis and treatment alternatives,
from an ex-ante point of view the decision structure is given by Fig. II.2.5. It should be
Figure II.2.5: Decision structure under ambiguity - I
noted at this point, that the four states of nature presented in Tab. II.2.2 are crucial to the
final treatment choice. However, the realized utility values as shown in Fig. II.2.5 show
symmetry in these values. In fact, the actual illness determines the effective utility given
16Edwards and Elwyn (1999) show that characteristics such as anxiety, certainty about decisions, ex-
pected satisfaction, etc., in relation to treatment choice are complements to such behavioral outcomes
as compliance, risk perception, and knowledge about the treatments. Hence, decisions are driven by
subjective beliefs and sensations. Thus, θi must be seen as related to this kind of decision drivers.
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the treatment choice resulting in two possible utility values for each treatment alternative.
Dominance of c is of specific relevance. If θ1 = 1, c is chosen if H1 is the self-diagnosis
due to u1c > u1sc. However, if θ1 = 0, u2c vs u2sc are the expected outcomes with a cor-
responding choice of c or sc. The first (latter) case can be translated into the maximin
(maximax) rule with the maximum pessimism (optimism) as avoidance of the worst case
u1sc (implementation of the best case u2sc if u2sc > u2c). The same can be derived for a
self-diagnosis H2 and a corresponding value θ2. The former cases can be seen as corner
constellations. Again, a threshold level θ∗ can be calculated by:
θ∗ <
e
e+ d
(2.22)
Furthermore, similar to the case of uncertainty θ∗ decreases if the individual is risk averse.
c becomes more attractive due to the remaining risk of a false choice, despite an existing
advantage of sc(H2).
In fact, θ∗ equals π∗ because it also represents the intersection of EUc with EUsc. How-
ever, the interpretation is different. θ∗ can be interpreted as a critical value of pessimism.
The higher θi the higher the degree of pessimism and therefore the weight of the severe
illness. In detail, c (sc) is chosen generally if θ∗ < (>)θi. Hence, the level of pessimism
must exceed the critical value θ∗ to choose c. A subjective dominance of c arises through
a level θ1 and θ2 which exceeds θ∗. For the subsequent discussion, the following relations
are assumed: θ∗ < θ1, θ∗><θ2. Hence, if the severe illness is diagnosed, c is always chosen;
however, in the case of banal illness, θ2 can vary. Then, subjective dominance arises if
also θ∗ < θ2 is the case.
The relations of ex-post utility values and the possible sources of dominance of c delivers
the basis of the factual treatment choice. Given an imperfect competence for self-diagnosis
and faced with a decision under ambiguity, Fig. II.2.5 can be translated into the following
ex-ante condition:
EU = π
[
π1u
1
c + (1− π1)u1k(θ2)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EU1
+(1− π)
[
π2u
2
k(θ2) + (1− π2)u2c
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EU2
(2.23)
If θ2 < θ∗ < θ1, (2.23) becomes:
EU = π
[
π1u
1
c + (1− π1)u1sc
]
+ (1− π)
[
π2u
2
sc + (1− π2)u2c
]
(2.24)
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For dominance of c, (2.23) can be simplified for θ2 ≥ θ∗ or u2c > u2sc:
EU = πu1c + (1− π)u2c (2.25)
(2.24) and (2.25) are not able to achieve the maximum of EUfb given an imperfect self-
diagnosis competence (πi < 1) and non-dominance of c. Hence, the first-best solution can
only be achieved if u2c > u2sc, in which (2.22) is not fulfilled for θ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, (2.12) =
(2.25). To get an idea, how the case of ambiguity is related to the case of uncertainty, the
following chapter compares both case.
2.2.5 Comparison of treatment choice under uncertainty and
ambiguity
How is the case of ambiguity connected with the information value? First, let us set
θ1 = θ2 = θ. Then, the treatment choice depends on (2.22). However, independent
from the self-diagnosis, the treatment choice stays the same, similar to (2.13). Hence, if
θ < (>) e
e+d
, sc (c) is always chosen, transforming (2.23) into (2.13). As long as π and θ
cause sc or c, IV = 0 follows for any case if no further information about self-diagnosis
quality is used. Both cases are equalized in their utility and the case of ambiguity cannot
be superior to the case in which only π is used as information. If θ < (>) e
e+d
< (>)π,
the choice under ambiguity remains sc (c), but according to the actual a priori risk π
without the use of further information, c (sc) is delivered as optimal in which EUsc > EUc
(EUsc < EUc) (see Fig. II.2.4a). If information about the quality of self-diagnosis is also
implemented and given the previously presented divergence where θ1 = θ2 = θ, Fig.
II.2.4a presents the fact that a situation with additional information must equalize a
decision under ambiguity under dominance or be superior to a case of ambiguity under
non-dominance (EU(Ii) > EUc (EU(Ii) > EUsc)).
Let us now distinguish between θi(Hi) with θ2 < θ∗ < θ1. Hence, if H1 (H2) is diagnosed
by the individual, then c (sc) is always chosen leading to (2.23) with
EU(πi, θi) = ππ1u
1
c + (1− π)(1− π2)u2c + π(1− π1)u1sc + (1− π)π2u2sc (2.26)
If the conditional decision also leads to c (sc) given I1 (I2) as indicator, (2.19) delivers
EU(p(Ii), psi) = ππ1u
1
c + (1− π)(1− π2)u2c + π(1− π1)u1sc + (1− π)π2u2sc (2.27)
Hence, EU(πi, θi) − EU(p(Is), psi) = 0 and the cases of ambiguity and uncertainty are
equivalent. The case of ambiguity also delivers a second-best solution conditional on a
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situation without education. That means a perfect substitution of the knowledge about
the indicator quality within the ex-post decision given an acute situation of indisposition
ex-post. Then the decision under ambiguity also induces an additional value equal to IV ,
which, however, cannot be referred to as IV . Instead, the description of a self-referential
value could be used. This value is related to an autonomous decision behavior concerning
the physical and psychological conditions produced by a situation of indisposition. Hence,
the former presents the surplus of θ compared to a case in which only π is implemented.
Please note that as long as (2.23) and (2.19) are valid, Fig. II.2.4a/b presents the IV
and corresponds to that of the self-referential value. Corresponding to the former, due to
the fixed character of θi, the only way to change the structure of expected utility under
ambiguity is a change of the outcomes resulting in a decrease or increase of θ∗. The
structure of (2.26) does not depend on a change of π or πi because the ex-post treatment
choice does not depend on the probabilities, but only on θi and the relative outcomes. This
is not the case if the decision is conditional on the quality of the indicator. Then, each
factual probability and outcome determines the treatment choice. Therefore, a decision
under ambiguity can result in dominance while a decision under uncertainty does not et
vice versa. Let us assume (2.19) as
EU(p(Ii), psi) = πu
1
c + (1− π)u2c (2.28)
representing a general choice of c under conditional decision (where z ≤ π). (2.23) is still
valid under ambiguity. Then, EU(p(Is), psi)− EU(πi, θi) can be simply written as
π(1− π1)(u1c − u1sc) + (1− π)π2(u2c − u2sc) (2.29)
It can then easily be shown that (2.29) is zero (larger than zero) for z = (<)π. Hence, the
fixed attitude corresponding to the assessment of treatment alternatives under ambiguity
leads to an inferior solution meaning a negative self-referential value17 as compared with
the case in which additional information, characterizing the quality of self-diagnosis, can
be used. Hence, in that case, ambiguity only delivers a third-best solution. Remember
that a similar situation was discussed under ambiguity when a solution under dominance
of c was superior to a solution with integration of sc, but the latter was realized. This is
not possible under a conditional decision due to the orientation of ex-post decision on the
factual probabilities as objective measure of risk.
What does the former analysis mean according to the optimal demand for c and sc? As
17If p11 and p12 exceed π∗, EUc exceeds any combination of EUc and EUsc (see Fig. II.2.4a). While
under uncertainty only c is chosen, c and sc remain possible alternatives under ambiguity.
93
2 Patient autonomy, specific knowledge and the role of self-care
long as the competence of self-diagnosis is not perfect and non-dominance is the factual
case given usc2 > uc2, but π < z (π > z), meaning dominance of sc (c) with IV = 0, the
demand for sc (c) is definitely too high under uncertainty. That corresponds to a too low
demand for c (sc). The former can be generalized for a situation of a false self-diagnosis
and z < π < z. The application of conditional probabilities as well as θi as degree of
subjective pessimism can deliver the same treatment choice. Then, a general situation of
dominance or non-dominance independent of the information structure is the result. In
fact, the same proposition about demand for c and sc can be derived for ambiguity as well
as for uncertainty. The demand level is second-best. However, what happens if the ex-post
treatment choice differs between both information structures? Let us assume dominance
of c under uncertainty and non-dominance under ambiguity due to a low value of θ2.
Such a situation is connected to non-dominance in the first-best case. One could argue
that ambiguity results in more efficient demand than uncertainty because c and sc can
potentially be realized as optimal in the first-best situation. However, this is not the case.
The reason is the poor quality of self-diagnosis delivering dominance under uncertainty as
optimal due to an adjustment of conditional probabilities. Ambiguity delivers a too high
demand for sc given the quality of self-diagnosis (see section 2.3.4). Indeed, uncertainty
delivers a too high demand of c compared to the first-best solution. However, as presented
above, this demand is superior to the situation of ambiguity. The former is generally valid
if the ex-post choice differs between ambiguity and uncertainty. Then, the demand for sc
or c is too high or too low compared to uncertainty delivering a third-best solution under
ambiguity.
2.2.6 Interim conclusion
As can be seen, the assumption of ambiguity is essential to the results due to a decoupling
of ex-ante and ex-post information and the integration of a subjective value of pessimism
leading to a specific importance of dominance and non-dominance of consultation. Within
the theoretical analysis, the degree of pessimism can be a fundamental reason for a too
high or too low demand for consultation or self-care respectively. Under uncertainty and
the explicit implementation of stochastic dependence between health status and quality
of self-diagnosis, a conditional decision is derived explicitly. An information value can
be calculated based on conditional probabilities. A perfect self-diagnosis competence
induces p(I1) = π, p(I2) = 1 − π, p11 = p22 = 1, and p21 = p12 = 0, representing the
maximum expected utility. The information value under uncertainty has an equivalent
under ambiguity which we name self-referential value, which, however, cannot exceed the
information value under uncertainty. Only if the ex-post treatment choice does not differ
between decisions under ambiguity and uncertainty, both values are equalized. In fact, if
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the treatment decisions are different the self-referential value implies an individual welfare
loss. The former is related to a too high or too low demand for self-care or consultation
compared to the case of uncertainty, delivering a third-best solution under ambiguity. The
principal reason is a too high level of optimism or pessimism with respect to a potential
realization of utility maximizing self-care or consultation outcomes. The former results in
a less flexible decision due to the explicit elimination of risks from the ex-post decision-
making.
2.3 Investments in education
Given the structure of decision-making in terms of treatment choice after the realization
of an acute illness, the optimal level of education will be discussed from an individual
perspective. Firstly, we present the fundamental effectiveness of education. Secondly, we
derive the optimal level of education in dependence of the degree of the rationality of
decision-making.
2.3.1 Function of education
Education takes place before any kind of illness comes into effect. Given the dimensions
of patient autonomy, specific education E has two essential effects: 1.) Self-protection
(SP ) - Increase in πi with πiE ≥ 0 and πiEE ≤ 0, π2E <>π1E. The improvement in the
competence for self-diagnosis reduces the risk of suboptimal treatment choices. 2.) Self-
insurance (SI) - Decrease in α with αE < 0 and αEE ≥ 0. In addition, NE < 0, NEE ≥ 0
and ME = 0. Before the optimal level of education is derived let us analyze the general
effect of SI in more detail. SI is only related to α. For that reason, only sc is affected.
Then, E affects u2sc as follows:
u2scE = −u2′sc · (αEqsc +NE + 1) (2.30)
with u2′sc being a derivative of utility with respect to y. Education produces constant
marginal costs of one.18 The result is a utility gain for the status u2sc if |αE| and |NE| are
sufficiently high.
What does the situation look like for a severe illness and sc?
u1scE = −u1′sc · (αEqsc +NE + 1) if α ≤ 1 (2.31)
u1scE = −u1′sc · (αE(αqscα + qsc) +NE + 1) if α > 1 (2.32)
18Please note, for α < 1, qscα = 0 follow.
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A utility gain for u1sc is possible if αE and NE are sufficient in their absolute value. qsc
remains nonproductive, but education may reduce the variable and fixed costs which arise
through a false choice of sc in the case of a severe illness. However, if α > 1, qscα < 0
follows. Then, a utility gain is more difficult to realize and specifically depends on the
elasticity of medical demand in the case of sc.
Finally, expenditures E have a negative effect for c:
uicE = −ui′c < 0 (2.33)
Altogether, SP and SI decrease the expected amount of ex-post damage, specifically
that caused by medical expenditures. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) define SP and SI more
generally. The main difference is that while the former is directed at the a priori risk
and the latter at the ex-post utility, I discuss both forms as directed toward the ex-post
decision. The a priori risk of realizing a specific illness is not influenced by self-protection,
but the risk of choosing a wrong treatment alternative.
Of course, the marginal product of E also depends on the general schooling level and
knowledge capital of the individual stimulating the success of medical education (Gross-
man 2005). Even though this relation is not specified, it underlies the subsequent discus-
sion. Finally, education does not have any preventive impact (πE = 0).
We digress briefly at this point. Within the literature, the role of social capital has
increased in significance. It can also be reasonably applied to the framework above. If
social capital refers to any kind of benefit an individual is able to generate through social
relations with other individuals, organizations, or clubs (Paldam 2000). The effectiveness
of patient education and sc could be stimulated by this kind of capital (Scheffler and
Brown 2008).19 Social capital can decrease the utilization of general physicians (Laporte
et al. 2008). Moreover, empirical studies show a positive relationship between social
capital and individual health stock (Sirven and Debrand 2011, Iversen 2008, Petrou and
Kupek 2003, Scheffler et al. 2007). In our, α could depend on social capital.20 Depending
on the experiences of or the general education level and medical competences of the social
relation, α can decrease. As an extremum, sc could be fully replaced by specific forms of
social relations as the individual’s family. Furthermore, πis could also benefit from social
relations. If these relations are more competent in self-diagnosis than the individual, they
19As shown by Ronconi et al. (2010), an increase in the individual’s social capital is correlated with
reporting of better health. While this result is focused on the relationship between personal assessment
of current well-being, which is not the focus of our analysis, it could be understood to be a confirmation
of a general relationship between social capital and health, although the factual effectiveness of social
capital has not been confirmed as of yet.
20Specifically, social capital could have a significant impact on the diffusion of health information
(Kawachi and Berkman 2000).
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could advise the individual either to seek a doctor or to care for himself. This can be
particularly useful if the individual has difficulty assessing symptoms correctly. Finally,
the productivity of education could be increased by social capital. The sources could be
experiences or more specific medical knowledge offered as inputs by the social relations.
However, social capital can also be transformed into a type of ’destructive capital’. This
means any personal environment or relation, which is not able to give competent advice.
Most likely, a constructive or destructive social environment depends on the education
and health behavior of the personal surrounding. Finally, despite the exclusion of social
capital as a defined variable within the following discussion, it should be kept in mind
that sc can be seen as being closely connected to the individual social capital or more
general, life world, influencing the productivity of sc, the diagnosis competence, and the
productivity of education.
2.3.2 Education under conditions of full rationality
Education takes place before Hi is realized. In the case of full rationality with π1 = π2 = 1
education can only be implemented in its function as self-insurance with αE < 0, αEE ≥ 0
and NE < 0, NEE ≥ 0. Education is implemented as long as the following necessary
condition is fulfilled for E > 0 (derived from (2.12)):
πu1cE + (1− π)u2scE = 0 (2.34)
resulting in E∗perf as the first-best level of education, decreasing in π. u1cE is given by
(2.33) and u2scE by (2.30).
As long as c is dominant, (2.34) changes to:
πu1cE + (1− π)u2cE = 0 (2.35)
Due to (2.33), (2.35) cannot be fulfilled for a positive value E and E∗perf = 0. If c is always
the best choice, investments in education would not make sense.
2.3.3 Education under conditions of uncertainty
Firstly, we only consider a situation in which the a priori illness probabilities are used
to derive a treatment choice (see ch. 2.2.3.1). Secondly, we also consider a conditional
decision as in chapter 2.2.3.2.
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2.3.3.1 Education and ex-post knowledge about a priori probabilities
The treatment choice only depends on EUk(π). Hence, only SI is an outcome of E.
Remember the decision threshold π∗. This value increases if uisc is increased and uic
decreased by E1. The choice is illustrated in Fig. II.2.6 (bold lines). For illustration, let
us assume a discrete measure E1 related to an increase in productivity dα. Fig. II.2.6
illustrates an example in which the threshold increases from π∗0 to π∗∗0 due to more (less)
beneficial sc (c).
Figure II.2.6: Decision threshold and knowledge of a priori probabilities
A change of π∗ does not deliver information about a welfare gain, but only about the
relation between the expected utilities before and after education. 0 < π < π∗E represents
the range of an individual welfare gain. If uisc is increased by E1, π∗E > π∗0 follows
necessarily. Then, a welfare gain is produced if EUsc(E1) > EU c, where:
π <
u2sc(E1)− u2c
u2sc(E1)− u2c + u1c − u1sc(E1)
(2.36)
Specifically, π∗0 < π < π∗E represents the range for which sc is the better choice given
effort in education. Hence, education can stimulate the demand for sc. On the other
hand, education is inhibited for values of π for which c is dominant. Of course, the
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first-best solution implies a situation with perfect knowledge. This solution would be
represented by the straight line (not printed) from u2sc to u1c (with or without E1) because
in the case of non-dominance of c, one of these both utility values is realized from an
ex-ante point of view. Hence, this solution always dominates a solution such as the one
mentioned above as second-best. Again, the a-priori probability must not be too high
with:
π <
u2sc(E1)− u2sc
u2sc(E1)− u2sc + u1c − u1c(E1)
(2.37)
u2sc(E1) − u2c > u2sc(E1) − u2sc, but u1c(E1) > u1sc(E1), leading to an ambiguous result
concerning the relation between the critical values in (2.36) and (2.37). Hence, the higher
u2sc and the lower u1c(E1), or the lower u2c and the higher u1sc(E1), the higher the incentive
to invest in education in a second-best case as compared to the first-best situation.
2.3.3.2 Education and the information value
Given the conditional probabilities (2.16) and (2.17) the derivatives as subject to education
are
p11E > 0, p22E > 0 ; p12E < 0, p21E < 0 ; pE(I1)
>
<
0 ; pE(I2)
>
<
0 (2.38)
Education increases the quality of the indicator (condition (2.38)) through an improve-
ment of the competence for self-diagnosis. The maximum value is achieved for πi = 1
with p(H1, I1) = p(H2, I2) = 1. As explained above, the competence for self-diagnosis
becomes perfect resulting in a first-best solution (2.12).21 pE(I1) and pE(I2) represent the
change in the probability of signal Ii. Due to an increase of π1 and π2 in a case where
education is effective as self-protection, p(I1) and p(I2) converge to π and 1−π which are
the a-priori probabilities of a signal I1 or I2 in the case of a perfect quality of self-diagnosis.
Now the influence of education given an imperfect quality of self-diagnosis is analyzed.
We specifically focus on the information value IV (see ch. 2.2.3.3). Education influences
p(Is) and psi with s = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2 as well as d and e. If IV nonperf < IV perf ,
then education can increase IV due to an increase of p11 and p22. However, if d (e)
decreases (increases), IV also decreases (increases). The reason for this is the reduced
(increased) loss in the case of a false self-diagnosis. As presented in Tab. II.2.5, z and
z are the thresholds for dominance. If either c or sc is strictly chosen, IV = 0 follows.
21The same result is produced by πi = 0 with p(H1, I1) = p(H2, I2) = 0. Total incompetence results in
turn to full pseudo-competence with perfect information. Knowledge about such a full incompetence
delivers knowledge about the correct diagnosis as a simple reversal of the perfectly wrong diagnosis.
However, in such cases, education makes no sense as a measure to improve the competence for self-
diagnosis, but only to increase the productivity of sc. This differs from the case without any ex-
post knowledge about probabilities where education could make sense for low values πi because the
individual could not infer anything from πi ex-post.
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Differing from the case of ambiguity, the utility outcomes and conditional probabilities
are important for the treatment choice in which both elements are directly influenced by
education. Hence, the thresholds z and z are calculated with respect to E to derive some
insights into the relationship between education and treatment choice under uncertainty:
∂z
∂E

> 0
= 0
< 0
if
if
if
(1− π2)/π2 (ηe,E − ηd,E − ηπ1,E) > ηπ2,E
(1− π2)/π2 (ηe,E − ηd,E − ηπ1,E) = ηπ2,E
(1− π2)/π2 (ηe,E − ηd,E − ηπ1,E) < ηπ2,E
(2.39)
∂z
∂E

> 0
= 0
< 0
if
if
if
(1− π1)/π1 (ηd,E − ηe,E − ηπ2,E) < ηπ1,E
(1− π1)/π1 (ηd,E − ηe,E − ηπ2,E) = ηπ1,E
(1− π1)/π1 (ηd,E − ηe,E − ηπ2,E) > ηπ1,E
(2.40)
with ηπ2,E, ηπ1,E > 0 and ηe,E > 0, ηd,E < 0 as elasticities of the subjective probabilities
and the utility differences for each health state with respect to education. z and z increase
if ηe,E and |ηd,E| increase. As can be seen in (2.20), an increase in the utility difference
between c and sc for H2 (value e) increases the threshold level p1i for which sc is chosen.
Thus, sc increases in its attractiveness. This is also valid for a decrease in the utility
difference between c and sc for H1 (value d) due to a decreasing value of loss in the
case of a wrong self-diagnosis according to H1. Hence, z and z are shifted to the right by
education, in the case that d and e are sensitive. This can be seen in the first lines of (2.39)
and (2.40) where ηe,E−ηd,E−ηπ1,E achieves a high value and ηd,E−ηe,E−ηπ2,E achieves a
low value (due to ηe,E > 0 and ηd,E < 0). Hence, the range of a positive information value
is shifted to the right (see Fig. II.2.4b). In Fig. II.2.4a, one can recognize that if EUsc is
shifted upward and EUc downward, the range for which EU(Ii) is located completely on
EUsc increases. Accordingly, the range of IV > 0 shifts to the left if the sensitivities of d
and e are too low.
With respect to SP , z is shifted to the left if π1 or π2 increase strongly because p11 in-
creases and p12 decreases manifesting a direct improvement in the quality of self-diagnosis.
In fact, while p11 and p22 increase, p12 and p21 decrease. Therefore, given π, IV must in-
crease. The latter is equally valid for z which shifts to the right.
In summary, a high sensitivity of d and e shifts the entire triangle to the right. A
high effectiveness of education as indicated by an increase in πi broadens the base of the
triangle.22 The relation between these sensitivities determines the resulting layer of the
triangle. Finally, the change in IVmax can be depicted as ∂IVmax∂E
>
<
0. The relation then
depends on the relative effectiveness with respect to d and e.
22In the case where p12 > p11, education shifts z to the right and z to the left, thus reducing the range
of IV > 0. However, p12 < p11 is generated by a corresponding impact of education on πi.
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As long as only SI is implemented with ηπ2,E = ηπ1,E = 0, (2.39) and (2.40) are
positive. The area of IV > 0 is shifted to the right. This is due to an increase of the
advantageousness of sc relative to c, which leads to an increase in the range for which sc
is chosen independently of the indicator. If, on the other hand, only SP is implemented
with ηd,E > 0 and ηe,E > 0, a negative value of (2.39) and (2.40) is more probable. z and
z decrease if ηd,E > ηe,E. The final factual shift of the range of IV > 0 depends on the
relative effectiveness of the conditional probabilities.
The overall structure of the IV -functions in Tab. II.2.5 remains unchanged after edu-
cation. For perfect information, only SI is effective. IV perfmax increases in d and decreases
in e. This is caused by the decrease in the potential loss between c and sc in state H1,
which makes it less worthwhile to have further information, such as the self-interpreted
symptom.
2.3.3.3 Education as self-insurance
As discussed above, the objective functions (2.19) and (2.23) are equal if c is either
dominant in the case of uncertainty and ambiguity or is non-dominant in the case of
uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, as long as this identity in the treatment choice is valid
(before and after education), the optimal investment in education does not differ between
a situation of uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, if we assume such an identity it is not
necessary to separate the discussion of optimal education into a situation of uncertainty
and ambiguity. The following results are also valid for the case of ambiguity.
As we already know, in a situation in which u2c > u2sc before and after education, E = 0
with E∗perf = E∗unc = E∗amb = 0. For that reason, at this point we presume a situation
of u2c < u2sc before and after education (where also θ2 < θ∗ for the case of ambiguity)
or in which 1 < α, but M − N > 0 is sufficiently high. If only SI is implemented,
with αE < 0, αEE ≥ 0 and πiE = 0, education is implemented as long as the following
necessary condition is fulfilled for E > 0 (derived from (2.23)):
πEU1E + (1− π)EU2E = 0 (2.41)
with
EU1E = −
[
π1u
1
cE + (1− π1)u1scE
]
(2.42)
EU2E = −
[
π2u
2
scE + (1− π2)u2cE
]
(2.43)
where uikE are given by (2.30), (2.31), (2.32) and (2.33), with k = c, sc. EU1E (EU2E)
represents the expected marginal utility for H1 (H2).
101
2 Patient autonomy, specific knowledge and the role of self-care
(2.43) delivers a utility gain if
π2
1− π2
> − u
2
cE
u2scE
(2.44)
It specifically depends on π2 as well whether (2.43) is positive. The higher π2 becomes,
the more beneficial a measure of SI is.
What does the situation look like for a severe illness (condition 2.42)? u1sc(E) < u1c(E)
holds. However, a utility gain with23
1− π1
π1
> − u
1
cE
u1scE
(2.45)
is possible depending on π1 and the absolute difference between the respective net in-
comes of both treatment alternatives. The lower π1, the more beneficial self-insurance is.
If qscα < 0 due to 1 < α, a utility loss for sc(H1) is possible if the demand elasticity is high
and |NE| is sufficiently low.
Summarized, (2.41) can be written as:
π(1− π1)u1scE(1− π)π2u2scE = −[ππ1u1cE + (1− π)(1− π2)u2cE] (2.46)
Given an imperfect competence of self-diagnosis, (2.46) is fulfilled for the optimal level
of education E∗unc = E∗amb > 0 if non-dominance is the case and the expected increase in
net income for sc (left-hand side) is sufficiently high to compensate for a decrease in the
expected net income for c (right-hand side).
Comparing (2.34) with (2.41), E∗unc = E∗amb > E∗perf , as long as u1scE > 0 and |u2cE| is not
too high (given πi < 1); otherwise, E∗unc = E∗amb ≤ E∗perf . Even if E∗unc = E∗amb = E∗perf >
0, πi < 1 still reduces the expected utility below that of the first-best solution. Altogether,
if the competence of self-diagnosis is imperfect, investments in SI are ambiguous in their
amount compared to a first-best solution.
2.3.3.4 Education as self-protection
Now, only SP is implemented, assuming πiE > 0, πiEE ≤ 0 and αE = 0. In this case, the
necessary condition for effort in education is (relying on (2.23)):
πEU1E + (1− π)EU2E =
ππ1E
[
u1c(E)− u1sc(E)
]
+ (1− π)π2E
[
u2sc(, E)− u2c(E)
]
(2.47)
23Remember that sc is not productive in the case of a severe illness.
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with
EU1E = −
[
π1u
1
cE + (1− π1)u1scE
]
(2.48)
EU2E = −
[
π2u
2
scE + (1− π2)u2cE
]
(2.49)
The left-hand side here represents the utility gain or loss. Under pure SP , (2.48) and
(2.49) are positive due to a utility loss. The right-hand side is the marginal gain as a
decrease in potential utility loss caused by a false self-diagnosis (in brackets), depending
on the effectiveness of education separated into π1E and π2E. u1c(E)−u1sc(E) should exceed
u2sc(E) − u2c(E). On the one hand, a high value of π makes education more reasonable.
On the other hand, the marginal income loss on the left-hand side increases in that case.
If c is dominant, then (2.35) is again valid. Education is not undertaken with E∗unc =
E∗amb = 0. Furthermore, as long as αE = 0 and πi = 1, the first-best solution (2.12) is
the maximum value of the ex-ante expected utility with E∗perf = 0 (derived from (2.34)).
Even if the effectiveness of E is high and πi = 1 could be achieved, (2.12) cannot be
achieved due to a minimum level of necessary expenditures E∗unc = E∗amb > 0. Despite
a utility loss, education remains beneficial if the shift to the correct positive or negative
diagnosis increases the expected utility sufficiently and compensates for the utility loss.
Altogether, investments in SP exceed the first-best level if the competence of self-diagnosis
is imperfect.
2.3.3.5 Combination of self-insurance and self-protection
Now let us combine SI and SP into one measure with αE < 0 and πiE > 0. Then, (2.47)
is satisfied as long as a utility gain arises or if a utility loss arises, but compensated by
a decrease in potential losses. The utility values after education are represented on the
right-hand side of (2.47). Then, the more effective SI becomes, the higher the potential
loss for H2, but the lower for H1 due to decreasing variable costs αqsc (if 1 > α). Due to
u2scE < u
1
scE and u2cE < u1cE, the decreased loss for H1 compensates for the increased loss
for H2. Hence, if eg. π1E = π2E and π = 0.5, SI partially substitutes SP , specifically
in connection with H1. Otherwise, a partial complementarity is given for H2 in which
the effectiveness of SP increases the effectiveness of SI. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) show
a similar result pertaining to market insurance. In their approach market insurance
substitutes for SP because of a loss in marginal gain based on a decrease in potential utility
loss. The case presented here regarding SI has a similar effect. However, an increase in
the potential loss is also induced, which results in a complementary relationship. As
Ehrlich and Becker remark, the substitutional relation between market insurance and SP
represents a source of moral hazard. However, in the case presented here, SP and SI are
both induced by a measure E directed on ex-post medical expenditures. Hence, it would
103
2 Patient autonomy, specific knowledge and the role of self-care
only be a substitution of the effectiveness of both kinds of investments, which would not
lead to a moral hazard problem. Furthermore, SP increases the importance of u1c (u2sc)
through a shift in the error probabilities (see (2.44) and (2.45)), decreasing (increasing)
the incentive for SI.24
E∗unc = E
∗
amb
>
<
E∗perf is again possible if c is non-dominant. However, the first-best
solution can only be achieved if E∗unc = E∗amb = E∗perf > 0 and πi = 1 after education.
Otherwise, E∗imp can only implement a second-best solution specifically based on the
reasonable assumption that E →∞ for πi → 1.
Given SI and SP as simultaneous effects of education, the structure of (2.47) can
be used to discuss the second order condition EUEE. For a maximum, EUEE < 0 is a
sufficient condition as given in Appendix 5.2 (assuming c is non-dominant). EUEE < 0
is more likely to be the case if there are decreasing returns to education according to
marginal utility (uikEE < 0). uikE and πiE are ambiguous in their impact, given that uiscE
is positive.
Basically, in order to realize maximum expected utility, a shift from a utility gain to
a utility loss with a corresponding self-diagnosis competence and a diminishing effect on
risk reduction are of central relevance. For example, if constant returns with uikEE = 0 are
assumed, the former effects can be necessary and sufficient for achieving such a maximum.
By contrast, if uikEE < 0, then πiEE < 0 is not necessary for EUEE < 0.
2.3.3.6 Comparative statics of health stocks
For the comparative statics, the case of non-dominance of c with 1 > α and N ≤ M is
analyzed.25 Taking (2.47) into account, with E∗ as an implicit function of H1 and H2,
the application of comparative statics delivers (see app. 5.3):
∂E∗
∂H1
>
<
0 ,
∂E∗
∂H2
>
<
0 (2.50)
The effects are ambiguous. Tab. II.2.6 shows the conditions more precisely in which
qscα = 0. EUEE > 0 is the second-order derivative. Then, the conditions in Tab. II.2.6
must be positive to ensure that ∂E∗
∂x
> 0.
The severity of the severe illness has an ambiguous impact on E. If the severity of
H1 decreases, the marginal utility gain (loss) of utility for sc (c) decreases (term 1 (2)).
Furthermore, due to risk aversion, the potential loss for H1 decreases as well (term 3).
A lower severity of banal illness likely decreases the incentive for E. The incentive
increases (decreases) due to a decrease in marginal utility gain (loss) for sc (c) (term 1
24The previous discussion can also be developed in line with a strict division into two different educational
measures. Then, substitutional and complementary effects can be derived similarly.
25Please note that the case of α > 1 is similar and does not cause significant changes in the results.
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∂E∗
∂H1
= π

−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π1)u1scEH1
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
+π1u1cEH1 +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1E(u1cH1(E)− u
1
scH1(E))

∂E∗
∂H2
= (1− π)

−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2u
2
scEH2 +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π2)u2cEH2 +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2E(u2scH2(E)− u
2
cH2(E))

+π

−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π2)u1scEH2 −
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1Eu
1
scH2

Table II.2.6: Comparative statics for ex-post education
(2)). The incentive decreases through a decrease in the potential losses of utility for H2
(term 3) as well. Term 4 presents the effects for the state of sc and an actual illness H1.
If H2 increases, the marginal utility gain for sc decreases. The marginal loss decreases in
the case of H1 due to an increase of u1sc (term 5).
As can be seen, for each of the presented conditions the distribution of a priori and error
probabilities as well as the effectiveness of SP is crucial for a final conclusion concerning
the demand for education.
Given the ambiguous results, the effects on the relative demand for c and sc in terms
of q are the following. An unambiguous proposition about the relation between ∂E∗
∂Hi
and
q is difficult to derive. First, without education, an increase in Hi decreases q2c and qsc.
Second, if ∂E∗
∂Hi
> (<)0, qsc decreases (increases) due to a decrease (an increase) in α. From
the former analysis, the final relation between qsc and q2c cannot derived bijectively.
2.3.3.7 Comparative statics of risk aversion
How does risk aversion (RA) influence investments in education? We assume constant rel-
ative risk-aversion. Fig. (II.2.7) presents linearity for a risk neutral individual (RN) with
(ACEF ) and a concavity (ABDF ) for RA. For the worst sc(H1) and best sc(H2) cases
the utilities are identical.26 However, for c(H1) (c(H2)), the utility for a RA-individual
exceeds the utility of a RN-individual at B − C (D − E).
At first, the relation between SI and RA is analyzed. (2.41) can be written as a
26This illustration is drawn from Eeckhoudt (2002), ch. 2. The position of ACEF can be changed, eg. as
a linear function through the point of origin with any slope, or with an arbitrary intersection between
the RN- and RA-function. However, the qualitative conclusion regarding the impact of risk aversion
is independent of such transformations.
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Figure II.2.7: Risk aversion and ex-post education
threshold π∗ for which investments in education are beneficial:
π∗ <
π2u
2
scE + (1− π2)u2cE
π2u2scE + (1− π2)u2cE − π1u1cE − (1− π1)u1scE
(2.51)
The impact of RA depends on the marginal utilities for the different utility states. Com-
paring point a with point f , the following relations are obtained: u1RN ′sc < u1RA′sc and
u2RN ′sc > u
2RA′
sc .27 Hence, a loss through education in the worst (best) case reduces the
incentive to invest in education more strongly under RA (RN) in comparison with RN
(RA). The opposite is the case for a gain caused by education. For c the relation between
the marginal utilities depends on the absolute amount of net income. As long as the y < ŷ
(y > ŷ), RA delivers a higher (lower) marginal utility than RN. At this point, y1c < ŷ
and y2c > ŷ. Given these relations of marginal utilities between RA and RN, RA has an
ambiguous impact.
The arrows in Fig. II.2.7 illustrate the direction of income growth if education as SI
is implemented. According to sc, the increase in net income was calculated as equal for
H1 and H2. Hence, according to H1, under RA the incentive for education increases due
to a higher expected marginal gain compared with RN, particularly if π1 is low. By con-
trast, with respect to H2, education loses attractiveness under RA, specifically in the case
where π2 is high. Contrary to that, given Fig. II.2.7, for c (with a decrease of net income,
E), RA decreases (increases) the incentive to invest in education for c(H1) (c(H2)). To
27These derivatives represent the slope of the utility function with subject to the net income y.
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analyze the total effect for c, the question remains whether |d(D − E)| < |d(B − C)|.
Similar to sc, this relation must be fulfilled between linear and concave utility functions.
Hence, for c, RA likely decreases the incentive to invest in education if π1 and π2 are
high. In sum, in the case of SI, RA should increase the incentive for education for sc and
decrease the negative contribution for c. RA is ambiguous. The final answer depends on
the distribution of error probabilities as well as on the absolute amounts of changes in the
differences between the utility values under RA and RN as distinguished between c and sc.
What is the impact of RA if SP is implemented? A threshold can be calculated:
π∗ <
u2sc − u2c + π2u2scE + (1− π2)u2cE
u2sc − u2c − u1c + u1sc + π2u2scE + (1− π2)u2cE − π1u1cE − (1− π1)u1scE
(2.52)
SP is focused on the difference in the absolute utility values. As can easily be seen in
Fig. II.2.7, given each net income after education, the difference in utility and, therefore,
the potential loss for H1 is larger for RA than for RN, if y < ŷ due to a higher marginal
utility in the case of RA. Otherwise, for H2 the potential loss is higher for RN than for
RA when y > ŷ.28 Hence, for SP the impact of RA is ambiguous as well. The potential
loss in a case of a severe (banal) sickness is of a greater importance for the individual
under RA (RN).
To formulate the results, u(y) = ya with constant (decreasing) relative (absolute) RA
is used. Moreover, EUEE > 0, EUEEa < 0 and EUEx > 0. Then (see app. 5.4):
∂E∗
∂a
>
<
0 ;
∂2E∗
∂H1∂a
>
<
0 ;
∂2E∗
∂H2∂a
>
<
0 (2.53)
In addition, RA influences the threshold π∗ through u1′sc > u2′sc. The lower the utility in
the worst case and the higher the degree of RA, the more probable dominance of c is.
The ambiguity of ∂E∗
∂a
was discussed above. The level of net income as well as the
curvature (depending on a) are crucial in order to explain the impact of RA on E and
the variables of the comparative statics analysis. According to the marginal utility-effect,
a decrease in RA 1.) decreases (increases) the marginal utility loss [for c] for low (high)
net incomes, and 2.) decreases (increases) the marginal utility gain [for sc] for low (high)
incomes. It is important to acknowledge the factual income level of each health status
and treatment alternative to derive a proposition about the impact of a changing RA.
Specifically the poles sc(H1) as the worst and sc(H2) as the best case can be opposed to
one another in terms of stimulating and dampening effectiveness if the difference in net
28This result is also based on Felder and Mayrhofer (2011) who discuss the relationship between risk
aversion and utility loss due to an imperfect medical test using a similar technical approach.
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incomes is too high, connected to a low level of y1sc. Then, the equal impact of E on the
absolute level of net income can induce opposite results. Otherwise, with respect to a
change in the potential utility loss, y1sc and y2sc should be opposed to each other for a total
positive effect of a decreasing RA.
The partial effects in (2.53) investigated further. The level of net income remains
important. As shown in the appendix, uya and uyya as the first- and second-order marginal
utilities derived with respect to the degree of RA are important. uya is focused on the
marginal gain or loss of a marginal increase in E. However, uyya is important to the
effectiveness of the variables in (2.53). Here the principal effects are summarized, rather
than discussing each of the partial derivatives in (2.53) in detail. Usually, a decrease in
RA decreases the impact of an increase or decrease of the net incomes through H1 and
H2, with respect to the marginal utility effects of E. This happens if the second-order
derivative decreases through a decrease in RA, resulting in a decrease in the effects of H1
and H2 on the change in marginal gain or loss for E. This is specifically the case if the
degree of RA is already low and the net income is low as well. Otherwise, a stimulation
of E through a change of H1 and H2 is also possible. However, these effects should tend
to decrease if RA decreases. As can also be seen, the former effects with respect to H2
are strengthened or weakened by the first-order condition effects discussed above, related
to the marginal effects of E itself. The reason is the focus of E on qsc and therefore α, in
which the marginal effectiveness is specifically influenced by H2.
As can be examined in the appendix, the effects of the partial derivatives in (2.53) with
respect to the potential utility loss depend on uya, but not on uyya. Thus, a decrease
in RA decreases the potential utility loss for H1 according to an increase in costs for sc
as long as the net income for sc is low. The opposite is the case for H2. A decrease in
RA also decreases the effect of a decrease in the potential utility loss corresponding to a
decrease in the severity of H1 if the net income for sc is low and high for c. Again, the
opposite is the case for H2. The effect of a decrease in potential utility loss decreases if
the net income is high for sc and low for c. Altogether, the impact of RA depends on the
level of net incomes and the distribution of objective as well as subjective probabilities
and therefore on the effectiveness of SI and SP .
2.3.4 Dominance vs. non-dominance in the case of ambiguity
Specifically in a situation of ambiguity a shift from dominance to non-dominance through
education must be highlighted. SI can increase u2sc above u2c . Then, in connection with
SI, a false negative self-diagnosis H2 is stimulated by education, despite the possible
increase of πi. As long as u2c > u2sc, the first-best solution EUfb without education is
generated. However, if education delivers u2c(E) < u2sc(E) and uisc(E) − uic(E) as suffi-
108
2.3 Investments in education
cient for θ2 < θ∗, (2.24) becomes relevant, but EUfb under dominance is not necessarily
exceeded by (2.24). If θ2 < θ∗ and πi = 1, a resulting non-dominance is unproblematic
and EUfb(E∗perf ) > EUfb(E = 0) is achieved if non-dominance is induced and E can
be efficiently implemented. However, due to πi < 1 as the risk of a false self-diagnosis,
(2.24) is not only lower than EUfb(E∗perf ) under non-dominance, but can also be below
EUfb(E = 0) under dominance of c and before any effort in education. sc accordingly
becomes more attractive if the individual decides in favor of H2 with a remaining error
probability 1 − πE1 > 0 after education. However, c remains the better alternative for
H1 and full dominance of c could be the better alternative. This could be interpreted
as a false self-confidence or an over-assessment of one’s own abilities. Then, from an
ex-ante point of view, education is only beneficial if the gain of expected utility for H2
compensates the loss for H1 with π∆EU1 + (1− π)∆EU2 > 0:
π
[
(πE1 u
1
c(E) + (1− πE1 )u1sc(E))− u1c
]
+
(1− π)
[
(πE2 u
2
sc(E) + (1− πE2 )u2c(E))− u2c
]
> 0 (2.54)
The first term in (2.54) is negative and the second is unrestricted. Hence, whether the
total effect of u2sc(E) − u2c > 0 is positive depends crucially on πEi − πi > 0 and the
effectiveness of education for each utility state.
θ2 is exogenous. Hence, if dominance is supposed to be induced, then θ∗ must be
increased. Then, in turn, any expenditure Z is able to realize dominance in (2.22) with
θ∗(Z) < θ2 (with eZ > 0, dZ > 0):
∂θ∗
∂Z
= (d+ e)−1(eZ − e(d+ e)−1(dZ + eZ)) < 0 (2.55)
(2.55) is necessary for dominance with θ∗(Z) < θ2 < θ∗.29 c can be dominant due to the
implementation of Z = E if a utility loss arises for sc.30 Then, u2c(E) < u2sc(E) remains,
yet through risk aversion, the differences between the utilities pertaining to each health
state increase. The attractiveness of sc is reduced. This reduction is in fact desirable if the
expected utility under dominance after education exceeds the utility under non-dominance
before education.31
If θ∗ cannot be sufficiently altered to induce dominance, the focus must be on fulfillment
29(2.55) is fulfilled if de <
dZ
eZ
.
30Note that dE < 0 and eE > 0 if there is a utility gain for sc and qsc decreases. Otherwise, if non-
dominance exists only due to N < M , dE > 0 due to an increase in qsc (if NE is small). To simplify
matters, this case is not discussed here.
31E must be sufficiently low. For that reason, E is simply a measure Z without any positive influence on
the productivity of sc. Such a measure is more efficient than E if it is beneficial to induce dominance
because E would exceed Z necessarily.
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of (2.47) with a corresponding inducement of education.
If non-dominance generates the higher expected utility compared with dominance and if
(2.54) is fulfilled, a decreasing θ∗ could be possible anyway, inducing dominance and thus
making (2.47) no longer satisfiable. Then, education should again not be undertaken.32
Finally, let us describe the utility relations with respect to E∗amb and E∗perf . At this
point, we ignore the solution E∗unc for which reason a statement in terms of efficiency is
not derived. Let us define E = E0 = 0 and EUc/sc as expected value in the case of non-
dominance of c. Then, if u2c(E0) > u2sc(E0), but u2c(E∗amb) < u2sc(E∗amb) with θ∗(E∗amb) > θ2
and (2.54) fulfilled, E∗amb delivers EUc(E0) < EUc/sc(E∗amb) < EUfb(E∗perf ). Otherwise,
if (2.54) is not fulfilled, then E∗amb delivers EUc/sc(E∗amb) < EUc(E0) < EUfb(E∗perf ).
Given u2c(E0) < u2sc(E0) and θ∗(E0) > θ2, but EUc(E0) > EUc/sc(E0) and EUc(E0) >
EUc/sc(E
∗
amb), education might inhibit sc. However, in such a case, education must be
interpreted as any expenditure Z because of its focus on the inducement of dominance in
which no effect on the improvement of skills is desirable, leading to a solution characterized
by EUc/sc(E0) < EUc(θ∗(Z) < θ2) < EUc(θ∗ < θ2) < EUfb(E∗perf ). On the other hand,
education or any measure Z should not be undertaken or schould be at least reduced
whenever EUc(θ∗(Z) < θ2) < EUc/sc(E0) < EUc/sc(Z) < EUc(θ∗ > θ2) < EUfb(E∗perf ) or
EUc(θ
∗(Z) < θ2) < EUc(θ
∗ > θ2) < EUc/sc(E0) < EUc/sc(Z) < EUfb(E
∗
perf ) exist.33
These situations rely on a case in which education is beneficial, however, leading to
dominance due to θ∗(Z) < θ2 (in light of a very effective SP , but less effective SI).
2.3.5 Education under uncertainty and ambiguity
As discussed before E∗amb = E∗unc is the result if there is an identity of treatment choice
under ambiguity and uncertainty. As presented above, one exception is the case in which
θ∗ decreases through expenditures E resulting in E∗amb < E∗unc. Then, E∗unc is second-best
if the self-diagnosis competence is not perfect. E∗amb must decrease to avoid a situation
of θ∗(Eamb) < θ2 delivering a third-best solution. A second-best solution in a situation
of ambiguity is only possible if the ex-post choice under uncertainty and ambiguity are
equalised. Otherwise, ambiguity only delivers a maximally third-best solution. The op-
timal level of education differs if (2.23) and (2.19) are different. If (2.28) and (2.23) are
valid, E∗unc = 0. However, E∗amb > 0 can possibly either induce dominance (decrease in θ∗)
or to improve the situation under ambiguity. The latter was discussed in section 2.3.4.
32Another situation must also be treated. Non-dominance could be preferred over dominance, however,
θ∗ < θ2. Then, education can also increase θ∗ if education improves the situation of sc relative to
c. In this case, non-dominance could be induced, which is beneficial as long as the expenditures for
education remain sufficiently low.
33EUc/sc(Z) refers to a hypothetical case where θ2 is sufficiently low to keep sc as an alternative.
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In that case E∗unc = 0 is second best if u2c < u2sc and E∗amb > 0 third best. Due to the
absence of a fixed treatment decision under uncertainty, no measures are necessary to in-
duce dominance. In the opposite direction, in the case of ambiguity dominance of c could
be the situation, but the case of uncertainty delivers (2.19). E∗unc > 0, however, E∗amb = 0
is the corresponding result in which E∗unc > 0 is second best as long as the self-diagnosis
competence is not perfect. However, the latter can be changed if θ∗ can be increased by
E, resulting in non-dominance. Then, E∗amb = E∗unc is the optimal level of education.
2.3.6 Interim Conclusion
If self-care is dominated by consultation through higher utility values for each health
state, the first-best solution is realized in which education is neglected. An extension of
alternatives through self-care only produces a first-best solution if the optimal choice for
each kind of illness actually takes place. However, this can only be realized if a perfect
competence for self-diagnosis is at hand and the characteristically optimistic or pessimistic
appreciation ex-post does not produce a general decision in favor of consultation. If the
self-diagnosis is imperfect, a second-best level of education - self-insurance and/or self-
protection - arises. In the case of pure self-insurance, the level is ambiguous compared
with a first-best effort. In the case of pure self-protection it strictly exceeds the first-
best level of education. If both types of education are implemented simultaneously, the
optimal level of education remains ambiguous. Self-protection and -insurance are con-
nected by a partially substitutional and complementary relation. Education depends on
the effectiveness of self-insurance and self-protection and the loss produced by a false self-
diagnosis. Additionally, the relative fixed costs as well as the degree of severity of banal
and severe illness and the level of risk-aversion are crucial and ambiguous in their impact
on education. The effectiveness of risk-aversion specifically depends on the particular net
income in the different health and treatment states. With respect to this, due to the fact
that self-care represents the worst (u1sc) and the best (u2sc) value of utility, an increase of
risk-aversion is strongly ambiguous for education.
Education under conditions of uncertainty characteristically influences the information
value due to: 1.) Self-protection increases the self-diagnosis competence and therefore z−
z. 2.) Self-insurance and the educational expenditures themselves influence the potential
utility losses in the case of a false self-diagnosis. A perfect self-diagnosis competence
induces p(I1) = π, p(I2) = 1 − π, p11 = p22 = 1, and p21 = p12 = 0, representing the
maximum expected utility. The more beneficial sc relative to c after education, the more
often sc is chosen. The productivity gain for sc, the level of illness severity, the relative
costs between sc and c and the potential decrease of a potential utility loss are important
determinants for education.
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It could be beneficial to turn education down or to generally reduce the attractiveness of
self-care in the case of ambiguity. This is the case if an extension of treatment alternatives
reduces the ex-ante utility related to a too low demand of consultation. However, if an
alternative treatment already exists (non-dominance) self-insurance and specifically self-
protection could be used to reduce the loss through an inefficient demand for self-care.
Furthermore, due to subjective pessimism, education should be reduced or omitted if
subjective dominance of consultation is an inferior solution. That case would indicate
a too high demand for consultation. Generally, education can be interpreted either as
a measure to strengthen patient autonomy or be transferred into a measure to weaken
patient autonomy in a sense that the alternative of self-care is dominated and therefore
excluded as an alternative.
Finally, expending effort in education is second-best under uncertainty if the compe-
tence of self-diagnosis is imperfect. In fact, the level of education under ambiguity can be
maximally second-best. The former takes place if the ex-post treatment choice does not
differ between decisions made under uncertainty and ambiguity. Otherwise, the level of
education under ambiguity is maximally third-best.
2.4 Conclusion
As it is intuitively clear, patient autonomy is supported by an increase of self-care produc-
tivity (self-insurance) and competence of self-diagnosis (self-protection). A welfare gain is
possible through a more efficient allocation of resources. This is independent from ambi-
guity or uncertainty as ex-post decision structure or degree of decision rationality. Under
uncertainty, but also ambiguity, the relative advantage between consultation and self-
care after education, as well as the ambiguous growth of the utility relation within each
health status, are of importance to the effectiveness of self-insurance and self-protection.
Education depends on the effectiveness of self-insurance and self-protection and the loss
produced by a false self-diagnosis. Additionally, the degree of severity of banal and se-
vere illness and the role of risk-aversion are ambiguous in their impact on education.
The ambiguous impact of these parameters is closely connected to the focus of education
on self-care and the exclusion of consultation as well as the partial substitutional and
complementary relationship between self-protection and self-insurance.
Generally, if self-care is dominated by consultation for each health status the first-
best solution is realized. If an extension of alternatives through self-care takes place a
first-best solution is only possible if the ex-post treatment choice is factually optimal
making a perfect self-diagnosis necessary. If the ex-post decision-making takes place
under ambiguity the individual optimistic or pessimistic appreciation must not produce
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a general decision for consultation to avoid dominance. If the patient is more rational in
the sense of a conscious integration of the quality of self-diagnosis, a conditional decision
with a corresponding information value can be derived under uncertainty. Education
influences this value due to an increase of self-diagnosis competence and a change in the
potential losses in the case of a false self-diagnosis. Compared to a simple utilization of
a priori probabilities as a measure of risk without further attention to self-diagnosis, the
implementation of a conditional risk delivers a higher quality of treatment choice. Under
ambiguity a similar value can be calculated, defined as a self-referential value. This value
can never exceed the information value under uncertainty. An equalization of both values
takes place if the ex-post treatment choice is identical. Otherwise, the self-referential
value is negative due to a fixed parameter of pessimism which does not react to changes
in self-diagnosis competence, but only in ex-post utility outcomes. Therefore, a solution
under uncertainty delivers a second-best solution in which the demand for consultation or
self-care can be either too high or too low, as long as the self-diagnosis competence is not
perfect. However, given individual behavior under ambiguity, the degree of pessimism
can be seen as a fundamental reason for an inferior demand for consultation or self-
care compared to uncertainty, leading to a third-best solution. Compared to a general
conclusion about the impact of imperfect information about the factual illness as derived
by Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990), the demand for healthcare can explicitly characterized
as too high or too low in the sense of a utility maximizing choice between defined treatment
alternatives. The sources can be different in the sense of ambiguity or uncertainty.
As a result, under uncertainty, a second-best level of education is derived. Related
to this solution, a situation of ambiguity can maximally deliver a second-best with an
equalization of the level of education under uncertainty. The latter is possible if both
mechanisms of decision-making result in the identical ex-post choice of treatment al-
ternatives. Otherwise, education decreases or increases under ambiguity resulting in a
maximally third-best solution. Connected to effort under ambiguity and uncertainty, a
conflict between dominance of consultation as optimal from an ex-ante point of view and
non-dominance as the factual situation ex-post is of specific importance under ambigu-
ity. The potential utility loss and its risk, the health stock of a severe illness, a subjective
value of pessimism under ambiguity, a high degree of risk-aversion, and specific fixed costs
for self-care are identified as typical reasons for the choice of a consultation. Regarding
subjective pessimism under ambiguity, it can be beneficial to implement measures with
the aim of realizing dominance. Hence, education can either be interpreted as a measure
of strengthening patient autonomy or of weakening the benefit of treatment alternatives
in the sense that self-care is dominated by consultation leading to a maximization of in-
dividual welfare. For the latter, the measure must not be understood as education as
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described above, but more as measure to safeguard against welfare decreasing decisions.
By contrast, if dominance is beneficial, it would be generally realized without any ad-
ditional expenditure under uncertainty. Furthermore, under ambiguity, a limitation or
complete avoidance of education connected to subjective pessimism in order to sustain
non-dominance can be beneficial. This is also impossible under uncertainty due to the
exclusion of subjective pessimism and the possibility of education being beneficial without
avoidance of non-dominance. Differing from the previous case, if dominance of consulta-
tion is factually optimal, a divergence in the opposite direction can be induced. While
under uncertainty education would not be undertaken, it will take place under ambiguity
but is less efficient.
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Abbreviations Symbols
c... consultation Hi... health stock i = 1, 2
sc... self-care Si... loss of health stock
fb... first-best q... amount of medical demand
RA... risk-aversion πi... a priori probability
RN ... risk-neutral πis... error probability of self-diagnosis i
pSI... ex-post self-insurance πE ... probability of preventive success
pSP ... ex-post self-protection Ai... reimbursement given i
MI... market insurance R ... insurance premium
PPR... patient-physician Y ... gross income
relationship y... net income
θ... subjective parameter of pessimism
α... marginal treatment costs self-care
P ... expenditures for prevention
E... expenditures for education
Z... non-specified expenditures
e... utility difference banal illness
d... utility difference severe illness
a... degree of risk-aversion
Table II.3.1: Abbreviations and Symbols for analytical analysis - Part II, ch. 3
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, self-insurance in the form of ex-post education have already been exten-
sively discussed.1 So far, two important elements have been neglected: 1. self-protection
as preventive effort and 2. market insurance. The former is represented by the left-hand
side of Fig. II.1.2. Self-protection typically represents a preventive measure to decrease
1For that reason, within this chapter the basic framework of treatment alternatives and the effectiveness
of self-insurance are only briefly presented.
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the probability of the occurrence of an illness risk (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). There is
a broad literature dealing with prevention as an individual decision problem, primarily
connected to the essential determinants of prevention. Breyer et al. (2009) and Parente
et al. (2005) discuss prevention in a simple framework. Prevention depends specifically
on its effectiveness and on individual net income after the occurrence of an illness and,
therefore, on the illness severity. A particularly important determinant of preventive be-
havior is the existence of market insurance. Analyzed by Breyer et al. (2009), Schneider
and Zerth (2008), Kenkel (2000), Pauly (1974) and Ehrlich and Becker (1972), preven-
tion and market insurance can have a substitutional relationship. This is either based
on asymmetric information supporting a situation of ex-ante moral hazard or on the fact
that a market insurance is cheaper than effort in prevention. Finally, the distribution of
information is also of specific importance for investments in self-insurance.
This chapter brings together measures of ex-ante self-protection (prevention and ex-ante
education) and ex-post education (ex-post self-protection and ex-post self-insurance). Our
questions can be summarized as follows:
1. How can uncertainty in the success of prevention influence investments in prevention
and how can ex-ante education be a complementary investment?
2. How does prevention and ex-post education interact, given ambiguity as ex-post
decision making structure and self-care as a treatment alternative?
3. How does market insurance under symmetric and asymmetric information influence
investments in prevention and ex-post education, given ambiguity as ex-post decision
making structure and self-care as a treatment alternative?
The former chapter focused on the separation of efficiency with respect to the rationality
of decision making. Questions two and three focus now on the incentives to invest in each
of the named efforts and on their interrelation. While a solution under full rationality
and ambiguity is discussed, we exclude the condition of uncertainty. Our special interest
is focused on the question how ambiguity influences the investment decision.
Prevention is defined as follows. It is limited to primary prevention. It focus only on
banal illness. The risk of a severe illness remains unaffected.2 This kind of differentiation
is implemented in order to analyze the effectiveness of an illness (severe illness) which is
not in the focus of prevention, however, still a risky event, and therefore a relevant element
2Of course, primary prevention is usually defined as any effort resulting in a decrease of risk of any kind
of illness and, therefore, also severe illnesses (Mayer 1995).
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of the decision problem. This is also connected to activities of self-insurance which have
their focus on self-care and therefore primarily on the banal illness.
As can be seen in Fig. II.1.2, self-protection is defined more differentiated compared to
a single investment in preventive effort. The preventive measure is uncertain in its suc-
cess due to a bounded individual competence to adequately apply it. Schneider and Zerth
(2008) and Schneider and Schneider (2009) identify education as an important factor for
the productivity of prevention. Fletcher and Frisvold (2009) show that a higher school-
ing level increases prevention. Bessey (2011) finds evidence for a positive relationship
between measures to increase specific health knowledge and a promotion of a healthier
lifestyle of university graduates. Related to the former, Parente et al. (2005) show that
patient competence to assess the effectiveness of preventive measures has a positive impact
on demand for preventive services. Hsieh and Lin (1996) deliver evidence for a positive
relationship between health information for the elderly and the use of preventive mea-
sures. Hence, this could be used as an indicator for a complementary relation between
information about one’s own health and the better assessment of appropriate preventive
measures. A positive relationship between education and a decrease in health-reducing
goods consumption and the level of risk factors has been found by several studies.3 Based
on the former findings, investments in ex-ante education should be implemented within
the following discussion as a further kind of education able to increase the effectiveness
of prevention.
Ex-ante self-protection is discussed in a simple framework rooted in the theory deliv-
ered by Breyer et al. (2009) who translate health risk into income risk.4 After analyzing
the basic effectiveness of ex-ante education within this framework, prevention is analyzed
without a specific focus on ex-ante education in the subsequent discussion. Then, the
framework used in chapter 2 is applied. A differentiation between consultation and self-
care as treatment alternatives is made. The ex-post decision takes place under ambiguity.
Hence, the self-diagnosis competence and self-care productivity are again important ele-
ments, influencing effort in prevention. Moreover, the improvement of these competences,
due to investments in ex-post education, is again implemented. Finally, individual com-
petences to decide correctly in the case of a realized illness ex-post and, therefore, invest-
ments in ex-post education, should be crucial and analyzed according to their relations
to preventive effort.
The relationship of prevention to alternative investments is also the subject of discussion
3See, amongst others, Hunt-McCool and Bishop (1998), Kahn (1998), Zhu et al. (1996), Bucher and
Ragland (1992), Kenkel (1991), Winkleby et al. (1990).
4Parente et al. (2005) delivers a similar framework where income and health are separated into two
utility arguments. The results do not differ significantly.
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in the corresponding literature. Schneider and Zerth (2009) use an alternative scheme
to differentiate preventative health investments. They classify primary prevention as
a private investment and secondary prevention as medical prevention as screenings to
identify illnesses or their risk in a very early stage. The success of secondary prevention
and the perception of it increase acceptance of this type of prevention. However, highly
successful secondary prevention increases the opportunity costs for primary prevention.
Both kinds of prevention are increased by the level of expected health shocks. Eeckhoudt
et al. (2001) discuss a similar idea. They investigate the relationship between prevention
and diagnostic tests, focused on the diagnosis of an illness. If the test delivers perfect
information a decrease in prevention with a corresponding shift of resources to secondary
prevention could be beneficial.
It will be shown that there are similar results if ex-post education and self-care (focused
on the ex-post case of illness) and prevention (focused on the risk of illness) are related to
each other. Finally, as shown by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), market insurance is not only
characteristically connected to self-protection, but also to self-insurance. Hence, as also
done for prevention, the impact of market insurance under symmetric and asymmetric
information related to self-insurance itself and related to the interrelation between self-
insurance and self-protection is analyzed.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, an increasing competence in imple-
menting preventive measures increases prevention and the individual welfare. Second,
self-care as a treatment alternative may decrease preventive effort depending on the dif-
ferentiation of illnesses corresponding to the preventative focus and on the quality of self-
care, specifically self-diagnosis competence and productivity. Third, market insurance
significantly influences prevention and ex-post education depending on the information
structure. It can be shown that market insurance can be a substitute as well as a comple-
ment for preventive effort and effort in self-insurance. Furthermore, a specific co-payment
structure under asymmetric information is identified in order to handle non-observable in-
vestments and self-care and, therefore, the problem of ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard.
The analysis shows that predictions concerning the relationship between moral hazard
and market insurance strongly depend on the scope of the individual’s action. Fourth,
both investments are connected by a reciprocal decrease or increase in opportunity costs
if each of the investments is implemented. Market insurance characteristically influences
this relation depending on the information structure. Fifth, dominance of consultation is
of importance. Due to ambiguity ex-post, dominance, either objective or based on sub-
jective pessimism, can be beneficial, leading to an increase of prevention but a neglect of
ex-post education under conditions of symmetric information. Prevention is normally in-
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hibited if consultation is dominant and information is asymmetric between the insurance
company and the individual. Otherwise, neglect of investments in prevention and edu-
cation can be beneficial if self-care is beneficial but consultation tends to be dominant.
Finally, market insurance itself can be responsible for dominance, either objectively or
based on subjective pessimism.
The discussion is organized as follows. First, ex-ante self-protection is discussed within
a simplified framework which ignores ex-post education and self-care. The focus is on the
interrelation between prevention and ex-ante education. Second, ex-post education and
self-care are included in the model, but ex-ante education is excluded. Both investments
are analyzed separately and in combination with a specific focus on the impact of market
insurance. Finally, the results are summarized.
3.2 Prevention and ex-ante education as measures of
ex-ante self-protection
In this subsection the general framework of Breyer et al. (2009) is applied to demonstrate
the effects of investments in prevention and ex-ante education.5 An illness reduces net
income through a decrease of the health stock. Prevention simply reduces the risk to fall
ill. However, in the following, an additional element of uncertainty of prevention success is
implemented. This chapter discusses the incentive to invest in ex-ante education in order
to reduce the risk of prevention failure. Please note, ex-ante education is different to the
formerly discussed ex-post education. While ex-ante education focus on the success of
prevention, ex-post education focus on the decision between treatment alternatives in the
ex-post case of illness. In this sub-chapter 3.2 we are going to discuss the model of Breyer
et al. (2009) more generally with an additional element of uncertainty of prevention as
well as ex-ante education. Afterwards, in the subsequent chapters after chapter 3.2, we
will exclude ex-ante education and only discuss the interrelation between prevention and
ex-post education.
There are three health states with S as loss of health stock: 1.) healthy SH = 0, 2.)
severe illness S1, and 3.) banal illness S2 with S1 > S2. These states arise with the
5A similar presentation of preventive effort (with a specific focus on the effectiveness of an insurance)
is presented by Zweifel and Eisen (2000), ch. 7.
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corresponding probabilities where the prevention success is uncertain:
π2 =

π02 if P = P0
E(πP ) = π
0
2π
E
0 + π
P
2 (1− πE0 ) if P = P1 and E = E0 = 0
E(πEP ) = π
0
2π
E
1 + π
P
2 (1− πE1 ) if P = P1 and E = EP > 0
with πjH = 1 − π01 − π
j
2 and j = 1, P . P1 is defined as a discrete and concrete preventive
measure delivering πP2 < π02 and consequently 0 < π0H < πPH . Moreover, prevention is only
focused on banal illness. The risk of severe illness cannot be influenced by prevention (π1
is fixed). This is in line with the previous section with an application of work-sharing
which also takes place in the field of prevention. πE0 is the probability of prevention failure
without education (E0) and πE1 if a positive effort (EP ) takes place with πE0 > πE1 > 0. As
long as P = P0, π10 = E. Also EP is defined as a discrete value and therefore a concrete
measure. Prevention failure does not increase S. Finally, the following relations hold:
π2(P0, EP ) = π2(P0, E0), π2(P1, EP ) < π2(P0, E0), π2(P1, EP ) > π2(P0, EP )
and
π2(P0, EP ) = π2(P0, E0) > π2(P1, E0) > π2(P1, EP )
3.2.1 Prevention and ex-ante education without market insurance
A sequential decision takes place. First, investments EP are made in order to improve
competences in prevention. Second, investments P1 are made.
Given preventive effort without ex-ante education, the principal structure of events can
be represented by Fig. II.3.1. Each illness arises with a corresponding probability and
suffering. The utility function is concave with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. The corresponding utility
values as uncertain events in Fig. II.3.1 are defined below. If P = P0, only the lower
branch is valid where P1 is replaced by P0:
EUP0 = π01u(Y − S1) + π02u(Y − S2) + π0Hu(Y ) (3.1)
Y is the gross income. For P1 and E0 both branches are valid with πE0 < 1 resulting in:
EUP0,E0 = (1−πE0 )[π01u(y1)+πP2 u(y2)+πPHu(yH)]+πE0 [π01u(y1)+π02u(y2)+π0Hu(yH)] (3.2)
with y1 = Y − S1 − P1, y2 = Y − S2 − P1 and yH = Y − P1. The first (second) term
represents the expected utility if prevention is successful (unsuccessful), each weighted
with the probability of success or failure, respectively. To realize prevention without any
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Figure II.3.1: Uncertainty in prevention success
ex-ante education, EUP1,E0 > EUP0 must be fulfilled:
π01u
′(Y −S1) + π02u′(Y −S2) + (1− π01 − π02)u′(Y ) < (1− πE0 )
∣∣∣∣dπPdP
∣∣∣∣ [u(yH)− u(y2)] (3.3)
where u′ represents the discrete difference between the net income with and without in-
vestment P1 where |dπPdP | the absolute difference dπP = |π
P
2 −π02| as the absolute probability
effect if P is invested. As presented by Breyer et al. (2009) and Parente et al. (2005), pre-
vention depends on the expected utility loss through expenditures P1 (left-hand side), the
effectiveness of P1 (right-hand side), the utility loss of a banal illness and the probability
of P1’s success (right-hand side). A high potential of P1 is worth nothing if the realization
of it is highly unlikely. Given (3.3), a perfect competence in applying preventive measures
(πE0 = 0) delivers an increase of prevention.
Finally, for P1 and EP the utility is described as:
EUP0,EP = (1− πE1 )[π01u(y1E) + πP2 u(y2E) + πPHu(yHE)]+
πE1 [π
0
1u(y1E) + π
0
2u(y2E) + π
0
Hu(yHE)] (3.4)
with y1E = Y − S1 − P1 − EP , y2E = Y − S2 − P1 − EP and yHE = Y − P1 − EP . The
investment decision in favor of EP must include the decision in favor of P1. Otherwise, ed-
ucation makes no sense. Hence, the decision concerning EP must include the effectiveness
of P1 with EUP1,EP > EUP0,E0 as the sufficient condition for ex-ante education:
π01u
′(y1) + [π
E
0 EU
′(y, π02) + (1− πE0 )EU ′(y, πP2 )] < dπP
∣∣∣∣dπEdE
∣∣∣∣ [u(yHE)− u(y2E)] (3.5)
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with dπP = πP2 − π02, dπEdE = π
E
1 − πE0 and
EU ′(y, π02) = −(π02u′(y2) + π0Hu′(yH))
EU ′(y, πP2 ) = −(πP2 u′(y2) + πPHu′(yH))
where u′ represents the discrete differences between the net income with and without
investments EP (given P1) and |dπEdE | with dπE = |π
1
E − π0E| as the absolute probability
effect if E is invested. The left-hand side of (3.5) represents the expected utility loss if
EP is spent with EU ′(y, π02) and EU ′(y, πP2 ) as the expected utility losses in the case of a
failed and a successful preventive measure. Furtermore, EU ′(y, πP2 ) < EU ′(y, π02) due to a
shift of probability weight to perfect health in the case of successful prevention. Without
any calculation it can be easily seen that an increasing illness severity S1 and S2 and a
decreasing gross income within the different health states increase the marginal utility
and, therefore, the utility gain. Additionally, the utility gain increases with a decrease of
the preventive effectiveness in the case of a successful preventive measure. This is also the
case for the probability of a severe illness. The latter increases in its importance due to
the independence of the severe illness from prevention and, therefore, also independence
from education. Taking E(πP ) as the expected probability for the banal illness we get
(3.6) and 1 − π01 − E(πP ) as probability for perfect health. This expression shows more
concisely the probability values for the different health states:
π01u
′(y1) + E(πP )u
′(y2) + [1− π01 − E(πP )]u′(yH) (3.6)
The right-hand side of (3.5) describes the marginal gain in utility due to a decrease in
potential utility loss, only of importance for the occurrence of banal illness. The higher the
potential loss, the effectiveness of education and the potential effectiveness of prevention
are, the higher the incentive to invest in education.
What can be said about the interrelation between prevention and ex-ante education?
Taking (3.3) and (3.5) into account, without further calculation, P and EP decrease the
net income for each health state resulting in an increase of marginal utility. Hence, P
and EP are diluted due to competition for resources. On the other hand, P and EP are
increased due to an increase in the potential utility loss in state S2. Moreover, according
to the effectiveness of P and EP regarding a decrease of the health risk and the risk of a
preventive failure, P and EP complement one another.
Principally, two cases can occur regarding an incentive to invest in ex-ante education.
Firstly, if (3.3) and (3.5) are fulfilled, EUP0,E0 < EUP1,E0 < EUP1,EP . Secondly, if (3.5)
is fulfilled, but (3.3) is not, a comparison between EUP0,E0 and EUP1,EP is necessary. As
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(3.5) is fulfilled the general effectiveness of prevention is increased by ex-ante education.
Then, ex-ante education may induce prevention with EUP1,E0 < EUP0,E0 < EUP1,EP
and only the combination of prevention and ex-ante education delivers an individual
welfare gain. Only for the latter case education can be seen as necessary and sufficient for
prevention. Otherwise, if (3.3) is still not fulfilled despite education is chosen, education
is also left done because education focus on an existing investment in prevention. Then, a
fulfillment of (3.5) is only necessary for prevention. Thirdly, generally, a fulfillment of (3.3)
is necessary for education. However, this can be achieved by two channels, either through
the described second point or because education is beneficial even without education while
education may additionally increase the benefit of prevention. Hence, a general fulfillment
of (3.3) is only necessary for education.
3.2.2 Market insurance with observable ex-ante self-protection
Now a lump-sum insurance is implemented. Efforts in prevention and ex-ante education
are observable. The insurance is conditional on prevention and education:
R(P,E,A) =

R0 = π
0
1A
1 + π02A
2 if P = P0
RP = π
0
1A
1 + E(πP )A
2 if P = P1, E = E0
RPE = π
0
1A
1 + E(πEP )A
2 if P = P1, E = EP
where Ai with i = 1, 2 is the reimbursement for Si and E(πEP ) = πE1 π02 + (1 − πE1 )πP2 is
the expected probability for the banal illness given ex-ante education. The insurant can
be reimbursed by an adjustment of the insurance rate. Similar to the previous discussion,
the expected utility can be described with P0 and E0 as:
EUP0 = π01u(Y − S1 −R0 + A1) + π02u(Y − S2 −R0 + A2) + π0Hu(Y −R0) (3.7)
For P1 and E0 follows:
EUP1,E0 = π01u(y
R
1 ) + E(πP )u(y
R
2 ) + π
P
Hu(y
R
H) (3.8)
with yRi = Y − Si − P1 −RP +Ai and yRH = Y − P1 −RP . Full coverage with Ai∗ = Si is
optimal.6 Without education EUP1,E0 > EUP0 is satisfied if:
P1 < S2(1− πE0 )dπP (3.9)
6This can be easily shown by differentiation of each of the expected utility conditions with respect to A
and R as constraints resulting in S = A as optimum.
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with dπP = π02 − πP2 . The expected gain of income must compensate the expenditures
for prevention. The lower the probability of prevention success the less beneficial effort
in prevention.
The third function represents the case of P1 and EP :
EUP1,EP = π01u(y
R
1E) + E(π
E
P )u(y
R
2E) + π
PE
H u(y
R
HE) (3.10)
with yiE = Y − Si − P1 − EP − RPE + Ai and yRHE = Y − P1 − EP − RPE. Then, the
utility functions can be simplified to:
EUP0 = u(Y −R0); EUP1,E0 = u(yRH); EUP1,EP = u(yRHE) (3.11)
To invest in education, EUP1,EP > EUP1,E0 must be fulfilled with:
EP < S2dπEdπP (3.12)
with dπE = πE0 − πE1 . The effectiveness of prevention and ex-ante education must be suf-
ficiently high to compensate the education expenditures. Compared to (3.5), the income
risk is eliminated. Hence, the severe illness, the potential utility loss in the case of a banal
illness, and the income level for both health states are no longer determinants of patient
self-education.7 Again, if (3.9) and (3.12) are fulfilled, EUP0,E0 < EUP1,E0 < EUP1,EP
is the result. Otherwise, similar to the case without insurance, if EUP1,E0 < EUP0,E0 ,
but EUP0,E0 < EUP1,EP , ex-ante education stimulates prevention, meaning a sufficient
increase in the productivity of prevention in which both kinds of investment expenditures
are compensated. Hence, also under conditions of market insurance with an on preven-
tion and education conditional premium and symmetric information, additional effort in
education can be beneficial if prevention is sufficiently stimulated in its effectiveness.
3.2.3 Market insurance with non-observable ex-ante
self-protection
Here it is assumed that prevention and ex-ante education cannot be observed. Usually, this
assumption of asymmetric information implies a problem of ex-ante moral hazard. The
individual reduces or totally turns prevention down if the price of the market insurance
is negatively correlated with effort in self-protection. To avoid an offset of an on self-
7Please note the extraction of substitutional and complementary relations between market insurance and
ex-ante self-protection are discussed in the following chapter in more detail, in which the additional
element of self-care is implemented as a more differentiated ex-post decision structure.
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protection conditional insurance contract, the common solution is the implementation
of a deductible as a signal of positive effort toward self-protection. In the following
discussion P1 can be signaled, but EP cannot. Hence, education is beneficial if there is
an improvement in individual welfare despite non-observance by the insurance company.
First, it is necessary to calculate the condition for investments P1. In general, for P1
the fulfillment of (3.9) is necessary. If (3.9) is not fulfilled even more under asymmetric
information prevention is left undone. The reason is a decrease of the expected utility
below the actual optimum of total coverage due to a deductible paid under asymmetric
information.
The premium can be specified as follows:
R
R0 = π01A1 + π02A2 if P = P0 = 0R1 = π01A1 + πP2 Ā2 if P = P1 > 0 (3.13)
with Ā2 < A2. S1 = A1 ∀ Ā2 is the optimal coverage for the status of a severe illness.8
The insurance does not include educational efforts within the premium because of its
non-observance. Full-coverage for both health states is optimal if R1 would be offered
independently from a co-payment for S2, meaning a natural ambition for the individual
to fully insure costs, because prevention is neglected if there is no correlation between the
insurance price and preventive effort. However, the former is not of interest because R1
is only offered for Ā2 < A2. Then, the inequality EUP1(R1(Ā2)) > EUP0(R1(Ā2)) must
be fulfilled to realize prevention with:
π01u(y1) + E(πP )u(y2) + π
P
Hu(yH) ≥ π01u(y01) + π02u(y02) + (1− π01 − π02)u(y0H) (3.14)
with
y1 = Y − S1 − P1 −R1 + A1
y2 = Y − P1 −R1 − S2 + Ā2
yH = Y − P1 −R1
y01 = Y − S1 −R1 + A1
y02 = Y − S2 −R1 + Ā2
y0H = Y −R1
In that case, there is no incentive of signaling P1, but factually choosing P0. An increase
8The reason is the existence of the perfect health status with SH = 0 as suffering. If only states with
S1 and S2 would exist, an equalization of both corresponding net incomes with A1 = S1 − S2 + Ā2
would be optimal.
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of Ā2 reduces the possibility of fulfillment of (3.14). An almost total coverage of S2 lets
(3.14) converge to a situation close to certainty for which the right-hand side is larger
due to P = 0; however, R1 is paid as long as Ā2 < S2. Due to risk aversion, an increas-
ing Ā2 increases the expected utility. Hence, a maximum value Ā2∗ exists which fulfills
(3.14) with a corresponding investment P1 if the preventive measure is sufficiently effec-
tive. (3.14) also shows that a high probability of misinvestment makes it more difficult
to fulfill (3.14) due to an increase of E(πP ). Therefore, EP can again stimulate preven-
tion. The principle impact of EP is similar to the cases above, for which reason it is not
recalculated. Once more, the success of EP , either to stimulate prevention if (3.14) is not
fulfilled, or to stimulate a further increase of expected utility in a case in which (3.14)
is already fulfilled, depends on the effectiveness of EP . Another effect due to EP is an
increase of Ā2∗ if (3.14) is fulfilled also leading to an increase in the expected utility. The
latter corresponds to a decrease of ex-ante moral hazard.
Finally, a second condition must also be fulfilled in order to invest in prevention with
EUP1(R1∗) > EUP0,E0 . The choice of Ā2∗ with an adjustment of the insurance rate must
deliver a higher expected utility than total insurance coverage without a reduced premium.
π01u(Y−S1−P1−R1∗+A1)+E(πP )u(Y−S2−P1−R1∗+Ā2∗)+πPHu(Y−P1−R1∗) > u(Y−R0)
(3.15)
Again, the probability of a prevention success is important for fulfillment of this condition.
According to investments EP the same statement as for condition (3.14) can be given.
Summarized, according to the results of Breyer et al. (2009), the individual does not
achieve the first-best optimum if EP and P1 are not observable. These investments are
only possible with a partial cost-coverage for the health state S2.
3.3 Self-care, prevention and ex-post education
without market insurance
Now, we implement self-care as treatment alternative with a corresponding investment
in ex-post education. These elements are connected to investments in prevention. The
objective is a derivation of interdependencies between these kinds of efforts and specific
demand situations respectively. For reasons of simplicity we ignore investments in ex-ante
education.
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3.3.1 Self-care as a treatment alternative
The basic treatment framework of this chapter again differentiates between consultation
(c) and self-care (sc) as discussed in chapter 2. The health states and their corresponding
a priori probabilities are given as in section 3.2, but are defined as health stocks: H1
as severe illness, H2 as banal illness, and HH as perfect health with H1 < H2 < HH .
To simplify matters, fixed-costs are excluded (M = N = 0). Tab. II.3.2 presents the
utility values. The demand ex-post is given by (2.3), (2.9) and (2.10). Due to α < 1,
Consultation (c) Self-care (sc)
H1 u
1
c = u(Y
1
c − q1) u1sc = u(Y 1sc − αqsc − q1−)
H2 u
2
c = u(Y
2
c − q2) u2sc = u(Y 2sc − αqsc)
Table II.3.2: Specification of utility for consultation and self-care - II
qsc = q2. sc represents an imperfect substitute for c with u1c > u1sc and u2c
>
<
u2sc. The
physician is able to restore perfect health HH . Hence, the gross income for sc is bounded
with Yc(HH) = Ysc(HH). Furthermore, the individual generates an self-diagnosis Hi with
a probability πis (Tab. II.2.2).
In chapter 2 the ex-post decision was separated according to the information structure.
At this point, the ex-post decision takes place under ambiguity with the use of the Hurwicz
decision rule as in (2.21). Remember that an ex-post decision under ambiguity is similar
to a decision under uncertainty as long as the ex-post treatment decision does not differ
between ambiguity and uncertainty. Otherwise, ambiguity is inferior to uncertainty based
on a limitation of rationality. Due to the common opinion of a limited rationality in terms
of decisions according to health production, ambiguity is used as ex-post decision basis in
this chapter. θ∗ is the decision threshold as in (2.22). Fig. II.3.2 represents the decision
structure. The only difference with respect to chapter 2 is that the individual does not
necessarily fall sick.
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Figure II.3.2: Decision structure under ambiguity - II
3.3.2 Investments in prevention without ex-post education
In this chapter, we discuss optimal investments in prevention without insurance coverage.
3.3.2.1 Prevention under conditions of full rationality
Similar to (2.12), the first-best solution conditional on a situation without effort in ex-post
education and prevention as well as without an application of insurance coverage is (with
πis = 1):
EUfb = π
0
1u
1
c + π
0
2max{u2c ;u2sc}+ π0HuH (3.16)
If u2c < (>)u2sc and θ2 < θ∗, non-dominance (dominance) arises and the corresponding
maximum utility values should be realized ex-post. If u2c < u2sc, but θ2 > θ∗, the first-best
case cannot be realized based on subjective pessimism.
The first-best condition without insurance and ex-post education for an investment P1
with πis = 1 (perfect competence of self-diagnosis) and πE0 = 0 (perfect competence of
prevention) delivers:
−(π01u1cP + π02u2kP + π0HuHP ) ≤
∣∣∣∣dπPdP
∣∣∣∣ [uH(P1)− u2k(P1)] (3.17)
with k = c, sc. uicP , uikP and uHP are the discrete utility losses due to expenditures P1
(left-hand side). Prevention depends on P1’s effectiveness and the utility loss in the case
of a banal illness (right-hand side)
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3.3.2.2 Prevention under conditions of ambiguity
Derived from Fig. II.3.2, Fig. II.3.3 presents a situation in which the lower branch
indicates either P = P0 or a non-successful measure P = P1. The upper branch indicates
the situation after a successful measure P1. Differing from the previous section, ex-ante
education (EP ) is no longer discussed explicitly. As could be seen, EP is similar to P1.
P1 focus on the decrease in the probability of H2. EP focus on the productivity of P1.
Hence, any measure which increases the effectiveness of P1 is able to increase the incentive
for P1, as long as resources EP can be justified by a sufficient marginal productivity.
Summarized, both investments decrease the likelihood of H2 and can be seen as technical
equivalents. The further discussion addresses only P1 as a primary and uncertain measure
of self-protection. First, the expected utility without prevention is:
Figure II.3.3: Decision structure given prevention and self-care
EUP0 = π01
[
π1su
1
c + (1− π1s)u1k
]
+ π02
[
π2su
2
k + (1− π2s)u2c
]
+ π0Hu
H (3.18)
with k = c, sc dependent on dominance or non-dominance of c. The expected utility with
prevention is:
EUP1 = π01
[
π1su
1
c(P1) + (1− π1s)u1k(P1)
]
+
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E(πP )
[
π2su
2
k(P1) + (1− π2s)u2c(P1)
]
+ π0Hu
H(P1) (3.19)
P1 is beneficial if EUP1 ≥ EUP0 :
−(π01EU1P + π02EU2P + π0HuHP ) ≤ πP ′2 [uH(P1)− EU2(P1)] (3.20)
with (1 − πE0 )
∣∣dπP
dP
∣∣ = πP ′2 and EU2(P1) = π2su2k(P1) + (1 − π2s)u2c(P1). EU iP and uHP are
the utility losses due to expenditures P1 (left-hand side). Now, prevention depends on
P1’s effectiveness, the utility loss in the case of a banal illness, and the probability of
preventive success (right-hand side).
Compared to the first-best case, the expected utility loss (left-hand side) is lower in
(3.17) than in (3.20). However, if k = sc, the relation between the potential utility losses
(right-hand side) uH(P1) − u2sc(P1) and (1 − πE0 )[uH(P1) − EU2(P1)] is ambiguous. The
former exceeds the latter if:
πE0 u
H(P1) + (1− πE0 )EU2(P1) > u2sc(P1) (3.21)
Hence, if πE0 = 1, investments in prevention in a first-best situation are more beneficial
than in a situation with imperfect self-diagnosis competence and imperfect competences
of prevention. This is always true due to uH(P1) > u2sc(P1) as always valid. The incentive
to invest in P1 is higher in the first-best case than in the situation indicated by (3.20).
If πE0 = 0, (3.21) delivers EU2(P1) < u2sc(P1), which increases the incentive to invest
P1. However, due to π2s < 1 within EU2(P1), sc itself is less effective in an imperfect
solution. Hence, the higher the error probability 1− π2s (EU2(P1) decreases), the higher
the incentive to invest in P1 in a situation of imperfect prevention success. However,
this is connected to an increasing expected utility loss (left-hand side in (3.20)) which
decreases the incentive. Moreover, if c is dominant with u2c > u2sc and therefore k = c in
(3.20) and (3.17), the incentive to invest in P1 is higher in the first-best case than in an
imperfect situation, as long as πE0 > 0.
However, if θ2 > θ∗, but u2c < u2sc, leading to EU2 = u2c within (3.20) as a situation
of subjective dominance, k = sc is in fact optimal in (3.17) as first-best solution. The
left-hand side in (3.21) decreases. Hence, the potential utility loss and the expected utility
loss increase within (3.20). Therefore, the ambiguity about the incentive to invest in P1
between the first-best and imperfect situation remains.
Summarized, as previously discussed for the situation without sc, prevention depends
on its effectiveness and failure probability, as well as the expected utility loss through
corresponding expenditures. Compared to a first-best solution, as long as prevention
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is uncertain and c is not objectively dominant, the preventive effort can be reduced or
extended. The role of subjective pessimism must be considered.
3.3.2.3 Comparative statics
The impact of sc is examined in this section in more detail.9 For the comparative statics
analysis, P1 must be changed from a discrete to a continuous variable. In such a case (3.20)
becomes an equation in the optimum and delivers P ∗(α,Hi, πis) as an implicit function.
Prevention specifically depends on the quality of sc. Hence, the given sc variables and
illness severities influence the factual benefit of prevention. If c is non-dominant with
θ2 < θ
∗ and u2sc > u2c , the comparative statics for P ∗ results in (given EUPP < 0, see app.
5.5):
∂P ∗
∂α
>
<
0 ;
∂P ∗
∂H1
> 0 ;
∂P ∗
∂H2
>
<
0 ;
∂P ∗
∂π1s
> 0 ;
∂P ∗
∂π2s
>
<
0 (3.22)
∂P∗
∂α
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
πP ′2 π
2
su
2
scα +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π02π
2
su
2
scPα + π
0
1(1− π1s)u1scPα
∂P∗
∂H1
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π01
[
(1− π1s)u1scPH1 + π
1
su
1
cPH1
]
∂P∗
∂H2
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
|πP ′2
[
π2su
2
scH2 + (1− π
2
s)u
2
cH2
]
|+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π02
[
(1− π2s)u2cPH2 + π
2
su
2
scPH2
]
+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π01(1− π1s)u1scPH2
∂P∗
∂π1s
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π01(u
1
cP − u1scP )
∂P∗
∂π2s
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π02(u
2
scP − u2cP ) +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
|πP ′2 (u2sc − u2c)|
Table II.3.3: Comparative statics for prevention
If the conditions within Tab. II.3.3 are fulfilled, ∂P
∗
1
∂x
> 0 is the result in which qsc′ = 0,
necessary for non-dominance (due to a bounded maximum health). If α increases the
effective price of sc, the potential utility loss for H2 (left-hand side in row 1) and the
9Please note the comparative statics analysis is essentially valid for the discussion of investments in
prevention and ex-ante education within section 3.2.1.
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expected marginal utility loss through expenditures P for sc(Hi) (right-hand side in row
1) are increased. The former increases while the latter decreases P .
The lower the severity of H1 (row 2), the higher the investments in P , due to a decrease
of the expected marginal utility loss for c(H1) and sc(H1). However, the severity of H2
has an ambiguous impact. A decrease in potential utility loss for H2 (left-hand side in
row 3) must be compensated by a decrease in marginal utility loss through expenditures
P for c(H2) and sc(Hi) (right-hand side in row 3).
Finally, an increase of the error probability π1s (row 4) stimulates P based on a shift
of the marginal utility loss through expenditures P from the worst sc(H1) to the better
case c(H1). However, the higher the quality of self-diagnosis for H2 (row 5) the lower the
marginal utility loss through expenditures P and the potential utility loss for H2. The
former decreases while the latter increases P .
Compared to the solution in section 3.2.1, the impact of sc according to prevention
is ambiguous. While the potential utility loss decreases for banal illness, the expected
marginal utility loss through expenditures P increases through sc(H1), but decreases
through sc(H2).
Summarized, sc as an extension of treatment alternatives has an ambiguous impact
on prevention. While a low effective price of sc and a high self-diagnosis competence for
a banal illness decrease the potential loss for a banal illness, these characteristics also
decrease the expected marginal utility loss through expenditures P . Hence, a higher
quality of sc can, but does not necessarily, stimulate prevention. Furthermore, the lower
the severity and the error probability of a severe illness, the more prevention is stimulated.
However, the case of low severity of a banal illness, however, is ambiguous. The reason
for this ambiguity is that both prevention as well as sc focus on the banal illness.
3.3.2.4 The case of dominance
Due to decision-making under ambiguity ex-post, EUc > EUc/sc (with EUc/sc as expected
utility under non-dominance of c) is possible from an ex-ante point of view despite non-
dominance ex-post with u2c < u2sc and θ∗ > θ2. To induce dominance in general, any non
specified measure Z delivers a fulfillment of (2.55) resulting in θ∗(Z) < θ2 < θ∗. Z should
be invested if EUc(Z1) > EUc/sc(Z0) with Z1 > 0 and Z0 = 0:
π01
[
EU1 − u1c(Z)
]
+ π02
[
EU2 − u2c(Z)
]
+ π0H
[
uH − uH(Z)
]
< 0 (3.23)
(3.23) depends on the distribution of πis and π0i as well as on the benefit/loss through sc.
Our special interest is geared to prevention and its potential source of dominance. Z
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can be replaced by P1.10 If (2.55) is not sufficient for dominance, independent from the
relation between EUc and EUc/sc, P1 should be invested if (3.20) is fulfilled. However, if
EUc(P0) > EUc/sc(P0) and θ∗(P1) < θ2, meaning a situation of subjective dominance as
factually optimal, (3.23) must be fulfilled so that EUP1c > EU
P0
c/sc.
11 In this case, due to
dominance, (3.20) changes to
−(π01u1cP + π02u2cP + π0HuHP ) < πP ′2 [uH − u2c(P1)] (3.24)
If (3.20) is fulfilled (for a hypothetical θ∗ > θ2) and EUP0c > EU
P0
c/sc, (3.24) must also
be fulfilled. Dominance increases prevention if the expected value for c exceeds the total
expected value integrating c and sc. This is based on a decrease of the expected utility
loss through expenditures P1 due to EUP0c > EU
P0
c/sc as well as an increase of the potential
utility loss for a banal illness. Given fulfillment of (3.23) for Z = P1, P1 should be
invested, resulting in EUP1/0fb > EU
P1
c > EU
P0
c > EU
P0
c/sc where P1/0 implies either P0
or P1 as solution in the first-best case. Please note, EU
P1/0
fb as first-best solution also
implements u2sc due to a perfect competence of self-diagnosis. Then, for the first-best
solution P1 is not necessarily optimal while it is optimal for the described solution under
ambiguity based on u2c as a possible status of utility for the banal illness.
Otherwise, even if (3.24) is not fulfilled, (3.23) can be fulfilled if any expenditure Z
with Z < P1 and θ∗(Z) < θ2 is invested, resulting in EUc(Z) > EUP0c/sc.
12 Then, Z must
be understood simply as a measure to induce dominance, resulting in EUP1/0fb > EU
P0
c >
EUZc > EU
P0
c/sc. If prevention is generally not efficient and if EU
P0
c > EU
P0
c/sc, but (3.23)
is not fulfilled, neither through Z nor P1, but in the same time θZ∗ < θ2 or θP1∗ < θ2
respectively, dominance should not be realized and Z or P1 should not be undertaken.
The latter results in EUP1/0fb > EU
P0
c > EU
P0
c/sc > EU
Z
c .
Summarized, based on ambiguity, prevention or any kind of non-defined expenditures
can inhibit sc as a treatment alternative depending on the subjective pessimism of the
individual. In a situation of dominance prevention is stimulated if sc is not beneficial from
an ex-ante point of view. Prevention should not be undertaken or should be decreased if
non-dominance is optimal, but preventive expenditures would induce a subjective domi-
nance.
10Though in principle it could be a continuous variable, please note that P1 is a discrete variable.
11If P1 is undertaken, the second and third terms in (3.23) must be changed in which π02 is only valid for
the terms without and E(πP ) for the terms with P1.
12If Z = P1, P1 would always be preferred to Z because P1 is beneficial with respect to its preventive
effect while Z is without any positive effectiveness.
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3.3.3 Investments in ex-post education without prevention
Due to its similarity to chapter 2.3, the solution for ex-post education without insurance
and without prevention is presented in a compact form. The effectiveness of ex-post self-
protection (pSP ) and ex-post self-insurance (pSI) remains with: πi′s (E) > 0, πi′′s (E) ≤ 0
and α′(E) < 0, α′′(E) ≥ 0. The only difference is the status of full health HH .
3.3.3.1 Ex-post education under conditions of full rationality
Due to perfect competence of self-diagnosis only ex-post self-insurance can be applied.
Similar to (2.34), the first-best condition without market insurance for a measure E =
E1 > 0 in the case of non-dominance is presented by:
π01u
1
cE + π
0
2u
2
scE + π
0
Hu
H
E ≥ 0 (3.25)
with u1cE, u2scE and uHE as discrete utility losses or gains through expenditures E1. The
expected utility gain must at least equalize the expected loss.
3.3.3.2 Ex-post education under conditions of ambiguity
Given (3.18) and similar to condition (2.47), the necessary condition for a discrete measure
E1 is:
−(π01EU1E + π02EU2E + π0HuHE ) ≤
π01
dπ1s
dE1
[
u1c(E1)− u1k(E1)
]
+ π02
dπ2s
dE1
[
u2k(E1)− u2c(E1)
]
(3.26)
with EU iE and uHE as utility loss through expenditures E1 and:
EU1E = π
1
su
1
cE + (1− π1s)u1kE
>
<
0 ; EU2E = π
2
su
2
kE + (1− π2s)u2cE
>
<
0
The expected utility gain due to ex-post self-insurance and ex-post self-protection must
exceed the loss through expenditures E1.13
3.3.3.3 Comparative statics
E is assumed to be a continuous variable. The solution can be derived from (5.3) and
(5.4) within the appendix as well as (2.50) and Tab. II.2.6 (with π02 = (1− π)). ∂E
∗
∂π02
is of
additional interest:
∂E∗
∂π02
= (1− π2s)u2cE + π2su2scE − uHE + π2′s (u2sc − u2c)
>
<
0 (3.27)
13For a comparison between the solutions under full rationality and ambiguity please see chapter 2.3.
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If π02 increases the relevance of the expected marginal utility loss for c(H2) (first term)
increases. Otherwise, the effectiveness of pSP and pSI is increased.
The impact of risk aversion was discussed in relation to Fig. II.2.7 and condition (2.53).
Again, a constant relative risk-aversion is assumed as well as EUEE > 0, EUEEa < 0 and
EUEx > 0 (see app. 5.4). Then:
∂2E∗
∂π02∂a
>
<
0 (3.28)
If E is stimulated by an increase in the relevance of H2, a decrease of RA increases
(decreases) this stimulation if the net incomes for sc(H2) and the state of perfect health
are high (low) and if the net income for c(H2) is low (high). Due the reasonable assumption
of a high income for sc(H2) and the state of perfect health, (3.28) is positive.
3.3.3.4 The case of dominance
The case of dominance is briefly analyzed. Similar to section 2.3.4, dominance could
be optimal. However, E1 can also induce non-dominance through an increase of u2sc
(excluding an increase in θ∗). A decrease in individual welfare can arise through the
induced risk of a false self-diagnosis and a false treatment choice in the case of H1. E1
should only be undertaken if EUE0c < EU
E1
c/sc, in order to increase individual welfare
(similar to (2.54)):
π01
[
(π1sEu
1
c(E1) + (1− π1sE)u1sc(E1))− u1c(E0)
]
+
π02
[
(π2sEu
2
sc(E1) + (1− π2sE)u2c(E1))− u2c(E0)
]
+
π0H
[
uH(E1)− uH(E0)
]
> 0 (3.29)
In conclusion, this corresponds to section 2.3.4 with its solutions depending on θ∗ and the
possible inducement of dominance or non-dominance.
Summarized, the basic results relating to investments were extensively discussed in
section 2.3. More specifically in the context of prevention, a decrease of the relevance
of banal illness is ambiguous according to an increase or decrease of ex-post education’s
incentive, specifically based on the focus of ex-post education on sc. Similar to the
other variables, a decrease in risk-aversion connected to the occurrence of banal illness is
ambiguous, but a stimulation of ex-post education is more probable.
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3.3.4 Interrelation between prevention and ex-post education
For the cross-derivatives, π02PE = πisEP = αEP = 0 is assumed to be valid. Hence, there
are no direct interrelations between prevention and ex-post education according to their
effectiveness in terms of the production function of the corresponding target variables.
For an interior solution (E∗ > 0;P ∗ > 0), (3.20) and (3.26) must simultaneously equal-
ize zero (see app. 5.6).14 A numerical simulation is applied here to better understand the
solution. For that, u is specified as u = ya with uy > 0 and uyy < 0 and a < 1. Then,
(P ∗ > 0, E∗ > 0) can, but does not necessarily, exist.
(3.20) and (3.26) are analyzed to extract the essential effects. Prevention reduces the
net income for each health state, but can increase the expected utility over all states
due to a decrease of π02. Otherwise, ex-post education can increase the expected utility
through both an increase in net income (pSI for sc) and a decrease in error probabilities
(pSP ). Comparing (3.20) with (3.26) with respect to the effect on the net income for the
utility states of sc, E is more beneficial than P because E is also able to make sc more
efficient with respect to the marginal costs. Otherwise, the relative outcome between P
and pSP is ambiguous. It depends on their relative effectiveness and the relative loss
between the case of banal illness and the case of a false self-diagnosis. In conclusion, the
relative advantage between P and E remains ambiguous. Hence, the relation between
EU with P > 0, E = 0 and EU with P = 0, E > 0 must be ambiguous and a superior
alternative does not generally exist.
(3.30) shows the cross-partial derivative of E and P (see app. 5.6):
EUPE = EUEP = π
0
1EU
1
EP + π
0
2EU
2
EP︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.+/−
+πP ′2 EU
2
E︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.−
+π0Hu
H
EP + π
0′
Hu
H
E︸ ︷︷ ︸
3.−
+π01π
1′
s (u
1
cP − u1scP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
4.+
+π2′s π
P ′
2 (u
2
sc − u2c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
5.−
+π02π
2′
s (u
2
scP − u2cP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
6.+
(3.30)
The second (if EU2E > 0), third and fifth terms show a substitutional relation between
E and P . The reason is the focus of E on sc and of P on H2, shown previously in
(3.27) and (3.22). A successful preventive measure decreases the relevance of H2 and
ex-post education increases the quality of sc. Hence, according to that objective the
two investments are substitutes. Otherwise, terms four and six show a complementary
relationship. While expenditures P increase the potential utility loss according to a false
self-diagnosis, E decreases the expected marginal utility loss for expenditures P due to a
decrease in the error probabilities. Finally, the first term is ambiguous. Both EU1EP and
EU2EP are ambiguous in their signs. The expected marginal utility gain for sc(Hi) through
14For the analysis at this point, P and E are continuous variables. Neither P nor E are essential inputs.
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pSI increases if P is implemented. Moreover, pSP decreases the expected marginal utility
loss for expenditures P . Otherwise, the expected marginal utility loss for c(Hi) increases,
either through expenditures E or P . Summarized, both pSP and pSI are connected to
P by substitutional and complementary relations.
As shown in Fig. II.3.4a and Fig. II.3.4b, a corner solution15 is possible with P0 =
P ∗ = 0 (P1 = P ∗ > 0) and E1 = E∗ > 0 (E0 = E∗ = 0) and
EUP1,E0 < EUP0,E0 < EUP0,E1
or
EUP0,E1 < EUP0,E0 < EUP1,E0
Otherwise, (P1, E1) can also be achieved as utility maximizing solution (Fig. II.3.4c) with:
EUP0,E0 < EUP1,E1
This case implies a solution in which a combination of both measures is superior to a single
investment. Hence, while in the former chapter prevention where excluded, prevention is
now available, may be increasing the efficiency when an interior solution exists. The final
solution depends on the marginal productivity of both kinds of expenditures according to
P , pSI and pSP .
If the first-best solution is implemented with πis = 1 and πE0 = 0, the first-order condi-
tions (3.17) and (3.25) must be applied. (3.30) is simplified. Terms four, five and six are
cancelled out because pSP loses its function. Then, the focus is only on the substitutional
and complementary relations between pSI and P . Finally, allowing for investments in
both measures with EUP0,E0 < EUP1,E1 can imply a first-best solution superior to (3.17)
and (3.25).16
The results are also related to Schneider and Zerth (2009) and Eeckhoudt et al. (2001).
While the former analyze the relationship between primary and secondary prevention,
the latter discuss the relationship between primary prevention and diagnostic tests. Both
identify substitutional relations between these elements. Within the previous discussion,
an increase in the effectiveness of sc or ex-post education also induces (partial) substi-
tutional effects due to a simple increase in opportunity costs for preventive effort. The
15Both solutions can be created for constant probabilities πis < 1, πi and Hi. Then, a corner solution
only depends on the relative effectiveness of both measures. For Fig. II.3.4a, the effectiveness of E is
strongly limited with a low level of dπis and dα while P is very effective with a high level dπ2. The
opposite is the case for Fig. II.3.4b.
16To simplify matters a more detailed discussion of the optimal solutions in the first-best case is not
done here. The basic differences between the first-best solution and possible less efficient results were
discussed previously and can also be applied at this point.
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reason for this is the focus of prevention as a measure of self-protection on the ex-ante
illness risk, while ex-post education is a measure of self-insurance decreasing the ex-post
injury.
Figure II.3.4: Simulation of the interrelation of prevention and ex-post education
Within the appendix, 5.6 shows the comparative statics between P and E more ana-
lytically, according to the relative price of sc and the illness severity. The analysis shows
an ambiguous result. The effect of these variables depends on the kind of basic relation
between investments (substitutional or complementary), and the isolated effect of the
variables for each of both investments.
Finally, we discuss the case of dominance. As in sections 2.3.4, 3.3.2.4 and 3.3.3, dom-
inance can be optimal. Dominance cannot be realized if θ∗ > θ2. θ∗ can be changed
by P1 or E1, simplified as discrete investments. While the incentive for P1 is increased
under dominance, E1 loses its effectiveness entirely. Hence, if P1 and E1 are implemented,
θP1,E1∗ < θ2 could be the result, leading to EUP1c or EUZc > EUP1c in which Z is any kind
of measure smaller than P1 with θZ∗ < θ2. For the reason of simplicity, not all possible
types of utility ranking are analyzed. However, the relevant point is the following. The
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interior and corner solutions discussed in Fig. II.3.4 are not calculated for non-dominance.
However, the interrelation between P1 and E1 can be of the character that EUP1,E0c or
EUZ,P0,E0c as another type of corner solution. Another solution can be EU
P0,E0
c/sc to adhere
non-dominance as a possible solution as discussed above. If an interior solution under
non-dominance is optimal, but both investments deliver θ∗ < θ2, a situation is imaginable
in which only one of the two is implemented.
Summarized, if P and E are implemented simultaneously, corner or interior solutions
can be identified. Both pSI and pSP are connected to P by substitutional and comple-
mentary relations specifically based on P ’s focus on banal illness and E’s focus on the
quality of sc. Whether one of these solutions is optimal also depends on the advantageous-
ness of a solution under dominance. Therefore, resources can be (but are not necessarily)
beneficially allocated between investments which are focused on the ex-ante illness risk
and on the ex-post productivity of sc as well as self-diagnosis competence.
3.4 Self-care, prevention and ex-post education with
market insurance
The following section discusses the interrelation between P and E when a market insur-
ance (MI) is available, different to the former chapter. A typical question arising when a
MI is implemented is the effectiveness of a MI with respect to private efforts, here pre-
vention and education. To answer this question, there will be a specific focus on the role
of sc and the distribution of information between the insurer and the insurant. First,
MI under symmetric information is analyzed. The insurer is able to observe activities
and the effectiveness of P and E. Furthermore, the effectiveness of sc is also known by
the insurer. Second, a more realistic situation of asymmetric information is applied. The
insurer is not able to observe activities of P and E. Additionally, the effectiveness of sc
is also not observable.
3.4.1 Market insurance under symmetric information
Tab. II.3.4 presents the different structures of insurance premiums under condition of
symmetric information. Within the following analysis, each of the premiums is defined
in dependence of the rewarded investment, the case of dominance and non-dominance as
well as the structure of ex-post decision-making.
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Description of premium R Condition of decision-making
Rfb prevention (no), ex-post education (no), c and sc full rationality
RfbP prevention (yes), ex-post education (no), c and sc full rationality
RfbE prevention (no), ex-post education (yes), c and sc full rationality
R0 prevention (no), ex-post education (no), c and sc ambiguity
RP prevention (yes), ex-post education (no), c and sc ambiguity
Rdom0 prevention (no), ex-post education (no), only c ambiguity
RdomP prevention (yes), ex-post education (no), only c ambiguity
RE prevention (no), ex-post education (yes), c and sc ambiguity
RPE prevention (yes), ex-post education (yes), c and sc ambiguity
Table II.3.4: Insurance premium under symmetric information
3.4.1.1 Investments in prevention without ex-post education
As in Breyer et al. (2009), ch. 6, a lump-sum insurance is implemented. At this point,
P and sc are observable. Tab. II.3.5 represents the utility values. A1 and A2 are the
coverages for c. Asc is the coverage for sc and H2, which must be consistently implemented
for H1 as well. A1− covers the additional costs for H1 if sc is chosen and c is necessary.
The premium can be written as follows (if c is non-dominant):
Consultation (c) Self-care (sc)
H1 u(Y 1c − q1 −R+A1) u(Y 1sc − αqsc − q1− −R+Asc +A1−)
H2 u(Y 2c − q2 −R+A2) u(Y 2sc − αqsc −R+Asc)
Table II.3.5: Consultation, self-care and market insurance under symmetric information
R =
π01EA1 + π02EA2 = R0 if P = P0π01EA1 + E(πP )EA2 = RP if P = P1 (3.31)
with
EA1 = π1sA
1 + (1− π1s)(Asc + A1−), EA2 = π2sAsc + (1− π2s)A2
and P0 = 0 and P1 > 0. If c is dominant, (3.31) changes to:
Rdom =
π01A1 + π02A2 = Rdom0 if P = P0π01A1 + E(πP )A2 = RdomP if P = P1 (3.32)
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If c is non-dominant the optimal gross income ex-post is Y i∗c = Y 1∗sc = Y 2∗sc = Y HH ≡ Y ∗∗.
As it is commonly known, the individual voluntarily demands for full cost coverage in the
case of risk aversion and symmetric information. Then, the MI equalizes the marginal
utilities in the optimum through full-insurance with A1 = q1∗, A2 = q2∗ and A1− = q1−∗
and Asc = αqsc∗. As a result, a solution with MI under symmetric information urgently
implies a superior solution to the case without MI (see chapter 2 and the former discussion
within chapter 3.3), valid for a situation of full rationality and ambiguity.
Prevention under conditions of full rationality
The first-best solution without prevention implies EU(Rfb) = u(Y ∗∗ − Rfb) with Rfb =
π01A
1 +π02A
i with i = c, sc in dependence of dominance or non-dominance. A replacement
of the utility values given in Tab. II.3.5 delivers
u(Y ∗∗ −RfbP − P1)− u(Y
∗∗ −Rfb − P0) ≥ 0 (3.33)
as a condition for P1 with RfbP = π
0
1A
1+πP2 A
i. If EUc(Rnon) < EUc/sc(Rnon) with Rnon = 0
meaning a case without insurance, a cost coverage of c and sc is utility maximizing. Full-
insurance delivers an ex-post indifference between c and sc. If c is preferred in that case, sc
is excluded ex-post from the treatment portfolio. However, under symmetric information
a binding contract can be assumed in which the patient is forced to choose sc, as it would
be done without MI. Then, (3.33) can be solved with:
P1 ≤ AscdπP (3.34)
The expected income gain through a decrease of expected costs for H2 must compensate
for the expenditures P1.17
Prevention under conditions of ambiguity
Now, the premium R0 is of relevance substituting Rfb in condition (3.33). The solution
is:
P1 ≤ EA2(1− πE0 )dπP (3.35)
17If sc and the self-diagnosis cannot be observed, a problem of ex-post moral hazard could arise. If there
is a preference for c ex-post and if H2 is correctly diagnosed by the individual, c(H2) could be chosen.
The insurance realizes a deficit due to an increase of expenditures for H2. Otherwise, if H1 is the
actual illness, a benefit is generated if c is always chosen. To realize sc if H2 is diagnosed an alternative
contract could be provided. A minimum co-payment for c(H2) delivers u2c(A2 < q2) < u2sc(Asc = qsc)
connected to a decrease of the individual welfare due to a remaining risk. Otherwise, if H2 is an
incorrect self-diagnosis, c is optimal. Then the alternative contract is not optimal if R0 delivers a
preference of c. However, the latter is not a problem insofar as no loss is produced for the insurance
because any false diagnosis according to H1 is already implemented within the alternative contract
(the co-payment is only valid for H2). For a more extensive discussion of the problem of asymmetric
information see the following chapter.
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Uncertainty in prevention success reduces the incentive of P1. The analysis of (3.35) can
be simplified due to the focus on EA2. The lower EA2, the lower the incentive to invest
in prevention:
∂P ∗1
∂α
> 0 ;
∂P ∗1
∂H2
< 0 ;
∂P ∗1
∂π2s
< 0 (3.36)
where P ∗1 describes a continuous level of preventive effort. Hence, the more successful sc
and the self-diagnosis are, the less interesting prevention is, which differs from the case
without MI where the influence of sc was ambiguous.18
P1 in the first-best case is more attractive than in a situation of imperfect competence of
self-diagnosis and preventive behavior if dπP (EA2(1−πE0 )−Asc) > 0. Due to EA2 > Asc,
it specifically depends on the success of P1 and the quality of sc.
Relationship between market insurance and prevention
The comparison between (3.35) and the case without MI (3.20) makes the relationship
between prevention and MI more explicit.19 The question arises whether MI is able to
stimulate preventive effort, or in other words, can (3.35) be fulfilled while (3.20) is not.
Differing from the case without MI, there is no potential utility loss under full-insurance.
MI induces a substitutional effect due to the equalization of net incomes and therefore
elimination of the a priori illness risk and the risk of a false self-diagnosis. This can be
typically seen as a source of ex-ante moral hazard, as identified by Ehrlich und Becker
(1972). Of course, due to symmetric information, there is no deficit for the MI and a
factual problem of moral hazard does not exist. In other words, the application of MI
is cheaper for the individual than preventative efforts. If the observability of prevention
is restricted, an elimination of income risk connected to a decrease in the MI price if
preventive effort is signaled inhibits the individual’s preventive effort.20
We can analyze the effectiveness of the expected loss of utility or income respectively
through expenditures P1. For that, we can compare the left-hand sides of (3.20) and
(3.33) through calculation of the following difference:
|π01EU1P + π02EU2P + π0HuHP | − |[u(Y ∗∗ −RP − P1)− u(Y ∗∗ −R0 − P0)]| (3.37)
π0iEU
i
P and πHuHP represent the expected utility loss through expenditures P1, given a
specific health status. Due to an equalization of net incomes, prevention directly affects
18This substitution is similar to the elimination of a potential utility loss through implementation of full
coverage. However, it cannot be seen as a source of moral hazard.
19The calculation is made for a discrete measure P1. The question as to whether prevention is stimulated
by MI means a possible increase of the range for which a preventive measure could have a utility
increasing effect. The effect of prevention in a marginal consideration delivers the same results.
20The problem of asymmetric information is discussed in section 3.4.2. Preventive effort typically de-
creases if insurance coverage increases (see Zweifel and Eisen (2009), ch. 7).
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income through a decrease in the insurance premium when dπP > 0. The insurance
premium is negatively correlated with effort in prevention. For that reason, MI actually
transforms prevention into a measure of self-insurance. If we only take P1 into account
within (3.37), without paying attention to a decrease of R, (3.37) is strictly positive,
meaning a lower loss through expenditures P1 under full insurance than in a situation
without insurance. The reason is the concavity of the utility function. In fact, MI equalizes
the net incomes corresponding to an increase in expected utility and therefore a decrease
in expected utility loss through expenditures P1. Hence, the loss under full-insurance is
lower and (3.37) is positive resulting in a complementary relationship between MI and
prevention. If R0 changes to RP (R0 > RP is always fulfilled), the complementarity
between MI and prevention is in fact stimulated.21
Moreover, due to concavity of u, the utility loss without MI within (3.37) increases if
the severity of Hi increases (due to higher expected treatment expenditures) resulting in
a decrease in the incentive to invest P1. This is of specific relevance for severe illnesses.
Hence, the complementary effect through the MI increases, particularly if we take the
expected utility loss for H1 into account. The latter is of specific importance if we want
to derive a proposition about the total effect of MI in relation to preventive effort. The
lower the net income or the higher the severity of illness (specifically for H1, which is
not in focus of P1) the more the incentive to invest in prevention is increased by MI. In
the opposite direction, such an increase can also stimulate a substitutional relationship
in total (specifically for the banal illness H2) given the elimination of the a priori illness
risk and the risk of a false self-diagnosis due to MI. Related to the impact of H1, the
distribution of a priori and error probabilities leading to a realization of severe illness is
also of importance. The lower π1s and the higher π01 (given a constant value π02), the higher
the stimulation of prevention through MI.
The case of dominance
As in the previous chapter, due to ambiguity c can be non-dominant despite EUc(Rnon) >
EUc/sc(R
non). Under MI, the question must be answered whetherEUc(Rdom0 ) > EUc/sc(R0).
If Rdom0 is implemented, c changes to dominance. If R0 is installed, c and sc are equal in
their expected utility. The difference between Rdom0 and R0 can be calculated as:
π01
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(A1 − EA1) +π02
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(A2 − EA2) >
<
0 (3.38)
21Please note, a further decrease of RP within (3.37) where u(Y ∗∗ − RP − P1) > u(Y ∗∗ − R0 − P0)
suggests a decrease of the complementary effect. However, this is a misinterpretation. Due to RP the
negative income effect turns to a positive effect within (3.37). However, this change may be falsely
interpreted due to the specific form of notation of (3.37).
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Due to risk aversion and the elimination of risk with its emphasis on H1, EUc/sc reasonable
increases relative to EUc. However, EUc(Rdom0 ) < EUc/sc(R0) is only fulfilled ifRdom0 > R0.
If Rdom0 < R0, a choice of Rdom0 is optimal corresponding to a dominance of c. Remember,
due to ambiguity, this is not possible without MI.22
If P1 is implemented, π02 decreases to πP2 which increases the relevance of EUc and
therefore c as optimal treatment alternative. If Rdom0 is optimal, a situation of domi-
nance cannot be changed to non-dominance. Then, Rdom0 changes to RdomP . Furthermore,
through dominance, (3.35) increases due to a replacement of EA2 by A2 with A2 > EA2.
The incentive to invest in P1 increases.23 Finally, EUc/sc could change to EUc after P1 is
undertaken, leading to an increasing incentive for P1. The optimal premium changes to
RdomP .24 Hence, while in a situation of ambiguity ex-post sc could also be chosen despite
an inferior expected utility, MI can have another complementary impact for prevention.
This effect takes place if sc is eliminated as an alternative treatment by the MI, leading to
an increase in the price of the banal illness within the premium (corresponding to (3.36))
and an increase in the expected utility loss in the case without MI.
Is there any subjective source of dominance? One could argue that under full-insurance,
θi loses its function due to an equalization of utilities. However, based on symmetric
information, the contract is binding (θ is also observable). Then, θ∗ can again be influ-
enced by P1. The difference from the case without MI is, if EUc(Rdom0 ) > EUc/sc(R0),
θi loses its function if dominance of c is realized by the MI. More generally, there is
no longer any necessity to pay expenditures Z to realize dominance of c. However, if
EUc(R
dom
0 ) < EUc/sc(R0), but θ2 > θ∗(P1) with a corresponding choice of Rdom0 , it could
be (but is not necessarily) optimal not to undertake P1 if EUP1c (RdomP ) < EU
P0
c/sc(R0) as
discussed in the previous chapter. A similar argumentation is possible for θ2 < θP1∗ and
EUP0c (R
dom
0 ) < EU
P1
c/sc(RP ) as a possible optimum. The incentive for P1 decreases, but sc
can be sufficiently high in advantage, which can also deliver expenditures Z as optimal
with EUP0c (Rdom0 ) < EU
Z,P0
c/sc (R0) and θ2 < θ
Z∗.
Furthermore, θ∗ is influenced by the MI itself, similar to (2.55). As previously argued,
full-coverage should increase the relative advantage of sc corresponding to an increase of
θ∗ making sc relevant, but prevention less interesting, if EUc(Rdom0 ) < EUc/sc(R0, θ2 <
θ∗(R0)). Dominance is preferred if the opposite relation is the case.
22The choice between different MI contracts is a typical problem of self-selection according to the expected
occurrence of different kinds of risk or illnesses respectively (see amongst others Manning et al. (1987)).
23If π0′2 < 0 and π0′′2 > 0, this type of change implements A2, but a further increase in prevention also
depends on the diminishing effectiveness of prevention.
24Hence, prevention under non-dominance is sufficient for prevention under dominance. However, that
does not mean that dominance is strictly superior to non-dominance, which depends on the effective-
ness of prevention and the advantageousness of u2sc.
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Summarized, given MI under symmetric information, full-insurance of c and sc is op-
timal. Differing from the case without MI, a high quality of sc is strictly negatively
correlated with preventive effort. A high productivity of sc and self-diagnosis competence
related to banal illness decreases the premium and therefore the incentive for prevention.
Compared to a first-best solution, it is not clear whether prevention increases or decreases.
Moreover, MI itself and prevention are related by substitutional and complementary in-
terdependencies. This ambiguity is primarily based on the elimination of the expected
utility loss for the severe illness stimulating prevention, the elimination of the potential
utility loss for the banal illness inhibiting prevention, and the negative correlation be-
tween the insurance premium and preventive effort stimulating prevention. Each of these
effects is strongly connected with the focus of prevention on the banal illness while the
risk of the severe illness, either through a priori risk or the risk of a false self-diagnosis,
is not influenced by prevention. Moreover, MI can be used to induce dominance (full-
insurance of c) or to strengthen non-dominance (full-insurance of c and sc). Dominance
of c increases effort in prevention. Hence, if MI induces dominance, prevention is stim-
ulated. Otherwise, based on subjective pessimism (also with MI) prevention could be
not undertaken in order to induce non-dominance. Furthermore, MI itself influences the
effectiveness of subjective pessimism and therefore investments in prevention. In fact, MI
itself can replace the function of subjective dominance.
3.4.1.2 Investments in ex-post education without prevention
As a further step, E1 is analyzed under the conditions shown in Tab. II.3.5 and the
following premium:
R =

π01EA
1 + π02EA
2 = R0 if P = P0;E = E0 = 0
π01EA
1
E + π
0
2EA
2
E = RE if P = P0;E = E1 > 0
π01EA
1 + E(πp)EA
2 = RP if P = P1;E = E0
π01EA
1
E + E(πp)EA
2
E = R
P
E if P = P1;E = E1
(3.39)
where EAE means the variable cost coverage as a function of education. Again, full-
coverage with an equalization of net incomes is optimal in the case of a binding contract.
Ex-post education under conditions of full rationality
Under full rationality the function of pSP is eliminated. Only pSI can deliver a benefit.
Then, the first-best solution implies EU(Rfb) = u(Y ∗∗ − Rfb) with Rfb = π01A1 + π02Asc
and RfbE = π
0
1A
1 + π02A
sc
E . E1 occurs if EUP0,E0 ≤ EUP0,E1 :
E1 ≤ π02(Asc − AscE ) (3.40)
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with AscE as reimbursement after education. A decrease in expected costs for sc results in
a decreasing premium. The gain in expected utility through a decrease in the premium
must compensate for expenditures E1 in which the decrease in variable costs AscE < Asc is
of importance.
Ex-post education under conditions of ambiguity
E1 without prevention occurs if EUP0,E0 ≤ EUP0,E1 :
E1 ≤ π01dπ1s(A1− − A1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+π02dπ
2
sA
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+π02(A
scπ2s − AscEπ2sE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
+π01(A
sc(1− π1s)− AscE (1− π1sE))︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
(3.41)
with πisE as value after education. The gain in expected utility through a decrease in the
premium must compensate for expenditures E1 in which the decrease in error-probabilities
dπis (pSP ) as well as the decrease in variable costs AscE < Asc (pSI) are of importance.
The first two terms on the right-hand side represent the decrease in the premium due
to an increase in the quality of self-diagnosis and therefore a decrease in the expected
costs represented by A1− and A2. The third term is ambiguous. While a decrease in
Asc increases the incentive for an investment E1, an increase in the competence of self-
diagnosis decreases the incentive. The former effect decreases, while the latter increases
the premium. Finally, the last term represents the effect for the severe illness. The
incentive for an investment E1 increases due to a decrease in Asc as well as an increase in
π1s . In total, the sum of the former effects delivers a decrease in the premium:
∂R
∂E
= π01
[
∂π1s
∂E
((q1 − q1−)− αqsc) + (1− π1s)α
∂qsc
∂α
∂α
∂E
+
∂α
∂E
qsc
]
+
π02
[
∂π2s
∂E
(αqsc − q2) + π2sα
∂qsc
∂α
∂α
∂E
+
∂α
∂E
qsc
]
(3.42)
with ∂q
sc
∂α
∂α
∂E
= 0 if qsc represents a corner solution. If ∂π
i
s
∂E
= 0 (only pSI) or ∂α
∂E
= 0 (only
pSP ), ∂R
∂E
remains negative.
Comparing (3.40) with (3.41), the incentive to invest E1 decreases in the first-best case
if only pSP is effective in the case of ambiguity and in the first-best case. However, if also
pSI is effective, Asc − AscE within (3.40) exceeds Ascπ2s − AscEπ2sE within (3.41) (because
π2s < π
2
sE. Hence, to produce a higher incentive to invest in E1 in the first-best case, the
difference Asc − AscE − (Ascπ2s − AscEπ2sE) must compensate for each of the other positive
effects in the case of ambiguity (condition (3.40)).
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Comparative statics
The comparative statics deliver the following ambiguous results (according to (3.41)):
∂E∗
∂H1
> 0 ;
∂E∗
∂H2
>
<
0 ;
∂E∗
∂π02
> 0 (3.43)
where E∗ represents a continuous value of education. Given full-insurance, an increase in
the marginal costs of sc is ambiguous. Within (3.41), terms three and four on the right-
hand are relevant. A decrease in the severity of a severe illness increases the incentive for
E. Otherwise, a decrease in the severity of a banal illness is ambiguous. The incentive
to invest in E decreases due to a decrease in Asc − AscE and therefore a less beneficial
shift from c(H2) to sc(H2) and from sc(H1) to c(H1). An effect in the opposite direction
can occur only if π2sE is high through lower expected health expenditures in the case of
sc(H2). In total, an increase of H2 will likely decrease the incentive for E. Finally, an
increase in the relevance of a banal illness (π02; terms two and three on the right-hand side
of (3.41)) increases the incentive for E. The results are similar to the case without MI.
The basic difference is the equalization of net incomes and therefore the elimination of
differences in the marginal utility loss through expenditures E with respect to an increase
or decrease of the net income due to a change in the analyzed parameters. However, the
substitutional and complementary relations between pSI and pSP remain a fundamental
source of ambiguity.
Relationship between market insurance and ex-post education
Let us distinguish between pSI and pSP . Given only pSI, (3.41) can be written as
(π01(1− π1s) + π02π2s)(Asc − AscE )− E1 ≥ 0 (3.44)
How does MI influences pSI? To answer this question let us us (3.26) as necessary
condition for education. In the case of pSI we can rwrite this condition as
π01EU
1
E + π
0
2EU
2
E + π
0
Hu
H
E ≥ 0 (3.45)
In the case with MI, E1 must be compensated for by a decrease in the cost of sc. In the
case without MI, the expected utility gain for sc must compensate for the loss of c and the
status of perfect health. The result is similar to investments in prevention. MI increases
the expected utility based on an income transfer from the worst to the best health status.
The expected marginal utility decreases. The expected loss for the status c(H1) decreases,
resulting in a stimulation of investment. For the status c(H2), a clear prediction cannot be
made. It depends on the income transfer direction. However, the situation differs for sc.
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For sc(H1) (sc(H2)) the marginal utility gain through pSI decreases (increases). Due to
risk aversion, the income transfer should produce a total decrease in expected utility gain
for sc. Hence, the summarized effect due to MI, similar to Ehrlich and Becker (1972), may
deliver a decrease in the incentive to invest in pSI. However, a high probability weight
on c(H1) may stimulate the incentive.25 26
If only pSP is effective, (3.41) can be written as
π01dπ
1
s(A
sc + A1− − A1) + π02dπ2s(A2 − Asc)− E1 ≥ 0 (3.46)
In fact, due an equalization of net incomes and a corresponding elimination of any risk
through a false self-diagnosis, the right-hand side in (3.26) must be zero, resulting in a
decreased incentive to invest in pSP . Then, similar to prevention, pSP delivers a utility
gain due to a negative correlation with the premium (condition (3.46)). Additionally, due
to full-insurance, the loss of expected utility through expenditures E1 (the left-hand side
of (3.26)) decreases, which increases pSP . Hence, similar to prevention, MI decreases
pSP due to an equalization of net incomes (as a source of ex-ante moral hazard under
asymmetric information), but stimulates effort due to a decrease in expected utility loss
(specifically for c(H1) and sc(H1)) and due to a negative correlation with the premium.
The case of dominance
Again, EUc(Rnon) > EUc/sc(Rnon) is possible. The question arises whether EUc(Rdom0 ) >
EUc/sc(R0). So far, there is no difference from the condition (3.38), in which either Rdom0
or R0 was optimal. However, E1 is not undertaken if Rdom0 is optimal. E1 changes EA1
and EA2 with ∂EA1
∂E1
>
<
∂EA2
∂E1
. The expected expenditures (the premium) are definitely de-
creased by E1. E1 increases the benefit through sc, delivering an increase in EUc/sc(Rnon)
(if (3.41) is fulfilled) and finally a decrease in R0 to RE. Then, EUE0c (Rdom0 ) < EU
E1
c/sc(RE)
is possible. Hence, the more beneficial sc is, the more likely a full-insurance of c and sc
could be utility maximizing based on E1. Furthermore, in the case of prevention, MI can
be seen as a complement if dominance is induced. In the case of ex-post education, only
non-dominance can induce E1.
The impact of θi is similar to that of prevention. The difference lies in the fact
that subjective dominance fully inhibits E1, which is equal to the impact of Rdom0 . If
25Note that if π1s = 0 and π2s = 1, only sc is chosen. While MI increases the expected utility, there
is no decrease in the incentive to invest E1. In fact, the expected marginal utility gain due to pSI
decreases, but not the total amount of investment. The investment itself in the case of pure sc only
depends on the sign of αEqsc + 1 (from a marginal perspective).
26In this respect, a problem of ex-ante moral hazard arises under asymmetric information or if the
individual signals any effort to increase the productivity of sc related to a decrease in the MI price.
Connected to a decrease in the expected utility gain for sc, a decline in the incentive to invest in pSI
could be induced. Please see the following section for a more detailed analysis.
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E1 is not effective, any measure Z induces θ2 > θZ∗ and EUZc (Rdom0 )
>
<
EUc/sc(R0) fol-
lows. However, as before, Rdom0 itself can induce dominance. Then, θ∗ and Z are no
longer relevant. Without going into detail, if dominance is to be avoided, education it-
self is beneficial (specifically pSP ), but E1 in fact delivers θE1∗ < θ2. Then, similar to
the previous discussions about dominance, a third-best solution is also conceivable with
EUc(R
dom
0 , θ
∗(Z) < θ2) < EU
E0
c/sc(R0, θ
∗ > θ2) < EU
E1
c/sc(RE, θ
∗ > θ2) < EUfb. Again, the
opposite, EUE0c (Rdom0 ) < EU
E1
c/sc(R0) with θ
E0∗ < θ2 < θ
E1∗, can be the case. Finally,
similar to prevention, θ∗ depends on the MI itself. Full-insurance of c and sc can deliver
non-dominance as beneficial solution with EUc(Rdom0 ) < EUc/sc(R0, θ2 < θ∗(R0)). In such
a case, MI can be effective as a complement to E1.
Let us summarize. First, whether an educational measure is preferred in a first-best
solution is not clear due to an elimination of pSP . Second, the comparative statics show
that given MI, a high health stock of banal illness and cost level of sc are ambiguous with
respect to their impact on E. A high probability of banal illness and a lower decrease of
health stock through a severe illness stimulate E. Third, similar to Ehrlich and Becker
(1972), MI can represent a substitute for ex-post education, but the relationship is more
specific than in their analysis. Specifically, pSI loses effectiveness in relation to the utility
gain for sc and pSP according to an elimination of potential utility losses due to false self-
diagnosis. Fourth, differing from Ehrlich and Becker, MI also has a complementary impact
on ex-post education. pSI is more effective if the probability weight for c (specifically for
severe illness) is high. Then, the expected utility loss through expenditures E1 decreases.
pSP is also stimulated due to a decrease in the expected utility loss over c and sc. A
negative correlation between the MI price and ex-post education stimulates education.
Fifth, MI can induce dominance when only c is insured, eliminating any incentive to invest
in E. However, MI can also stimulate non-dominance when c and sc are insured, resulting
in a complementary relationship with E. Sixth, E itself may increase the benefit of sc,
which can induce non-dominance with a corresponding choice of full-insurance for both
treatment alternatives. Otherwise, non-dominance neglecting E (despite its effectiveness)
can be optimal, specifically when non-dominance is based on subjective pessimism.
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3.4.1.3 Interrelation of prevention and ex-post education
Given (3.35), as fulfilled with P1 (therefore E(πP ) and not π02), E1 is chosen if EUP1,E0 ≤
EUP1,E1 , similar to (3.41):
E1 ≤ π01dπ1s(A1− − A1) + Asc[π01(1− π1s) + E(πP )π2s ]−
Asc(E1)[π
0
1(1− π1s(E1)) + E(πP )π2s(E1)] + E(πP )dπ2sA2 (3.47)
with πis(E1) and Asc(E1) as values after education E1. The corresponding derivation,
subject to P , delivers:
πP ′2 ((A
scπ2s − Asc(E1)π2s(E1)) + dπ2sA2) < 0 (3.48)
with πP ′2 < 0. (3.48) is negative.27 Then, a substitutional relation between E1 and P1 can
be derived. As can also be seen, (3.48) is also negative in the case of a first-best decision
structure with π2s = 1.
Given (3.41), as fulfilled with E1, P1 is chosen if EUP0,E1 ≤ EUP1,E1 , similar to (3.35):
P1 ≤ EA2(E1)(1− πE0 )dπP (3.49)
with EA2(E1) as value after education E1. The corresponding derivation with respect to
E delivers
−πP ′2 (
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sE(A
sc − A2) + AscEπ2s) < 0 (3.50)
Again, a substitutional relationship between P1 and E1 is derived due to EA2 > EA2E.
This is related to Schneider and Zerth (2009), who also identify a substitutional relation-
ship. An increase in the effectiveness of ex-post education increases the opportunity costs
of prevention. Given (3.48) and (3.50), P1 and E1 are substitutes, which can be identified
more precisely than in the case without insurance, due to the elimination of risk. Due to
full-insurance, the complementary effects are eliminated.28 Then, if P1 and E1 are discrete
measures, and if both measures are implemented sequentially, a situation is possible in
which (3.35) and (3.41) are fulfilled; but, (3.47) and/or (3.49) are not. If (3.47) is not
fulfilled, but (3.49) is, and EUP0,E1 < EUP1,E0 , EUP0,E1 < EUP1,E1 < EUP1,E0 is valid
and vice versa. Imagine an extreme case in which prevention is free of charge. If ex-post
education is undertaken in a first step, prevention is clearly undertaken in a second step.
27Ascπ2s−Asc(E1)π2s(E1)+dπ2sA2 can be written as π2s(Asc−A2)+π2s(E1)(A2−Asc(E1)). The first term
is negative, the second positive. However, the sum must be positive due to |Asc−A2| < A2−Asc(E1).
28The complementary effects specifically focused on a increase (decrease) of the expected utility stimu-
lating P1 (E1).
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However, if prevention occurs first, ex-post education does not necessarily occur due to
its decreasing of effectiveness. A corner solution must follow with (P1, E0) as optimal. A
similar solution with (P0, E1) can be derived if (3.49) is not, but (3.47) is, fulfilled. If
(3.35) and (3.41) are fulfilled as well as (3.47) and (3.49), a solution (P1, E1) exists. The
latter means, a combination of both measures is superior to a single investment. Hence,
if preventive and educational measures are able to be demanded, the first-best solution is
given by such a combination of investments under conditions of a market insurance under
symmetric information.
Summarized, under full-insurance, prevention and ex-post education are substitutes,
based on an elimination of risk. If both measures are invested sequentially, corner or
interior solutions can be derived.
3.4.2 Market insurance under asymmetric information
In the following analysis, prevention, ex-post education and self-care cannot be observed
by the insurance. As previously discussed, full-insurance is partially effective as a sub-
stitute to prevention and ex-post education, resulting in a decrease in both kinds of in-
vestments and an indifference between c and sc. Under asymmetric information another
aspect is of importance; the problem of ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard. The follow-
ing analysis is focused on the case of ambiguity, specifically on the factual realization of
insurance contracts in a situation of asymmetric information. The case of full rationality
is not discussed explicitly. It is commonly known, that asymmetric information deliver a
decrease of efficiency also for the case of full rationality.
Tab. II.3.6 presents the different structures of insurance premiums under condition of
asymmetric information. Within the following analysis, each of the premium is defined in
dependence of the rewarded investment, the case of dominance and non-dominance and
the structure of ex-post decision-making.
Description of premium R
R0 co-payment (no) in the case of prevention, co-payment (possible) in the case of education
R1 co-payment (yes) in the case of asymmetric information and prevention
Rc/sc symmetric information and ambiguity, c and sc
Rdom symmetric information and ambiguity, only c
R0c/sc co-payment (yes) in the case of asymmetric information and signaling of sc
REc/sc co-payment (yes) in the case of asymmetric information and signaling of sc and education
Table II.3.6: Insurance premium under asymmetric information
The following analysis focus on the impact of MI if prevention can be signaled, but
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sc, and therefore ex-post education, cannot. Hence, the MI is only able to reward pre-
vention. Through better monitoring instruments and better institutional integration, c is
observable. Then, the MI contract focus only on c with:
R =
π01A1 + π02A2 = R0π01A1 + E(πP2 )Ā2 = R1 if Ā2 < q2 (3.51)
If a mistake occurs in the self-diagnosis of H1 (sc is chosen) the individual seeks out the
physician, leading to MI coverage with costs q1. If c is demanded but H2 is not the
factual illness, the MI can only suppose H1 as the alternative illness with costs q1. Then,
the coverage is aimed at costs q1 < q1−. R0 represents a contract without any incentives.
Otherwise, within R1, a positive co-payment for H2 with Ā2 < q2 is interpreted as a signal
for investing in prevention.29 The MI rewards this effort with πP2 < π02. For simplification,
there is a specific preventive measure P1 resulting in πP2 . Hence, Ā2 induces only one
specific relation between P1 and πP2 within the contract. There is symmetric information
about the effectiveness of P1. The MI is also informed about the uncertain success of P1
and can transform πP2 to E(πP2 ). The utility states are given by Tab. II.3.7.
Consultation (c) Self-care (sc)
H1 u(Y 1c − q1 −R+A1) u(Y 1sc − αqsc − q1− −R+A1)
H2 u(Y 2c − q2 −R+A2) u(Y 2sc − αqsc −R)
Table II.3.7: Consultation, self-care and market insurance under asymmetric information
Let us assume R1 as premium, paying attention to the preventive measure P1. The
condition for optimal coverage can be derived as (see app. 5.7)
π01(1− π01 + E(πP2 ))[π1su1′c + (1− π1s)u1′sc] =
(π01 − E(πP2 ))
[
π02(π
2
su
2′
sc + (1− π2s)u2′c ) + π0HuH′
]
+ π02(1− π2s)u2′c (3.52)
where only insurable states are considered and prevention has factually not yet occurred.
For that reason, E(πP2 ), as well as π02, are elements of (3.52). The reason why R1 is
combined with P = P0 is our interest in the relationship between a signaling of prevention
through a partial cost coverage although prevention is left undone. As can be seen,
29Note that, as in Kenkel (2000), a progressive tariff is also possible, resulting in a stronger stimulation
of prevention.
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the condition for Ai∗ is complex. (3.52) asks for a specific equalization of the expected
marginal utilities and therefore net incomes between each health state, depending on
E(πP2 ), π0i , and πis, each known by the insurant. Due to the complexity of (3.52), a
numerical simulation is most suitable to derive the optimal MI-coverage. Tab. II.3.8
presents the chosen parameters for the following figures.30 To identify the range of optimal
coverage, some extreme cases are discussed.31 The results for the cases of Tab. II.3.8
are robust. That means, each of the following cases is stable for a broader range of
the exogenous parameters which are not in the direct focus of the single scenarios (eg.
health status). Otherwise, the discussed scenarios are not robust insofar that a specific
change of parameters delivers a characteristic change of demand for insurance coverage.
Additionally, please note, prevention is so far not undertaken. For that reason, πP2 within
the premium and the real life world of the individual are different.
Fig. II.3.5a Fig. II.3.5b Fig. II.3.5c Fig. II.3.6d Fig. II.3.6e
H1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
H2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
α 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
π01 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
π02 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
πP2 0.4 0 0.3 0.3 0.3
π1s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
π2s 0.6 0.6 0.6 1 0
Table II.3.8: Parameter calibration - I
Non-effective prevention
Prevention is not effective when E(πP2 ) = π02 (either πP2 = π02 or πE0 = 1).32 Then, the
choice of the optimal premium does not depend on any prevention resulting in R0. Fig.
II.3.5 shows the expected utility in dependence from the co-payments A1 and A2 where
the maximum co-payments are A1 = q1 and A2 = q2.
Fig. II.3.5a shows the expected utility depending on the combination of partial cover-
ages with Ai ≤ qi. At this point, A2∗ = 0 and A1∗ = q1 delivers the maximum individual
welfare. The basic requirement for partial coverage of q2 is the exclusion of coverage for
sc(H2) while sc can be the optimal choice ex-post for the banal illness. Additionally, the
higher the self-diagnosis competence π2s , the lower the factual relevance of c(H2). This,
however, is not implemented within the premium, but leads to an adjustment of A2. Fur-
thermore, a discontinuity arises. An increase in A2 decreases the variable costs for c(H2),
30Please note, we set a value of 0.5 for the marginal costs of c for reasons of presentation.
31For that, u is specified as u = ya with uy > 0 and uyy < 0.
32Please find an example of this and the further cases within app. 5.7.
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Figure II.3.5: Simulation of optimal insurance under asymmetric information - I
resulting in dominance of c if αqsc > q2−A2. Then, only c is chosen ex-post, resulting in
full coverage of Hi (Ai = qi).33 However, this is not necessarily optimal, as shown in Fig.
II.3.5a.
Otherwise, similar to the case of symmetric information, a solution of a dominant c with
a corresponding full-coverage can be optimal if sc delivers a low benefit, either based on
high marginal costs (here α increases from 0.2 to 0.5) of sc as printed in Fig. II.3.5b or on
a low self-diagnosis competence (not printed). However, asymmetry between the insurer
and the insurant induces a problem. Due to the assumption of ambiguity, c and sc remain
in the treatment portfolio, eg. if the individual chooses A2 = 0 or the contract is binding
as under symmetric information. Then, under symmetry the individual chooses between
33Under dominance and the existence of HH as a perfect health status, (3.52) is simplified to:
π01(1− π01 + E(πP2 ))u1′c = π02(1 + π01 − E(πP2 ))u2′c + (π01 − E(πP2 ))π0HuH′
If E(πP2 ) = π02 , Ai = qi is optimal, which is also the case for E(πP2 ) < π02 (without including factual
effort in prevention). The less relevant HH , the less relevant an income transfer from HH to the most
severe illness. Hence, in the extreme case of π01 + π02 = 1, a combination of partial coverages with
Ai < qi can also be optimal if E(πP2 ) = π02 and sc cannot be insured.
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two different contracts: full-coverage of c without sc and full-coverage of c and sc. As
a result, both contracts under dominance and non-dominance are optimal. Now, under
asymmetry, a choice takes place between either full-coverage of c or a partial coverage
of c (due to A2∗ < q2, see Fig. II.3.5a) and a partial coverage of sc (partial coverage of
c(H1) and full exclusion of coverage for sc(H2)). While a solution of dominance as optimal
under symmetry also delivers dominance as optimal under asymmetry, a contract under
asymmetry is more likely to deliver dominance as optimal while non-dominance is still
optimal in the case of symmetry. The reason for the latter is the restricted elimination of
risk under asymmetry if the solution without full-coverage of c is chosen.
In addition, θi > θ∗ delivers dominance. The MI influences θ∗ (see (2.55)).34 Through
risk-aversion, any coverage A1 (A2) decreases d (e). Otherwise, d (e) is increased by A2
(A1) combined with an increase of the premium. Therefore, an increase of MI-coverage
for a severe (banal) illness increases (decreases) the range of θ2 for which sc is chosen
ex-post based on a subjective assessment under ambiguity. This leads to a shift in the
jump discontinuity to the right (left) (within Fig. II.3.5). Thus, objective dominance
through differences in ex-post costs for H2 is not responsible for dominance alone, but is
also influenced by θ∗ (except θ2 = 0). The reason is an income shift from the best to the
worst possible outcome, both implemented in sc.35 36
Highly effective prevention
Let us set E(πP2 ) = 0 (with πP2 = πE0 = 0), π02 > 0, and πis > 0 (recall that prevention
is so far not undertaken). R1 is valid if a co-payment is chosen. Fig. II.3.5c shows the
optimal coverages Ai∗, which does not change fundamentally with variation of πis and
π0i . Factually, the a-priori probability of H2 remains π02 because prevention is not yet
implemented. Then, a maximum coverage of H1 and nearly maximum coverage of H2 is
optimal if πP2 A2 = 0 (due to E(πP2 ) = 0 within R1), resulting in a dominant solution.37
34The total effect of MI can be shown using the total differential for θ∗ (using (2.55)):
dθ∗ =
2∑
i=1
∂θ∗
∂Ai
dAi =
2∑
i=1
[
(d+ e)−1(eAi − (d+ e)−1(dAi + eAi))
]
dAi
with dA1 = (1 − π01)(u1′c − u1′sc) < 0, dA2 = −E(πP2 )(u1′c − u1′sc) > 0, eA1 = −π01(u2′sc − u2′c ) > 0 and
eA2 = −E(πP2 )u2′sc − (1− E(πP2 ))u2′c < 0.
35In the case of E(πP2 ) = 0, the type of dominance is not of importance. The optimal solution is
full-coverage of some sort.
36Of course, in a situation without MI-coverage, θ∗ can be already too low to induce non-dominance.
Then, the corresponding choice of full-coverage under dominance follows, generally leading to a solu-
tion as under symmetric information. As shown, θ∗ is specifically increased by the coverage of H1.
Then, non-dominance can be induced with partial coverage of H2 as shown in the previous figures.
37In fact, R1 is only valid for A2 < q2. Full coverage results in R0. However, to simplify the figures, R1
is also calculated for A2 = q2. This applies for the following figures as well.
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Low and high self-diagnosis quality
If π2s = 1 and E(πP2 ) < π02, Fig. II.3.6d shows R1 with A2∗ = 0 as a possible optimal
solution. Then, if H2 is realized, c(H2) would never be chosen and a beneficial sc for H2 is
demanded, resulting in non-coverage of c(H2). However, for π2s = 1, a situation as shown
in Fig. II.3.6d is not necessarily optimal. A situation of dominance as shown above can
arise if sc is less beneficial or prevention is very effective (corresponding to the previous
case with E(πP2 ) = 0). Then, dominance is optimal with a maximum coverage for c(H2).
Figure II.3.6: Simulation of optimal insurance under asymmetric information - II
If π2s = 0 and E(πP2 ) < π02, Fig. II.3.6e shows R1 with a nearly maximum coverage for
c(H2) as optimal. For π2s = 0, dominance of c must always be optimal. Furthermore, if
π1s = π
2
s = 0, full-insurance of c must also be optimal.
Finally, if πis < 1, 0 < E(πP2 ) < π02, and non-dominance occurs, partial coverage of
A1 < q1 without coverage of H2 can also occur. This takes place if A1 = q1 decreases the
expected marginal utility of H1 below the expected marginal utility of H2. Furthermore, if
a minimum co-payment is implemented for H2 that inhibits dominance, a partial coverage
of H2 with q2 > A2∗ > 0 (not A2∗ = 0!) can also occur.
Summarized, under asymmetric information and differing from section 3.2.3, partial cost
coverage (specifically for banal illness) is optimal if sc cannot be observed and dominance
is not superior. Under these circumstances, and connected to a positive relationship
between signaling of prevention and a reward within the contract, prevention is signaled
though not necessarily undertaken. Compared to the case of symmetric information,
dominance as a utility maximizing treatment alternative increases due to the MI’s focus
on c. This is also connected to an increasing relevance of subjective dominance. Compared
to the first-best solution with c(H1), k(H2) as effective health states after treatment and
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full-insurance as optimal, a situation under asymmetry specifically reduces the expected
utility due to a restricted income transfer between each utility state.
For the further discussion two reasonable constraints are made. The expected marginal
utility for H1 is higher than the value of the expected marginal utility for H2 for all values
of A1 to guarantee full-coverage of treatment costs q1. This assumption is for simplification
purposes to hold the degree of MI-coverage for H1 constant. For that, πi and πis must
have sufficient values. Furthermore, u1′sc > u2′c ∀Ai with αqsc + q1− − A1 > q2 − A2 in
combination with a comparable low π1s guarantees full-insurance of H1. Finally, assuming
E(πP2 ) < π
0
2 is reasonable. Given these constraints, a lower degree of MI-coverage for H2
than for H1 is probable with A2∗ = 0 and A1∗ = q1 as reasonable coverage in the case of
non-dominance.
To simplify the analysis, θ∗ > θ2 is assumed if no MI is implemented. Hence, cost-
coverage of H1 delivers an increase of θ∗, shifting the jump discontinuity to the right, but
not fundamentally influencing the results.
3.4.2.1 Investments in prevention
The only thing the insurance may know about prevention is its factual effectiveness ac-
cording to a decrease of illness probability. However, whether prevention is actually done
by the individual cannot be observed. Furthermore, partial coverage of H2 is optimal
if non-dominance is the case. This is also the case if E(πP2 ) = π02, delivering R0 as the
corresponding contract. If E(πP2 ) < π02, R1 is provided by the MI due to E(πP2 )[P1(Ā2∗)]
as signaling. However, P1 has not been undertaken at this point. At this point, the signal
of a co-payment is a result of optimization and does not depend on a factual effort P1 in
the first level. Hence, if the MI is not informed about sc and R is given by (3.52) (and
fixed, given Ā2∗), the incentive of P1 must be explained by EU(R1, P0) < EU(R1, P1).
Then, differing from Breyer et al. (2009) and Ehrlich and Becker (1972), the conflict does
not occur between full-insurance as hindrance of P1 on the one side and partial coverage
of P1 and remaining risk on the other side. The conflict is instead found between partial
coverage as generally optimal before any effort P1 is undertaken on the one side, and the
incentive to invest in P1 with a corresponding contract on the other side. Hence, if we talk
about ex-ante moral hazard as a conscious behavior to put oneself at an advantage with
the MI, the previously discussed choice of a partial coverage is not necessarily a result
of such a behavior. Due to a limited robustness of a single scenario we analyze different
combinations of parameter. Tab. II.3.9 presents the chosen parameters for the following
scenarios. Additionally, expenditures for prevention are set to P1 = 0.02. The chosen
parameters guarantee full-coverage of A1∗ = q1.
Given A2∗ = 0 and A1 = q1, Fig. II.3.7a shows a strictly monotonic decrease in A2 for
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Fig. II.3.7a Fig. II.3.7b Fig. II.3.8 Fig. II.3.9a Fig. II.3.9b
H1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
H2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
α 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
π01 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
π02 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
πP2 0.3 0.2 0.25 0.58 0.59
π1s 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
π2s 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.2
Table II.3.9: Parameter calibration - II
Figure II.3.7: Simulation of prevention under asymmetric information - I
EUP0(R1) and EUP1(R1).38 Given a specific effectiveness of P1, EUP0(R1) < EUP1(R1)
is strictly fulfilled if the individual chooses non-coverage for H2, based on a sufficient
decrease of π02 to E(πP2 ) (but not too high as shown above) connected to a sufficient
probability of preventive success as well as a sufficient quality of self-diagnosis competence
and productivity of sc to realize non-dominance. Given the assumed constraints of the
parameters, Fig. II.3.7a shows that EUP1(R1) > EU(Rnon), EUP1(R1) > EUP1(Rnon),
EUP1(R1) > EU
P1(R0) as well as EUP1(R1) > EUP0(R0) are valid at the point A2 = 0.39
Dominance arises for high values A2, but only as a suboptimal solution. However, in
Fig. II.3.7b the situation changes where P1 remains partially optimal in the case of non-
dominance, but not optimal in general. The individual always prefers dominance of c with
R1 and full-coverage of both health states40, however, with P0 as factual choice, eg. if the
38Note that the curves EUP1(R1) and EUP0(R0) must slightly increase in the case of dominance which
is difficult to see within the corresponding figures. However, EUP1(R0) must decrease due to the fact
that prevention is not rewarded within the premium. Hence, the higher the cost coverage, the less
beneficial prevention. There is no benefit for full-coverage.
39Note that R1 = R0 for A2∗ = 0.
40Remember that to realize R1, A2 < q2 is necessary.
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benefit of sc is low (here α increases from 0.2 to 0.3) or alternatively if the relevance of H2
is low or the effectiveness of P1 is too high (the latter points are not printed). In this case,
the co-payment as a signal for prevention delivers a problem of ex-ante moral hazard.
Then the MI only offers R1 with maximum coverage A2∗∗ to induce P1 with zero-coverage
of H2 as the optimal choice.
Figure II.3.8: Simulation of prevention under asymmetric information - II
As shown in Fig. II.3.8, a situation can arise in which a range of co-payments exists in-
ducing dominance of c, but also P1 (again, ex-ante moral hazard must be avoided). Here,
α = 0.3, π1s = 0.1 and π2s = 0.2 are set as parameters especially relevant for the quality of
sc and self-diagnosis. Given these values, sc is not very attractive. However, the illness
probability for the banal illness is decreased by prevention from 0.7 to 0.2. While c is
more attractive, prevention itself is also beneficial in this case. Furthermore, EUP0(R1)
increases if A2 increases (given full-coverage of H1).41 Different to the former cases, R1 is
offered for a minimum co-payment A2∗∗, but with a solution of dominance with prevention
as utility maximizing. This situation is similar to the discussion in section 3.2.3 in which
c was chosen as the only available treatment.
Relationship between market insurance and prevention
In principal, (3.20) remains the necessary condition for P1 with:
−
[
π01EU
1
P (R1(A
i)) + π02EU
2
P (R1(A
i)) + π0Hu
H
P
]
≤
41Given full-coverage of H1, an equalization of marginal utilities under dominance can only be achieved
if A2 = q2.
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πP ′2
[
uH(P1, R1(A
i))− EU2(P1, R1(Ai))
]
(3.53)
If partial coverage is optimal before P1 is undertaken or if the partial coverage is imple-
mented to avoid ex-ante moral hazard (delivering R1), factual effort P1 does not influence
the premium. Given A2∗ = 0 and A1∗ = q1, due to risk-aversion and a shift of income
from H2 to H1, the following relationship follows according to the potential utility loss:
uH(P1, R1(A
i))− EU2(P1, R1(Ai)) > uH(P1, Rnon)− EU2(P1, Rnon) (3.54)
Hence, at this point, due to the income shift a complementary relation between R1 and
P1 exists. Furthermore, if the MI is optimal, the left-hand side of (3.53) decreases due
to an increase in the expected utility leading to a decrease in the expected utility loss
due to expenditures P1. Therefore, if A2∗ = 0, the MI under asymmetric information is a
complement for prevention based on a shift of income from banal to severe illness and the
focus of P1 on banal illness. Remember, under symmetric information, prevention and
the MI can also be substitutes.
Does the incentive to invest in prevention increase compared to symmetry? On the side
of potential utility loss a complementary effect exists under asymmetry, but is substitu-
tional under symmetry. Otherwise, the complementary effect on the side of the utility
loss due to expenditures P1 (left-hand side of (3.53)) is lower under asymmetry due to a
limitation in income shift. Additionally, the factual preventive effort is not correlated with
the price of MI under asymmetry if a co-payment is already optimal without prevention.
Altogether, it is not clear whether the incentive of prevention is extended compared to
the case of symmetry.42 Based on the former analysis, prevention is more likely under
asymmetry if the non-insured costs within the status sc(H1) (αqsc + q1− − q1) and the
error-probability 1− π1s are not too high. The impact of banal illness is ambiguous. The
lower the severity of H2, the lower the potential utility loss under asymmetry, but the
expected utility loss through expenditures P1 is also lower. Under symmetry, however,
the utility gain through prevention and therefore its incentive decrease definitely. As
previously discussed, similar results can be derived for an increase in the quality of sc.
Altogether, MI under symmetry can be a cheaper solution than prevention efforts.
Under asymmetry, however, the specific circumstances discussed above increase the benefit
of prevention. Otherwise, particularly for the severe illness MI under symmetry can also
stimulate prevention and may increase the incentive for prevention relative to the case of
42Note that P1 is defined as a discrete measure. Hence, P1 does not normally present the optimal level of
prevention in comparison with a continuous variable. For that reason, extension of the incentive does
not mean the comparison between optimal preventive efforts in the sense of a continuous variable,
but according to P1 as a discrete measure that is able to increase the expected utility under some
circumstances and not others.
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asymmetry.
Of course, a solution under asymmetric information is inferior to a solution under sym-
metry EUsym.43 Hence, complementarity under asymmetry does not extend welfare, in
contrast to symmetry.
Furthermore, given P1 as a discrete measure and if EUP0(R1) > EUP1(R1) ∀ Ā2 (based
on a low effectiveness of P1), the individual never invests P1, but chooses R1, inducing
ex-ante moral hazard. Hence, R1 is not offered by the MI, but only R0. In Fig. II.3.9a a
situation is shown in which P1 is generally not beneficial.44 Given R0, A2∗ = 0 is chosen
and P1 does not occur. However, as shown in II.3.9a, in a situation of symmetric infor-
mation, P1 is chosen due to its positive effect on individual welfare. Hence, as mentioned
above, despite the fact that MI under asymmetry is a complement for prevention, preven-
tion does not always occur (leading to EUP0(R0)) while it is efficient under symmetry.45
In Fig. II.3.9b, the individual prefers dominance under full-insurance without prevention
because R1 is not offered, leading to EUP0(R0) if the benefit of sc is low. However, un-
der symmetry a solution with EUsym(Rdom, P1) is optimal, meaning effort in prevention
under dominance of c as optimal. If EUP0(R1) is generally superior (under dominance
and non-dominance), then prevention does not occur, leading to an inefficient solution
under asymmetric information in comparison to the case of symmetry. This is based on
either an inefficient preventative measure in cases with and without MI under asymmetry
(without coverage of sc) or based on an efficient preventive measure, but exclusion of R1.
The individual always prefers a solution with MI, but not necessarily with P1.46 Finally,
under symmetric information dominance of c was discussed as having a stimulating im-
pact on prevention. Under asymmetric information two points are important. First, as
previously discussed, a solution under dominance is supported under asymmetry. Sec-
ond, dominance inhibits prevention (and therefore induces ex-ante moral hazard) based
on a false signal sent by the individual (except in a situation such as that shown in Fig.
II.3.8). Hence, in this regard dominance itself has the opposite effect compared to the
case of symmetry. Then, to induce non-dominance and therefore prevention, either sc is
43Note that EUsym is only printed as the corresponding welfare level under symmetry, but not related
to the A2-coordinate. Additionally, EUsym represents the solution under ambiguity, given imperfect
quality of self-diagnosis and prevention success. Then, a solution under full rationality delivers a
higher expected utility than EUsym. Whether prevention is chosen or not was discussed within the
former chapters.
44That means, not beneficial in a situation of asymmetric information and exclusion of sc within the MI
tariff.
45As can be seen, EUP0(Rnon) > EUP1(Rnon), however, EUP1sym(Rc/sc) represents an increasing welfare,
meaning a stimulation of P1 given a MI under symmetric information.
46Note that EUP1(R0) ≤ EUP1(R1) must always be valid. Furthermore, if EUP0(R1) is generally
superior but R1 is not offered, EUP0(R0) is always optimal if A2∗ = 0, due to EUP0(R1, A2∗ = 0) =
EUP0(R0, A2∗ = 0).
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Figure II.3.9: Simulation of prevention under asymmetric information - III
sufficiently attractive through a high sc productivity and self-diagnosis competence with
the implementation of a minimum co-payment or R0 is offered. However, as previously
discussed for the case without MI (condition (3.20)) and due the limited reduction of
risk under asymmetric information, a high sc quality can - but does not necessarily -
increase the incentive for investments in prevention under asymmetry (condition (3.53))
(recall, there is a strict substitutional relationship in a situation of symmetry, see condi-
tion (3.36)). Summarized, while a transformation from dominance to non-dominance has
a complementary impact according to prevention in the case of asymmetry, an increase in
the quality of sc can have a substitutional impact if non-dominance is the case. Further-
more, as discussed above, the fact that sc is not insurable increases prevention. However,
also in that context, prevention can decrease the quality of sc.
Summarized, if sc and prevention are not observable, a conflict arises between partial
coverage as optimal without prevention and actual investments in prevention. Ex-ante
moral hazard is a problem, which, however, cannot be derived from the choice of a pos-
itive co-payment. Given specific assumptions about the relevant parameters and partial
coverage of the banal illness, prevention is possible, but can be connected with a mini-
mum co-payment, specifically depending on the quality of sc. Differing from the case of
symmetry, MI under asymmetry and prevention are complements, based on the partial
coverage of costs for the banal illness. However, whether the incentive to invest in preven-
tion increases compared to the case of symmetry is ambiguous and depends specifically
on the expected costs and the degree of cost-coverage of the severe illness in a situation
of sc. Hence, complementarity does not mean that an efficient investment in a defined
preventive measure under symmetry delivers investments in prevention under asymmetry.
Furthermore, a situation is possible in which MI does not offer any incentive for preven-
tion due to the possibility of a false signal leading to complete avoidance of prevention as
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a possible inefficient solution. Then, MI under asymmetry has a substitutional impact,
due to ex-ante moral hazard. Dominance is of specific relevance: MI under asymmetry as
discussed here makes dominance of c more attractive. The reason is a non-coverage of sc.
Differing from the case of symmetry, dominance itself can inhibit prevention, resulting
in an inefficient solution if the MI accepts a co-payment as a signal of prevention. Oth-
erwise, a contract with a minimum co-payment for the banal illness, but a compulsory
full-insurance of the severe illness can induce prevention under dominance. In a situa-
tion of asymmetry and non-dominance, the quality of sc and prevention are connected by
substitutional and complementary relations, similar to the case without MI.
3.4.2.2 Investments in ex-post education
sc is not observable. Hence, ex-post education is also not observable. Both cannot be
signaled and are not included within the premium. Here, we only discuss investments in
ex-post education. Prevention is excluded. Then, (3.51) can be simplified to:
R0 = π
0
1A
1 + π02A
2 (3.55)
(3.52) is changed by replacing πP2 with π02. Hence, as previously discussed for the situation
where E(πP2 ) = π02, the basic optimality of MI-coverage does not change with respect to
full- or partial coverage of Hi. Similar to the case of symmetric information, full-insurance
under dominance of c is beneficial if the productivity of sc or competence of self-diagnosis
is too low. Tab. II.3.10 shows the parameter calibration for the simulation of optimal
investments in ex-post education. We set the fixed costs for E1 to 0.01.
Fig. II.3.10a Fig. II.3.10b
H1 0.1 0.1
H2 0.6 0.6
α 0.3 0.3
αE 0.24 0.27
π01 0.1 0.1
π02 0.7 0.7
π1s 0.1 0.1
π2s 0.3 0.2
π1sE 0.23 0.13
π2sE 0.35 0.24
Table II.3.10: Parameter calibration - III
Fig. II.3.10a shows the simulation result for ex-post education (given the same restric-
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Figure II.3.10: Simulation of ex-post education under asymmetric information
tions of parameters as before, specifically to ensure full cost-coverage of A1∗ = q1).47 As
already shown, dominance inhibits E1. Fig. II.3.10a shows a situation in which ex-post
education is optimal and superior to dominance if A2∗ = 0. The basic structure and
relation of and between the curves remain. Hence, EUE1 > EUE0 is generally possible,
given A1∗ = q1 and A2∗ = 0. The principle mechanisms of a beneficial E1 were discussed
in the previous sections. pSI and pSP sustain the benefit of the non-observable sc as a
substitute for c. Therefore, the optimal co-payment structure of R0, as mentioned before,
is also sustained. Fig. II.3.10b shows a situation in which EUE1 < EUE0 . Then, for each
co-payment A2, R0 with E = E0 is optimal (here with dominance (but not necessarily)
as optimal). At this point, there is no problem arising from asymmetric information with
respect to the choice of E1 because there is no possibility for the individual to send a false
signal.
Relationship between market insurance and ex-post education
How does asymmetric information influence ex-post education? Again, (3.26) as first-
order condition for investments in ex-post education without MI can be used for a com-
parison to R0 and the corresponding partial coverage of the costs for health state Hi:
−(π01EU1E(R0) + π02EU2E(R0) + π0HuHE (R0)) ≤
π01
dπ1s
dE1
u1c(R0, E1)− u1sc(R0, E1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
xMI
+ π02 dπ2sdE1
u2sc(R0, E1)− u2c(R0, E1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yMI
 (3.56)
47Note that, as shown in Fig. II.3.10, the threshold of the co-payment to change to dominance of c differs
between the case with E0 and E1. The reason is an increase in productivity and a decrease in qsc
leading to a threshold shift to the right.
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In the case of non-dominance, the right-hand side (representing the potential utility loss
in the case of a false self-diagnosis) is ambiguous in response to the premium
u2sc(R0, E1)− u2c(R0, E1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yMI
> u2sc(E1)− u2c(E1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y
u1c(R0, E1)− u1sc(R0, E1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
xMI
< u1c(, E1)− u1sc(E1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y
where x and y represents the corresponding terms taken from condition (3.26). While the
potential loss for H2 increases, it decreases for H1, due to risk aversion and an income
transfer from H2 to H1. Hence, pSP is ambiguously related to MI under asymmetry. The
expected utility on the left-hand side in (3.56) decreases. For H1, the expected utility
loss (gain) through expenditures E1 decreases for c (sc) while for H2 the loss (gain) for
c (sc) increases (due to partial coverage). As a result, pSI is less effective due to a
decrease in the expected gain within sc, however, less than that under symmetry due to
a restricted income transfer. Otherwise, for c, given A2∗ = 0 and A1 = q1, specifically
through c(H1), pSI is stimulated, but less than under symmetry due to non-coverage of
c(H2). In total, for both pSP and pSI, MI under asymmetric information and ex-post
education are connected by substitutional and complementary relations.
Compared to a situation of symmetric information and according to pSP , there is
still a potential utility loss under asymmetric information stimulating ex-post education.
Otherwise, there is no correlation between effort in ex-post education and the premium
under asymmetry. As previously shown, whether or not the incentive of pSI is stimulated
under asymmetry relative to symmetry is ambiguous. Altogether, similar to prevention,
it is not clear as to whether ex-post education under asymmetry is more beneficial than
under symmetry. However, the welfare under asymmetry cannot rise above the level of
symmetry.
There is another problem with respect to dominance. As discussed above, MI un-
der asymmetry supports dominance as utility maximizing. Hence, while non-dominance
and therefore ex-post education can be optimal under symmetry, neglect of ex-post ed-
ucation can be optimal under asymmetry. The former is not necessarily the case, as
can be seen in Fig. II.3.10b. Both EUsym(R0c/sc, E0), given symmetric information, and
EU(R0, E0), given asymmetry and dominance, are optimal. If EUsym(Rdom0 , E0) is opti-
mal, EUsym(Rdom0 , E0) = EU(R0, E0) follows.
Summarized, if sc and, therefore, ex-post education cannot be signaled, partial cover-
age is optimal resulting in remaining risk. Ex-ante moral hazard cannot arise. Ex-post
education can only be beneficial under non-dominance. However, full-coverage and dom-
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inance without ex-post education can be beneficial when not under symmetry. Ex-post
education and MI in the case of asymmetry can be complements or substitutes in which
non-coverage of banal illness, income transfer to severe illness, and the focus of educa-
tional investments on sc are again of importance. The relation between cases of symmetry
and asymmetry concerning investments in education is ambiguous.
3.4.2.3 Interrelation between prevention and ex-post education
As previously discussed, a contract is possible for both kinds of investments for which
A1∗ = q1 and A2∗ = 0 are valid (given the parameter restrictions as before and a sufficient
benefit of sc). Due to A2∗ = 0 in the optimum, the premium R1 for P1 and R0 for E1 are
equalized with R0(A2∗ = 0) = R1(A2∗ = 0) = π01q1.
The principal discussion corresponds with the analysis of the case without MI. The
difference is the implementation of R1 and the corresponding cost coverage. (3.53) and
(3.56) can be used. As already analyzed, R1(A2∗ = 0) increases the incentive for P1. If
R0(A
2∗ = 0) = R1(A
2∗ = 0) is implemented in (3.56), the incentive for E1 is increased or
decreased. As it was also concluded in the case without MI, a superior investment does
not generally exist, for either P1 or E1 if they are mutually exclusive investments.
Under symmetry P1 and E1 were identified as substitutes, but inner solutions are pos-
sible. Under asymmetry, the kind of interrelations according to complementary and sub-
stitutional effects between P1 and E1 are not fundamentally changed by R1 compared to
the case without MI which can be analyzed again by the cross partial derivatives ((3.53)
and (3.56) remain valid, as does the discussion within the appendix). For that reason,
both corner and inner solutions are possible depending on the effectiveness of P1 and
E1. However, the complementarity between MI under asymmetry and prevention may
allow an increase of preventive effort relative to efforts in ex-post education. Otherwise,
whether prevention is increased relative to ex-post education, compared to the case of
MI under symmetry, is not clear, due to the derived ambiguity between the extension of
efforts under symmetry and asymmetry compared to the case without MI.
Let us assume P1 is inefficient. R0 is optimal and P1 does not occur under either
dominance or non-dominance. If R0 with non-dominance is optimal (with A1∗ = q1 and
A2∗ = 0), a corner solution takes place with (without) E1, resulting in EU(R0, P0, E1) >
(<)EU(R0, P0, E0). Otherwise, if Rdom with dominance is optimal before E1 is done,
E1 would also not occur because of its loss of function due to the focus on sc. Then,
it must be examined whether EU(Rdom, P0, E0) < EU(R0, P0, E1). If this condition is
fulfilled, E1 with partial coverage of H2 and non-dominance is optimal. Finally, given the
interrelations between P1 and E1 it must be examined whether P1 can be modified to be
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an efficient investment with EU(Rdom, P0, E0) < EU(R0, P1, E1).
If E1 is assumed to be inefficient, Rdom or R0 with E0 could be optimal. Then, it must
be examined whether a solution EU(Rdom, P0, E0) < EU(R0, P1, E0) or EU(R0, P0, E0) <
EU(R0, P1, E0) can be realized (given the specific contracts discussed under prevention
and asymmetric information). Then, P1 with partial coverage of H2 and non-dominance
is optimal. Finally, given the interrelations between P1 and E1, it must be verified again
that E1 can be an efficient investment with EU(Rdom, P1, E0) < EU(R0, P1, E1).
Finally, as discussed above, P1 can be beneficial under dominance with a minimum
co-payment A2∗∗. Given R1(A2∗∗), dominance occurs and E1 is avoided, resulting in
EU(R1(A
2∗∗), P1, E0). Again, EU(R1(A2∗∗), P1, E0) < EU(R0, P1, E1) must be satisfied.
Summarized, under symmetry both types of investments are substitutes due to a full
elimination of risk. Under asymmetry, compared to a solution without MI, the basic
substitutional and complementary relations between prevention and ex-post education
remain under MI. However, prevention may increase in its relative importance. Dominance
of c results in the problem of a false signaling in terms of prevention and the loss of
effectiveness of ex-post education. Hence, except the specific contract for prevention
with a minimum co-payment under dominance, both kinds of investments (separate or
in combination) can only take place under non-dominance with a corresponding contract
either as corner or inner solutions.
3.4.2.4 Extension: Signaling of self-care and ex-post education
The common practice in the health insurance market justifies the assumption of prevention
signaling. However, it is less reasonable that the insurance is able to assess the quality of
alternative treatments as sc, due to its exclusion from professional health care provision.
A signaling of expenditures for education and an assessment of their factual effectiveness
by the insurance may also be not very likely. A short insight concerning the theoretical
possibility of a signaling sc and ex-post education shall be given despite its limited rele-
vance in practical issues. To be able to design an insurance contract it is necessary to be
informed about the utility values of sc and error-probabilities to derive an assessment of
quality of sc and the effectiveness of ex-post education. However, the insurer is not able
to observe the factual utilization of sc ex-post. Then, the given framework allows some
propositions about investments in a measure P1 or E1.
With respect to partial coverage as optimal for the banal illness, additional information
can be derived for the MI. Imagine the following situation. The individual asks for a
contract with A2 < q2. There are two possible pieces of information for the MI. The first
is an investment in P1 under dominance of c (see Fig. II.3.8). In that case, a positive co-
payment itself does not guarantee sc as an existing alternative. A second signal could be
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A2 < q2 connected to the demand of a contract which also includes sc (eg. as shown in Fig.
II.3.7). The reason is a sufficient benefit of sc. In that moment, due to the possibility
of cost-coverage for expenditures of sc, A2∗ = q2 − µ2 signals sc with µ2 as any small
amount.48 Then, the MI is able to implement sc with A2∗ = q2 − µ2, Asc∗ = αqsc (also
valid for sc(H1)), A1∗ = q1, and A1−∗ = q1−, which guarantees the choice of sc ex-post if
H2 is diagnosed by the individual. However, in such a case, sc has weak dominance in the
sense of u1c = u1sc and u2c < u2sc. Hence, θ1 > θ∗ is impossible, delivering sc as a general
choice ex-post independent from the self-diagnosis.49 For that reason, A1−∗ = q1− − µ1−
is a further necessary condition, which guarantees the choice of c in the case of a self-
diagnosis H1. Then, to realize the choice of c, µ1− must be sufficiently high to realize the
choice of c, if H1 is the self-diagnosis and therefore depends on the factual level of θ1 and
θ∗. Otherwise, the higher the co-payment µ1−, the lower θ2 must be to realize sc if H2 is
the self-diagnosis. If θ2 is fixed, µ2 could be adjusted upwards which may result in a further
increase of µ1−. Altogether, both µ1− and µ2 are interdependent if the decision-making
ex-post takes place under ambiguity and if dominance of sc is avoided. This relation
strongly depends on the fixed parameters θ1 and θ2. Finally note that A2∗ = q2 − µ2 and
A1−∗ = q1− − µ1− guarantee a choice of sc (c) if H2 (H1) is the self-diagnosis. Of course,
both self-diagnoses can be false. In that case, both co-payments also guarantee a wrong
treatment choice. However, if the contract is given as
R0c/sc = π
0
1EA
1(A2∗ = q2 − µ2;A1∗ = q1;Asc∗ = αqsc)+
π02EA
2(Asc∗ = αqsc;A1−∗ = q1− − µ1−) (3.57)
it does not matter according to the expected costs for the insurant and insurer due to
the implementation of π1s . The main problem for the insurance is the observability of sc.
The corresponding co-payments as signals solve this problem. Of course, any solution
with R0c/sc delivers EU(Rsym) > EU(R
0
c/sc) > EU(R0) with Rsym as a contract with full-
insurance under symmetric information and R0 as a contract under asymmetry without
implementation of sc within the contract. Summarized, the problem of ex-post moral
hazard can be solved by the structure of co-payments to guarantee the choice of sc.
The ex-ante expected utility can be written as
(π01π
1
s + π
0
2π
2
s + π
0
H)u(Y
∗ −R0c/sc) + π01(1− π1s)u1sc(Y ∗ −R0c/sc − µ1−)+
48Note that Fig. II.3.7 shows a case in which sc(H2) cannot be insured. Then, µ2 must be sufficiently
high to realize non-dominance. However, we now also allow cost-coverage for sc. Then, the net income
of c(H2) must slightly be below the net income of sc(H2).
49Differing from the case of symmetric information, the insurance is not informed about the degree of
subjective pessimism θ.
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π02(1− π2s)u2c(Y ∗ −R0c/sc − µ2) (3.58)
with Y ∗ as ex-post gross income, equal for each health state and treatment alternative.
The first term represents the expected utility for c(H1) and sc(H2), each fully insured.
How does the problem of signaling sc change prevention investments? Given (3.58),
condition (3.59) must be satisfied. Attention must be paid to the factual contract which
changes to R1c/sc if any co-payment delivers a signal for P1 corresponding to (3.51):
(π01π
1
s + π
0
H)u(Y
∗ −R0c/sc) + π01(1− π1s)u1sc(Y ∗ −R0c/sc − µ1−)+
π02
[
π2su
2
sc(Y
∗ −R0c/sc − µsc) + (1− π2s)u2c(Y ∗ −R0c/sc − µ2)
]
≤
(π01π
1
s + π
P
H)u(Y
∗ −R1c/sc − P1) + π01(1− π1s)u1sc(Y ∗ −R1c/sc − µ1− − P1)+
E(πP2 )
[
π2su
2
sc(Y
∗ −R1c/sc − µsc − P1) + (1− π2s)u2c(Y ∗ −R1c/sc − µ2 − P1)
]
(3.59)
Of course, µ2 itself is insufficient to fulfill (3.59), because it can be any small amount to
signal sc. Hence, µ2 must increase to result in a solution that does not make preven-
tion less attractive. Furthermore, the effectiveness of an increasing µ strongly depends
on the error-probability 1 − π2s . The lower this value, the higher µ2 can be without any
stimulating effect on prevention (due to a lower loss if H2 occurs). For that reason, a
value µsc ≤ αqsc can be implemented for sc(H2). It is necessary that µsc < µ2 still
guarantees sc ex-post if H2 is diagnosed. Then it depends on π2s whether µsc > 0 is
necessary to realize prevention. Compared to a solution without signaling sc, prevention
is more difficult to induce due to a lower degree of remaining risk if sc can also be insured.
As a final remark, investments in ex-post education are discussed without formalization.
E1 cannot be observed, however it can be signaled by co-payments. As a necessary
condition for an investment E1, µ2 > 0 must be fulfilled to signal sc due to the focus
of E1 on the productivity of sc and the competence of self-diagnosis. It makes sense to
distinguish between pSI and pSP . In principle, a co-payment as a signal of pSI should
focus on the expenditures αqsc. It is more credible that E1 is invested if the individual
reduces the coverage for these costs. Otherwise, a co-payment as a signal for pSP should
focus on αqsc + q1− as expenditures for sc(H1) and q2 as expenditures for c(H2). It is
more reasonable that E1 is invested if the individual is willing to pay out-of-pocket for
these costs, if an increase in the competence of self-diagnosis shifts the choice to the most
beneficial treatments depending on the factual health status. If the insurance is informed
about the effectiveness of education according to pSI and pSP , a contract can be offered,
based on R0c/sc, changing to R
E
c/sc, able to induce an incentive to invest in E1.
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Compared to the case without an integration of sc within the contract and signaling of
ex-post education, ex-ante moral hazard is now induced. This is based on REc/sc, which
allows a decrease in risk and may induce a false signal, similar to the case of prevention.
An appropriate co-payment structure can solve this problem. Of course, as long as dom-
inance of c is signaled, REc/sc is not offered due to a loss of effectiveness of E1.
Summarized, if the insurer is able to assess the effectiveness of sc and ex-post education,
but the possibility of observation is excluded, sc can be signaled by a co-payment structure
which guarantees the choice of c and sc. Due to ambiguity, the final structure also depends
on the subjective pessimism of the individual. As a result, ex-post moral hazard can be
avoided. Prevention is still possible, but is more difficult to realize compared to a solution
without signaling sc. The factual use of a co-payment as a signal to invest in prevention
depends on the error-probability with respect to the diagnosis of the banal illness. Ex-
post education can also be signaled by a specific co-payment structure that depends on
the focus of ex-post education. Finally, ex-ante moral hazard is a problem which can be
solved by a sufficient level of appropriate co-payments.
3.5 Conclusion
We brought together prevention (P ) and education (E). P focus on a decrease of illness
risk. E is divided into ex-post self-insurance (pSI) and ex-post self-protection (pSP ), fo-
cusing on the self-care productivity and self-diagnosis competence. We differentiate into a
severe (H1) and banal (H2) illness. A self-diagnosis and a choice between consultation (c)
and self-care (sc) takes place. We divide between decision-making under full rationality
and ambiguity. The analysis focus on the incentives to invest in P and E within the given
framework as well as on the interrelation of these efforts. Finally, the impact of market
insurance (MI) under symmetric and asymmetric information is investigated.
As a contribution to the literature of prevention, ex-ante education is identified as
important measure to induce P by an increase in individual skills corresponding to a
decrease of uncertainty in P ’s success. Additionally, increasing skills decrease the problem
of ex-ante moral hazard in a situation of MI with asymmetric information where P cannot
be observed.
Due to P ’s focus on H2, the same as it is for sc, P can increase or decrease under
ambiguity compared to a solution under full rationality. There is a clear result according
to H1. A low severity and error probability of H1 clearly stimulate prevention. Hence,
different to the literature, a differentiation between illness severities and of P ’s focus
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allows a more differentiated proposition about the incentive to invest P .
The literature only focus on the relation between prevention and an unique kind of
ex-post treatment. However, a differentiation into c and sc produces more insights. Dom-
inance of c stimulates P if sc is not beneficial from an ex-ante point of view. Moreover,
due to ambiguity as information structure, P should not be undertaken or should be de-
creased if non-dominance with a remaining illness risk for H2 is optimal, but preventive
expenditures induce a subjective dominance.
The literature discusses the interrelation between P and the quality of ex-post treat-
ment, but not between P and E according to a portfolio of treatment alternatives. pSI
and pSP are connected to P by a mutual decrease or increase of the opportunity costs.
Corner or interior solutions can be identified as optimal. Therefore, resources can be ben-
eficially allocated between investments focused on the ex-ante risk of illness as well as on
the ex-post productivity of sc and self-diagnosis competence depending on the opportunity
costs generated by sc itself and the specific type of investment.
Due to risk aversion, MI under symmetric information increases the efficiency. Under
ambiguity P can increase or decrease compared to a solution under full rationality. MI
can be a substitute or complement for P , based on P ’s focus on H2, but not on H1.
Moreover, a successful sc, corresponding to a decrease in the price of MI, is negatively
correlated with P .
MI can induce dominance or strengthen non-dominance. Hence, MI can be a comple-
ment for P in the case of dominance. However, if sc is beneficial due to a decrease of
expected expenditures for H2, c and sc should be fully insured. Beside an objective dom-
inance, a case with MI can deliver a solution as beneficial in which P is not undertaken
to remain a situation of non-dominance of c based on subjective pessimism.
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) identify MI as a substitute for self-insurance. We identify
both a complementary and a substituional relationship between MI and E. Thereby, the
relationship is more specific, due to a separation of E into pSI and pSP . Furthermore,
MI can induce dominance if only c is insured, eliminating any effort E. Otherwise, MI
itself can stimulate non-dominance due to an increase of the critical pessimism threshold,
as another source of a complementary relationship with E.
Given MI under symmetry, P and E are strict substitutes (different to a solution
without MI) due to equalization of marginal utilities. However, similar to a situation
without MI, if both investments are discrete measures and sequentially invested, corner
solutions are possible as well as a simultaneous allocation of resources over both measures.
Within the literature, a differentiation between observable and non-observable treat-
ment alternatives is ignored. However, there are some crucial impacts on effort in pre-
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vention. Under asymmetric information - where neither P , E nor sc are observable - and
as in the case without MI, sc and P are connected by substitutional and complementary
relations (not only by substitutional relations as under symmetry). A partial cost cover-
age (specifically for the combination H2 and c) is optimal if sc cannot be insured. Then,
asymmetry produces a conflict. Different to the common discussion between signaling
and prevention, a co-payment cannot be uniquely identified as a signal for prevention.
To realize P > 0 it possibly requires a minimum co-payment. Otherwise, ex-ante moral
hazard arises meaning an avoidance of P . The latter results in dominance of c, which is
not necessarily efficient. Due to ex-ante moral hazard, the MI may not offer any incentive
for P , leading to a complete avoidance of P resulting in an inefficient solution.
Compared to symmetry, the relevance of dominance as a utility maximizing treatment
alternative increases due to exclusion of sc from coverage. Then, the problem of ex-
ante moral hazard rises in relevance and P is inhibited. The former is also valid for the
relevance of subjective dominance. Then, if dominance with P is optimal under symmetry,
a solution under asymmetric information where P cannot be observed must be inferior.
However, only under specific circumstances a contract with a minimum co-payment for
H2, but compulsory full-insurance of H1, is possible resulting in P under dominance.
Under symmetric information, P and MI can be complements or substitutes. Under
asymmetry P and MI are complements. The latter is based on the partial coverage of H2
and a redistribution of income from H2 to H1. Therefore, non-observability of sc is an
important source of complementarity between MI and P . However, this does not mean
that effort in P under symmetry results in P under asymmetry.
If sc and therefore E cannot be observed, ex-ante moral hazard according to E cannot
arise if signaling of E and sc is excluded. An increasing relevance of dominance under
asymmetry may inhibit E. MI under asymmetry and E can be complements or substitutes
in which non-coverage of H2, the income transfer to H1, and the focus of investments on
sc are again of importance. Finally, it is not clear whether the incentive of investments
in E increases in the case of asymmetry compared to that of symmetry.
While P and E are substitutes under symmetry, due to a full elimination of risk, P and
E can be complements or substitutes under asymmetry. However, P may increase in its
relative importance. Dominance of c delivers a loss of effectiveness of E and the problem
of false signaling in terms of P . Hence, except a situation of a specific contract for P with
a minimum co-payment under dominance, both kinds of investments can only take place
under non-dominance, as either a corner or interior solution.
As a final remark, the effectiveness of E and sc could be observable while the factual
investment or utilization are not. A co-payment structure can guarantee the choice of
c and sc. Then, ex-post moral hazard can be avoided. The use of a co-payment as
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signal specifically depends on the expected costs for H2 and therefore on the quality of
self-diagnosis. The co-payment also depends on the individual’s subjective pessimism.
Compared to a solution without signaling sc, P is more difficult to realize. Finally, E can
also be signaled by a specific co-payment structure depending on E’s focus. Then, ex-ante
moral hazard is a problem, but can be resolved by a sufficient level of co-payments.
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What are the political implications of this research? As defined in the previous discus-
sion, patient autonomy consists of two dimensions: the extension of alternatives and the
ability to correctly differentiate and assess illnesses. If self-care means an extension of al-
ternatives and also includes the risk of utility decreasing decision-making, the competence
of self-diagnosis is necessary for a beneficial extension of alternatives. For that reason,
educational measures must always be focused on both dimensions of patient autonomy to
realize a more efficient resource allocation of medical supply.
Connected to the previous point, the degree of an individual’s rationality or ability
to implement knowledge about relevant health risks and competence for self-diagnosis in
the context of ex-post decision-making is crucial for the benefit of education. It is more
common to say that rationality is restricted and may be characterized less as a conditional
decision than as a decision under ambiguity connected to decision-making parameters and
rules. This differentiation of rationality is significantly connected to the incentive to invest
in education. Ambiguity commonly delivers an inefficiently low level of demand for both
consultation and self-care, the level of education, and individual welfare. Moreover, if an
individual over- or under-consumption of consultation is observed, the model indicates the
degree of individual pessimism as a fundamental reason for such an observation. Finally, it
is an empirical or even experimental question to determine which type of decision-making
is most realistic, specifically when focusing on observable demand behavior and measures
which should increase objective decision-making competence.
The environment of treatment choice is crucial for measures in health policy that are
focused on improving self-dependent behavior. If the environment is not known by the
policymaker, there is a danger of stimulating inefficient medical demand through educa-
tional measures or of wasting resources through non-effective education. Attention must
be paid not only to the degree of pessimism but also to the available mix of self-insurance
and self-protection. The different impacts of these measures are more crucial or critical
with respect to welfare decreasing effects under conditions of ambiguity than for conditions
of uncertainty.
An important remark must be made related to the former. As assumed in the theoretical
discussion heretofore, the individual is forced to generate a self-diagnosis by assessing the
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symptoms of a specific illness. Usually, further sources are used for gathering additional
information that is more or less helpful in producing a correct positive or negative self-
diagnosis. A prime example of such a source is the Internet. The literature reports
ambiguous results concerning the complementary and substitutional impact of using the
Internet on the demand for consultation (Suiziedelyte 2010, Lee 2008, Wagner et al.
2001). The question arises whether further information is generally beneficial. Given
the framework of distinguishable ex-post treatment alternatives, a decrease or increase in
consultation related to the use of further information can be beneficial depending on the
actual illness. A general decrease or increase in the demand for consultation, however, is
not beneficial. Further information is only beneficial if it can be correctly assessed. Hence,
the relevant individual skills must be sufficiently developed. Otherwise, the self-diagnosis
competence and ability to beneficially implement supporting information are too weak
and the corresponding treatment choices are usually non-optimal.
The focus of the discussion was on microeconomic decision-making. A number of indi-
vidual characteristics, such as medical disposition, individual productivity in education,
subjective pessimism, and the degree of risk-aversion influence the individual decision-
making. Beside these characteristics the health care system itself delivers important
determinants as the relative costs between treatment alternatives. These are strongly
related to the characteristics of a specific health care system. For example, partial in-
surance coverage of consultation makes self-care and therefore education less attractive.
Differences in fixed costs, eg. waiting time, may stimulate self-care demand. The former
examples can result in an inefficient demand.
Finally, ex-post education was distinguished into ex-post self-insurance and ex-post
self-protection. Both are focused on strengthening different individual competences and
therefore different individualized parameters within the ex-post decision problem. More-
over, both are connected by substitutional and complementary relations depending on
their specific productivity. Knowledge in general is an important element of human capi-
tal. However, as an political implication, to guarantee a real benefit of education in health
care, it is crucial to focus on more differentiated and individualized educational measures.
The individual characteristics and the varying effectiveness of educational measures are
important reasons for an individualization of knowledge formation in health care.
Altogether, if education and health production are generally positively linked, theoret-
ically as well as empirically, a specification of education according to the target variables
and a specification of the structure of ex-post decision-making delivers a specific contri-
bution to understanding how education can be effective in detail, particularly in order to
increase patient autonomy as defined in the context of this analysis.
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Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of mixing preventive mea-
sures and measures to increase patient autonomy. Whether either a mix of both invest-
ments or isolated investment should be supported depends on the relative effectiveness
of the two types of measures. Educational measures could work to increase the effective-
ness of prevention. Furthermore, differentiating ex-post medical treatment alternatives
significantly influences the effectiveness of the measures. In addition to the relative effec-
tiveness, the allocation of resources also depends on the insurance framework. As shown,
market insurance typically decreases preventive and educational efforts, though it some
situations it may promote them. Moreover, market insurance also influences the benefit
of an extension of treatment alternatives. It can be optimal to implement measures that
can induce dominance and hinder self-care, and vice versa. Such a measure can be (social)
full-insurance of consultation or also of self-care, resulting in the neglect of ex-post educa-
tion paired with stimulation of preventive measures (this functions only under symmetric
information).
Given the plausible scenario of the non-observability of self-care and private invest-
ments in prevention and education, variable insurance contracts should be offered to
induce each kind of investment and avoid moral hazard. These contracts strongly depend
on the characteristics of the individual (as health status, a-priori illness risk, productiv-
ity of preventative and educational measures), the ex-post decision framework (degree
of rationality as well as treatment alternatives) and the possibility to observe individual
activities (as prevention, education, self-care). Otherwise, if alternative treatment solu-
tions are beneficial, measures which are able to realize these alternatives and make them
observable or at least signalable can support a more differentiated form of medical care
and may induce ex-post education. A more efficient utilization of resources may result. A
complex framework of the individual decision-making and allocation of resources emerges
from different investments into different stages of health production, connected to differ-
ent illnesses and different treatment alternatives. The individual characteristics as well as
the insurance framework are essential to explaining this and also to influencing individual
decision-making.
Finally, the ethical literature speaks about responsibility in the context of luck egal-
itarianism, meaning that people who are responsible for a choice that resulted in their
suffering misfortune are also fully responsible to cope with the damage (Arneson 2000,
Rakowski 1991). Adopting this concept to patient autonomy and also keeping in mind the
worst potential outcome in the case of self-care (due to limited competence in making a
correct diagnosis), the general willingness to increase patient autonomy could be limited.
This is especially true if the focus is more on the expansion of alternative treatment and
less on the skills of self-diagnosis and if self-care is only partially insured. This standpoint
177
4 Discussion and Outlook
may strengthen the role of paternalism from an ethical point of view, contrary to the
opinion that encourages the strengthening of patient autonomy.
Some limitations and a need for further research remain. The literature follows dif-
ferent threads, each focusing on certain non-market goods, especially the production of
individual health stock. Let us recall condition (1.1) as static health production func-
tion. Several differentiations are possible. First, the individual utility usually depends
on a number of different non-market goods with u(G1, G2, ..., Gn) where G represents
non-market goods such as health, fertility, quality of the own children, etc. (Grossman
2005). Gi = eγEF (K1, K2, ..., Kn) represents the production function for each G, using
inputs K and education E. Hence, while the discussion above is focused on Gi = H and
the allocation of the corresponding investments in education and prevention, a typical
extension of the analysis is reasonable in order to allocate resources over different types
of non-market goods and their inputs, as well as to differentiate E as general education
from Ei as specific education focused on the productivity of each non-market good Gi.
The latter point characteristically induces a change in relative prices between non-market
goods in correspondence with a reallocation of demand.
Second, the differentiation of inputs within H itself is of importance. A number of
resources that deliver positive or negative marginal products, such as smoking, obesity,
sports, diets, etc., are relevant factors which are simultaneously primary inputs to indi-
vidual utility (Glied and Lleras-Muney 2008, Grossman 2005, Kenkel 2000, Kenkel 1991).
Third, the utility inputs may be differentiated as Gi = F (M0eγte−zt) with M0 as the
initial level of medical technology (Glied and Lleras-Muney 2008, Grossman 2005). The
productivity of medical care increases over time with the growth rate γ; however, it is
decreased by z as a lag in competence to implement technology appropriately. z de-
creases the individual’s knowledge. Then, the more productive education is, the higher
γ. This relationship suggests an increase in the effectiveness of education with regard to
specific illnesses for which significant recent progress in relevant treatment technologies
has occurred.
Of course, the former points considerably extend the individual decision problem treated
here. Investments in specific education or different preventive measures to increase health
capital may be connected with a high level of opportunity costs. However, these invest-
ments in education can also be a source of opportunity costs for alternative market or
non-market goods.
Another shortcoming of this approach is the assumption of a totally isolated individ-
ual in the case of self-care. Realistically, the influence of the health care system and
its professionals should be recognized. Concepts of shared decision-making within the
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patient-physician-relationship along the lines of an ideal of partnership generally provide
more realistic scenarios (O’Connor et al. 2004). Different therapeutic options with spe-
cific information about opportunities and risks are offered. As has been analyzed, for
example by Sommerhalder et al. (2009), in most cases, it is indispensable that additional
health-related information collected on the Internet be interpreted by the physician and
not only by the individual. These relations can be expected to be quite helpful in increas-
ing the efficiency of decisions as the results may be more in accord with the individual’s
preferences than decisions made by the physician alone would be (Wennberg et al. 2007).
Hence, even the physician plays an active role in promoting individual competence that
generates more effective, autonomous behavior. Related to this question, uncertainty and
information known to medical professionals pertaining to appropriate treatment as dis-
cussed by Phelps (1992) is another interesting phenomenon. Additionally, certainty about
the quality of treatment has been assumed here for the ex-post case. However, this ele-
ment is often treated as uncertain. Furthermore, time and the discounting of prospective
utility also play a role in individual decision processes regarding healthcare (see, inter
alia, Reach (2009)).
Moreover, the general question should be answered as to what extent an individual’s
disengagement from other actors in the health care system in the sense of real autonomy, as
characterized by more responsibility and productivity, can be a realistic or even a desirable
target. From an ethical perspective, self-responsibility should likely be encouraged, yet the
particular characteristics of medical care can have a seriously inhibiting effect. The present
work provides some insights to discuss this issue. We need an extension of the discussion
about the ambivalence between a desirable autonomy as kind of self-understanding and
economically viable forms of autonomy.
The problem of liability in the case of medical malpractice is also of interest for self-care
as well as for consultation. Liability can inhibit self-care if it is asymmetric.
Another important point is the real capacity to assess objective and subjective prob-
abilities as a layman. This question concerns both prevention and treatment decisions.
Lifestyle and illness risks differ widely in their potential for adequate assessment. This
is also essential to the assessment of adequate education measures.1 A large body of lit-
erature exists concerning the psychology of health behavior, subjective beliefs in health,
and cognitive capabilities. Rational choice is a critical aspect. Due to its relative distance
from prevailing economic methodologies and weak integration with the economic sciences,
a remark is made here to draw attention to this research. However, the question arises
1There is a large body of research dealing with this subject. Mostly, biases in risk perception can
be identified where there is ambiguity regarding the success of reducing them through educational
measures. See, amongst others, Adriaanse et al. (2008), Kahn and Tsai (2004), Watson et al. (1999),
Weinstein and Klein (1995).
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as to which levels of knowledge are achievable, whether or not the costs for these are
justifiable, and if knowledge alone is sufficient to result in rational behavior in healthcare.
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The following notation is valid within the appendix: For the discussion within chapter 2,
π0H = 0, π
0
2 = (1− π), πis = πi are valid. Within chapter 3, N and M are set to zero.
5.1 Information value
EU(π) can also be written as:
EU(π) = max{EUc;EUsc} =
2∑
i=1
p(Ii)max
{
2∑
i=1
psiu
i
c;
2∑
i=1
psiu
i
sc
}
This condition is equivalent to (2.19). However, if information is implemented the optimal
strategy can differ in comparison to the case without information. If c or sc is optimal
without information, IV as the information value can be written as (see Laux 2007, ch.
11):
IV =
2∑
s=1
p(Is)
[
max
{
2∑
s=1
psiuc(Hs);
2∑
s=1
psiusc(Hs)
}
−
2∑
s=1
psiuk̃(Hs)
]
with k̃ = c̃ and s̃c as the optimal choice without information. The value within the
brackets for both I1 and I2 is zero and therefore also IV in its minimum if the chosen
strategy does not differ between the different levels of information. Further information
does not influence patient’s choice. If the information about quality of self-diagnosis
is implemented, a different strategy is chosen if the expected utility exceeds the value
generated without information and the value within the brackets becomes positive.
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5.2 Second-order conditions for education
The second-order conditions for a maximum as a sufficient condition where EUEE < 0
can be derived as follows (assuming c is non-dominant with α < 1).
EUEE = π
[
π1u
1
cEE + (1− π1)u1scEE + 2π1E(u1cE − u1scE) + π1EE(u1c(E)− u1sc(E))
]
+(1− π)
[
(1− π2)u2cEE + π2u2scEE + 2π2E(u2scE − u2cE) + π2EE(u2sc(E)− u2c(E))
]
The FOC (2.47) is implemented into the SOC. Let us take (2.47) and set u1c(E)−u1sc(E) =
z with
z =
1
ππ1E
πEU1E︸ ︷︷ ︸
z1
+(1− π)EU2E︸ ︷︷ ︸
z2
−(1− π)π2E(u2sc(E)− u2c(E))︸ ︷︷ ︸
z3

Now, z, (2.48) and (2.49) can be implemented in EUEE with
EUEE = π
π1u1cEE︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.
+(1− π1)u1scEE︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.
+2π1E(u
1
cE − u1scE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3.
+π1EEz︸ ︷︷ ︸
4.

+(1− π)
(1− π2)u2cEE︸ ︷︷ ︸
5.
+π2u
2
scEE︸ ︷︷ ︸
6.
+2π2E(u
2
scE − u2cE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
7.
+π2EE(u
2
sc(E)− u2c(E))︸ ︷︷ ︸
8.

where
uicE < 0 ; u
i
cEE < 0
uiscE = −ui′sc · (αEqsc +NE + 1)
uiscEE =
−︷︸︸︷
ui′′sc ·(αEqsc +NE + 1)2 −
+︷︸︸︷
ui′sc
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(αEEq
sc +NEE) < 0
Then, EUEE < 0 is more likely to be the case if there are decreasing returns to education
with respect to marginal utility (uikEE < 0).1 Otherwise, uikE and πiE are ambiguous in
their impact, provided uiscE is positive. Given ukEE < 0, z and terms 3, 7, and 8 must be
analyzed according to their algebraic sign. z1 and term 3 can be written as A:
A = 2π1E( u
1
cE︸︷︷︸
A1
−u1scE︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
)− ππ1EE
π1E
(π1u
1
cE︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
+(1− π1)u1scE︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
)
1Note that uiscEE must be negative with αEE > 0 and NEE > 0.
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First, 2π1EA1 and −π1EEπ1E A3 combined are negative. Hence, |u
1
cE| supports EUEE < 0.
Second, 2π1EA2 and −π1Eπ1EA4 deliver
2π1E
(1−π1) > |π1EE| as necessary so that u
1
scE can support
EUEE < 0. The combination of z2 and term 7 delivers B:
B = 2π2E(1− π)(u2scE︸︷︷︸
B1
−u2cE︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
)− π1EE
π1E
(1− π)(π2u2scE︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3
+ (1− π2)u2cE︸ ︷︷ ︸
B4
)
Then, 2π2E(1 − π)B1 and π1EEπ1E (1 − π)B3 deliver
2π2E
π2
< π1EE
π1E
as necessary so that u2scE
supports EUEE < 0. This, however, cannot be fulfilled. For that reason u2scE should
be small to realize a maximum. Bringing together 2π2E(1 − π)B2 and π1EEπ1E (1 − π)B4,
2π2E
1−π2 <
π1EE
π1E
is necessary so that u2cE supports EUEE < 0, which can also not be fulfilled.
Hence, u2cE should be small. Finally, z3 and term 8 deliver C:
C = π2E(1− π)(u2sc(E)− u2c(E))−
π1EE
π1E
(1− π)π2E(u2sc(E)− u2c(E))
C is negative if |π2EE
π2E
| > |π1EE
π1E
|. Hence, the potential loss for H2 supports EUEE < 0 if
the degree of diminishing returns π2EE is high.
The interpretation is as follows: First, |u2cE| and u2scE should be low to achieve a maxi-
mum. Term seven reveals how an increase in the competence for self-diagnosis (π2E > 0)
decreases the relevance of a decreasing net income for c(H2), while increasing the weight
of the positive income effect for sc(H2). This implies a positive income effect and a de-
crease in the potential utility loss through a false self-diagnosis. Then, high values |u2cE|
and u2scE increase the value of maximum expected utility and therefore E∗.
Second, a high value of |u1cE| supports the satisfaction of EUEE < 0, opposite to the
previous effect. This means a the decision shifts in favor of c(H1), connected to a negative
income effect (term three).
Third, u2scE is ambiguous. It should be high as long as
2π1E
(1−π1) > |π1EE| is fulfilled. As
can be recognized in term three, a shift of the decision from a positive to a negative
income effect is supported by a strong effectiveness π1E. Hence, u1scE should be high. It
should be low, however, if there is a strong decrease in marginal returns with respect to
the self-diagnosis competence (πiEE < 0), due a dilution of the former effect.
Fourth, with respect to the potential loss of utility, a loss supports EUEE < 0, if
|π2EE
π2E
| > |π1EE
π1E
|. Hence, a strong decrease in marginal returns with respect to π2 reduces
the effectiveness in terms of a decrease in the potential loss through education. Again, π1E
should be high. Term four represents a high degree of diminishing returns with respect to
π1, which lends support to EUEE < 0 being satisfied. However, |π2EEπ2E | > |
π1E
π1E
| postulates
the opposite. The reason is the substitution of term four in the FOC (substituting term
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eight delivers similar results). A high value |π2EE| for H2 should compensate for a positive
risk, decreasing the effect of H1 in supporting EUEE < 0.
Basically, in order to realize a maximum expected utility, a shift from a positive to a
negative income effect with a corresponding self-diagnosis competence and a diminishing
effect of risk reduction are of central relevance. That is, if constant returns with uikEE = 0
are assumed, these effects can be necessary and sufficient for achieving such a maximum.
By contrast, if uikEE < 0, then πiEE < 0 is not necessary for EUEE < 0.
In the case of pure SP , with αE = 0, uiscE is negative. Term three takes a positive
value when |u1cE| < |u1scE|. Then, an increase of π1 shifts the choice to c, attenuating the
negative income effect. Term seven does not change its sign when |u2scE| < |u2cE|, but
decreases as compared to the case of SI, due to the decreasing, but non-zero advantage
of shifting the choice to sc.
In the case of pure SI with π2E = 0, EUEE0 is reduced to the sum of the terms one,
two, five and six. Then, uikEE < 0 is necessary and sufficient for EUEE < 0. This is clear
in light of the simple opposing effect of an increase in utility for sc and a decrease for c.
5.3 Comparative statics for education
The theorem of implicit function is used with ∂E∗
∂x
= − EUEx
EUEE
and x as the changed variable.
EUEx is the cross-partial derivative. For a maximum E∗ > 0 the second order condition
EUEE must be negative. However, within the first order condition a multiplication by
−1 was made to allow a more definite interpretation. Hence, EUEE must be positive for
a maximum (please keep in mind the different notations for chapters 2 and 3) (similar to
5.2, but with uH as additional health status).
EUEE = π
0
1EU
1
EE + π
0
2EU
2
EE − π0HuHEE
−π01[
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1sE(u
1
cE − u1scE) +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1sE(u
1
c − u1sc)]− π02[
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sE(u
2
scE − u2cE) +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sE(u
2
sc − u2c)]
where
EU1EE = −(
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1sEu
1
cE + π
1
su
1
cEE −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1sEu
1
scE +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π1s)u1scEE)
EU2EE = −(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sEu
2
scE +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2su
2
scEE −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sEu
2
cE +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π2s)u2cEE)
The corresponding partial derivatives can be derived as in Tab. II.5.1 and II.5.2.2 The
following is assumed to be valid: |αE| is sufficiently high where m = αEqsc +NE + 1 < 0.
2Please note, for the derivatives with subject to u1sc, an increase of H1 with any value z exactly increases
the health stock of a severe illness with this value z. The reason is a fixed depreciation value ∆H.
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Hence, for the analysis non-dominance is assumed where N as sufficiently low.
∂E∗
∂H1
= −EUEH1EUEE π
0
1 [(1− π1s)u1scEH1 + π
1
su
1
cEH1
+ π1sE(u
1
cH1
− u1scH1)] · EU
−1
EE
∂E∗
∂H2
= −EUEH2EUEE
π02 [π
2
su
2
scEH2
+(1−π2s)u
2
cEH2
+π2sE(u
2
scH2
−u2cH2 )]+π
0
1 [(1−π
1
s)u
1
scEH2
−π1sEu
1
scH2
]
EUEE
∂E∗
∂π02
= −
EU
Eπ02
EUEE
[(1− π2s)u2cE + π2su2scE − uHE + π2sE(u2sc − u2c)] · EU
−1
EE
Table II.5.1: Comparative statics for ex-post education
E uiscE = −ui′scm > 0 ; uicE = −ui′c < 0
Hi u
i
cEHi
= ui′′c q
i
Hi
> 0
uicHi = −u
i′
c q
i
Hi
> 0 ; u1scH1 = −u
1′
scq
1−
(H1)
> 0 ; uiscH2 = −u
i′
scαq
sc
H2
> 0
u1scEH1 = u
1′′
scmq
1−
(H1)
< 0 ; uiscEH2 = q
sc
H2
(ui′′scαm− ui′scαE) < 0
Table II.5.2: Partial derivatives of utility subject to education
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5.4 Risk-aversion and education
Due to the complexity of the comparative statics analysis, an explicit case is elaborated
with respect to the impact of risk-aversion (RA). A utility function u(y) = ya with
0 < a < 1 is assumed, which fulfills the assumption of a constant (decreasing) relative
(absolute) RA. The Arrow-Pratt measure for the absolute RA is ARA = (a− 1)y−1 and
for the relative RA is RRA = a− 1. If uy > 0 and uyy < 0 any monotone transformation
with z(u(y)) with zy > 0 and zyy < 0 decreases the degree of absolute (and relative) RA
with − zyy
zy
> −uyy
uy
(Eeckhoudt and Gollier 1995, ch. 4). For that reason, an increase in a
decreases the degree of RA at each net income point. Again, using the theorem of implicit
function, the impact of RA on education can be calculated as follows:
∂E∗
∂a
= [−[π01(π1sy1c1a +m(1− π1s)y1sc1a) + π02(mπ2sy2sc1a + (1− π2s)y2c1a)] + π0HyHH1a+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π01π
1
sE(y
1a
c ln y
1
c − y1asc ln y1sc) + π02π2sE(y2asc ln y2sc − y2ac ln y2sc)] · EU−1EE
Please note that if y2sc > y2c and y1sc < y1c , due to (ln y)′ > (ya)′ for 0 < a < 1, y2asc ln y2sc −
y2ac ln y
2
c > 0 ∀y > 0 as well as y1ac ln y1c−y1asc ln y1sc > 0 ∀y > 0. For ∂
2E∗
∂x∂a
> 0, the conditions
in Tab. II.5.3 must be positive (using the quotient rule) with yik1a =
∂ayiµk
∂a
= yiµk (1+a ln y
i
k)
as the derivative of uy subject to a and µ = a− 1 and with yik2a =
∂a(a−1)yiωk
∂a
= yiωk (a(2 +
µ ln yik) − 1) as the derivative of uyy subject to a and ω = a − 2. Due to ln y < 0 for
y < 1 the total effect depends on the level of net income as well as the level of a itself.
Furthermore,
EUEEa =
∂EU∗EE
∂a
= π01(π
1
sE(my
1
sc1a − y1c1a) + π1sy1c2a + (1− π1s)u1scEEa)+
π02(π
2
sE(y
2
c1a −my2sc1a) + π2su2scEEa + (1− π1s)y2c2a) + π0HyHH2a+
π01[π
1
sE(my
1
sc1a − y1c1a) + π1sEE(y1ac ln y1c − y1asc ln y1sc)]+
π02[π
2
sE(y
2
c1a −my2sc1a) + π2sEE(y2asc ln y2sc − y2ac ln y2c )]
with
uiscEEa =
∂3uiscE
∂E∂E∂a
= yisc2a(αEq
sc +NE + 1)
2 − yisc1a
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(αEEq
sc +NEE)
As can be seen, the level of net income as an argument for the different health states
and treatment alternatives is of specific importance to explain the impact of a change in
the degree of RA (see also Fig. II.2.7). Due to the assumption of a constant relative RA,
an increase in net income decreases uyy
uy
, which also happens through an increase in a.3
3That means a decrease of absolute RA with ARAa = y−1 which in turn means that for high net
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∂2E∗
∂H1∂a
π01 [
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π1s)mq1−H1 y
1
sc2a +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1sq
1
H1 y
1
c2a + π
1
sE(
−︷︸︸︷
q1−H1 y
1
sc1a −
−︷︸︸︷
q1H1 y
1
c1a)] · EUEE
−EUEEa · EUEH1
∂2E∗
∂H2∂a
[π02 [π
2
s(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
αmqscH2 y
2
sc2a −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
qscH2αE y
2
sc1a) +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− π2s)q2H2 y
2
c2a +
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sEq
2
H2
+/−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(y2c1a − y2sc1a)]
+π01 [(1− π1s)(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
αmqscH2 y
1
sc2a −
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
qscH2αE y
1
sc1a) +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1sEq
sc
H2 y
2
sc1a]] · EUEE
−EUEEa · EUEH2
∂2E∗
∂π02∂a
[−(1− π2s)y2c1a −
−︷︸︸︷
π2smy
2
sc1a + y
H
H1a +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π2sE(y
2a
sc ln y
2
sc − y2ac ln y2c )] · EUEE
−EUEEa · EUEπ02
Table II.5.3: Comparative statics for ex-post education and risk-aversion
As can be seen within the equations, the impact of a decreasing RA strongly depends
on the levels of y and a. The impact of a must always be opposed between c and sc
which is related to their derivatives. This opposing relationship depends on the positive
impact of education for sc and the negative impact for c. The impact of a is related
to the absolute RA. Given the specified utility function, the lower the net income, the
higher the absolute RA. However, within yik1a and yik2a, the former (first-order derivative)
is positive if either the net income or a are low, or if the net income is high independent
of the level of a. That means, given the specific utility function, specifically for the worst
case sc(H1), a decrease of RA only increases effort in education definitely if y1sc > 1. If
y1sc < 1, a must be sufficiently low to realize a positive impact of a decreasing RA. For
the latter (yik2a as second-order derivative), a high value a generally stimulates a positive
value yik2a. In principle, this is independent from the level of net income. According to
the comparative statics in Tab. II.5.3, the basic effects of an increasing a are related to
the former interpretation (given in more detail in the main text). Fig. II.2.7 specifically
shows the ambiguity with respect to the level of net income and a.
incomes and ARAy > 0 an increasing a naturally decreases in impact.
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5.5 Comparative statics for prevention
The theorem of implicit function is used with ∂P
∗
1
∂x
= − EUPx
EUPP
and x as the changed variable,
EUPx as the cross-partial derivative, and EUPP as the second order condition. Please note
that EUPP > 0 is sufficient for a maximum value P ∗. The reason is the representation of
the first-order condition within the main text with a multiplication by -1 to allow for a
more definite interpretation.
EUPP =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
π01EU
1
PP + π
0
2EU
2
PP
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
+2πP ′2 (EU
2
P − uHP )
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−π0HuHPP
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
+πP ′′2 (u
H − EU2)
with
πP ′2 = |πP ′H | = (1− πE0 )π0′2
EU1PP = −(π1su1cPP + (1− π1s)u1kPP ) ; EU2PP = −(π2su2kPP + (1− π2s)u2cPP )
∂P∗
∂H1
= −EUPH1EUPP
π01[(1−π1s)u1scPH1+π
1
su
1
cPH1 ]
EUPP
∂P∗
∂H2
= −EUPH2EUPP
πP ′2 [π2su2scH2+(1−π
2
s)u
2
cH2 ]+π
0
2[(1−π2s)u2cPH2+π
2
su
2
scPH2 ]+π
0
1(1−π
1
s)u
1
scPH2
EUPP
∂P∗
∂π1s
= −
EUPπ1s
EUPP
π01(u
1
cP−u
1
scP )
EUPP
∂P∗
∂π2s
= −
EUPπ2s
EUPP
π02(u
2
scP−u
2
cP )+π
P ′
2 (u
2
sc−u
2
c)
EUPP
Table II.5.4: Comparative statics for prevention
Tab. II.5.4 presents the partial derivatives. Additionally, c is assumed to be non-
dominant. Then Y ik is fixed. Hence, the marginal return on health for gross income is
zero and qscα = 0. However, an increase in the productivity of sc or a decrease in the
severity of illness is able to decrease sc demand with qscHi < 0. Then, the expressions of
the derivatives shown in Tab. II.5.5 are valid.
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α u2scα = −u2′scqsc < 0 , u1scPα = u1′′sc qsc < 0 , u2scPα = u2′′sc qsc < 0
Hi u
1
scPH1
= u1′′sc q
−
H1
> 0 , u2scPH2 = u
2′′
sc q
sc
H2
> 0 , u1scPH2 = u
1′′
scαq
sc
H2
> 0,
uicHi = −u
i′
c q
i
Hi
> 0 , uicPHi = u
i′′
c q
i
Hi
> 0 , u2scH2 = −u
2′
scq
sc
H2
> 0
Table II.5.5: Partial derivatives of utility subject to prevention
5.6 Comparative statics for prevention and ex-post
education
To maximize EU(P,E) with EU∗sc > 0 and P ∗1 > 0, (3.20)=(3.26)=0 is necessary. The
corresponding cross partial derivatives are (Young’s theorem of EUPE = EUEP is assumed
to be fulfilled):
EUPE = EUEP = π
0
1EU
1
EP + π
0
2EU
2
EP + π
P ′
2 EU
2
E + π
0
Hu
H
EP + π
0′
Hu
H
E
+π01π
1′
s (u
1
cP − u1scP ) + π2′s πP ′2 (u2sc − u2c) + π2′s π02(u2scP − u2cP )
To realize a maximum, EUPP < 0 and EUEE < 0 as well as D = EUPPEUEE −
EUEPEUPE > 0 are sufficient conditions.
The comparative statics deliver the following effects (using the Cramer rule for x =
α,Hi): (
EUPP EUPE
EUEP EUEE
)(
dP1/dx
dE/dx
)
=
(
−EUPx
−EUEx
)
Then, related to an inner solution in the context of self-care, the comparative statics
deliver the following results:(
dP/dx
dE/dx
)
= D−1
(
EUExEUPE − EUPxEUEE
EUEPEUPx − EUPPEUEx
)
P1 [E1] is stimulated by a change in x (x = {Hi, α}) if
EUExEUPE − EUPxEUEE > 0 [EUEPEUPx − EUPPEUEx > 0]
(if an inner solution exists with EUEE < 0, EUPP < 0 and D > 0). EUExEUPE > 0 and
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EUPx > 0 [EUEPEUPx > 0 and EUEx > 0] is sufficient for dP/dx > 0 [dE/dx > 0]. If P1
and E1 are complements and both partial effects with respect to x are also positive (see
(3.22) and (2.50)), P1 [E1] is additionally stimulated by an increase in E1 [P1] based on
x. If P1 and E1 are substitutes, and EUPx > 0 [EUEx > 0], an increase in x decreases
E1 [P1] which in turn further increases P1 [E1]. Contrary to this, EUExEUPE < 0 and
EUPx > 0 [EUEPEUPx < 0 and EUEx < 0] are sufficient for dP/dx < 0 [dE/dx < 0].
However, as long as EUExEUPE > 0 and EUPx < 0 [EUEPEUPx > 0 and EUEx < 0],
the conclusion concerning the impact of an increase in x is ambiguous. The same is valid
if EUExEUPE < 0 and EUPx > 0 [EUEPEUPx < 0 and EUEx > 0].
5.7 Optimal insurance under asymmetric information
Assuming non-observability of any effort in prevention and education as well as non-
dominance of consultation, the optimal insurance can be calculated as:
EU = π01
[
π1su
1
c(R,A
1) + (1− π1s)u1sc(R,A1)
]
+
π02
[
π2su
2
sc(R,A
2) + (1− π2s)u2c(R,A2)
]
+ π0Hu
H(R)
∂EU
∂A1
= π01
[
(1− π01)
[
π1su
1′
c + (1− π1s)u1′sc
]
− π02
[
π2su
2′
sc + (1− π2s)u2′c
]
− π0HuH′
]
= 0
∂EU
∂A2
= −E(πP2 )π01
[
π1su
1′
c + (1− π1s)u1′sc
]
+
π02
[
−π2sE(πP2 )u2′sc + (1− π2s)(1− E(πP2 ))u2′c
]
− π0HE(πP2 )uH′ = 0
Under the assumption that positive insurance coverage is optimal the following contract
arises:
π01(1− π01 + E(πP2 ))[π1su1′c + (1− π1s)u1′sc] =
(π01 − E(πP2 ))
[
π02(π
2
su
2′
sc + (1− π2s)u2′c ) + π0HuH′
]
+ π02(1− π2s)u2′c
If E(πP2 ) = π02, the basic structure of the condition remains. Furthermore, let us set
π01 = π
0
2 for simplification. It follows that
π1su
1′
c + (1− π1s)u1′sc = (1− π2s)u2′c
If π1s = 1 and π2s = 0, full-insurance is optimal with an equalization of marginal utilities.
Otherwise, let us set π1s = π2s = 0.5. Then, partial coverage for H1 and/or H2 can be
optimal to equalize the marginal utilities.
Now, let us set E(πP2 ) = 0 and assume that π01 = π02 = 0.5 and π1s = π2s = 0.5, resulting
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in:
u1′c + u
1′
sc = 3u
2′
c + u
2′
sc
A similar expression can be derived for π1s = 1 and π2s = 0, resulting in dominance with:
u1′c =
1
2E(πP2 )
u2′c
For both cases, given E(πP2 ) = 0, non-coverage for sc(H2), and partial coverage for sc(H1),
a maximum coverage of c(H2) follows, bounded by costs E(πP2 )A2∗ = E(πP2 )q2 = 0
implemented within the premium.4 Hence, both cases represent corner solutions. For
that reason, A2∗ must be implemented in ∂EU
∂A1
. As can be seen (also for dominance),
full-insurance of H1 with A1∗ = q1 is also optimal.
Finally, let us set π2s = 1 and π01 = π02 = 0.5. Then,
0.5 + E(πP2 )
0.5− E(πP2 )
(u1′c + u
1′
sc) = u
2′
sc
u1′c + u
1′
sc must exceed u2′sc independent of cost coverage of q1. u1′sc > u2′sc is always valid.
Full-coverage of H1 follows. c(H2) is no longer of relevance; for this reason A2∗ = 0.
Finally, π2s = 0 is assumed, resulting in:
0.5 + E(πP2 )
1.5− E(πP2 )
(u1′c + u
1′
sc) = u
2′
c
In this example, the maximum of E(πP2 ) is 0.5. Similar to the case where E(πP2 ) = π02,
partial coverage of both health states, or partial coverage of H2 and full coverage of H1,
could be optimal. Partial coverage of H2 makes sense if the weighted expected marginal
utility for H1 equalizes the marginal utility for H2 before full-coverage for H2 is realized.
However, the former cannot be optimal if c can also be dominant. If sc(H2) can never be
realized due to π2s = 0, full coverage of c and dominance of c are typically optimal.
4Again, A2 < q2 is the case to realize R1.
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